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• . . . ~·~~
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a strategy for electricity pricing in the 
South African electricity supply and distribution industry. To achieve this, the thesis 
focuses on three specific areas: Electricity pricing theory; past and present electricity 
pricing in South Africa; and a review of electricity pricing in the United Kingdom, 
France and Zimbabwe. Using this research as a basis, various thoughts are presented 
on a pricing strategy for the South African electricity industry. 
The _essence of the strategy is that optimal pricing will occur in a truly competitive 
industry. The thesis does not seek to prove this hypothesis. Instead a three phase 
development process is proposed whereby electricity pricing in the South African 
industry may be transformed from its currently fragmented and decentralised 
position, to a state in which the force of fair competition will be the prime 
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1.1 Background and rationale . 
~-
1 
Electricity in South Africa has consistently been amongst the cheapest in the world. There 
are perhaps two main reasons for this. Firstly, South Africa's abundant reserves of cheap 
coal have resulted in the development of large coal-fired stations which produce electricity 
very economically. Secondly, as a result of the policies of a previous political dispensation, 
the industry has largely ignored the electrification of millions of potential customers, 
whose limited ability to pay would have placed a financial burden on the electricity 
industry. 
One of the consequences of the low cost of producing electricity is that there has been 
relatively little incentive for. the development of economically efficient tariffs. This 
problem is further exacerbated by an inefficient and fragmented distribution industry in 
which the structure and level of tariffs are generally influenced to a greater degree by 
political rather than economic considerations. 
However, political changes in South Africa are forcing the industry to face up to some of 
the realities that have so far been swept under the carpet. The success of the industry in 
future will depend on a workable solution being found to the problem of serving the needs 
of the industry's existing customers, as well as providing electricity for many millions of 
currently unelectrified homes. The way electricity is priced is at the heart of this issue and 
hence the purpose of this dissertation is to develop ideas on a pricing strategy which will 
ensure the survival and growth of the South African electricity industry in the context of 
the severe constraints which it currently faces, and will continue to face in future. 
1.2 Research on which this thesis is based 
This thesis is based on research conducted principally during 1992 and 1993 during which 
time the author was employed in the Transmission Economics and subsequently the 
Electricity Pricing Departments in Eskom. Most of the research was conducted through a 
desk-bound review of published literature and documentation. However, information and 
support was obtained from a number of people including: Messrs. Andries Calitz, Hendrik 
Barnard, Dirk Els, Jae Neushloss and Callie Fabricius (Eskom); Mr Charles Anderson; 












Francis Habozit (Electricite de France); Mr Mike Walpole (Office of the Electricity 
Regulator, UK); Mr Larron Harper (Global Utilities Institute, Samford University, USA) 
and Mr Mark Pickering, Mr Hilton Trollip and Mr Grove Steyn (Electricity for 
Development Research Centrei·UCT). Finally, results from some of the research conducted 
by the author during 1993, for the Electricity Distribution Industry Database for the 
National Electrification Forum is also used in this paper. 
1.3 Development of the thesis 
The second chapter presents a theoretical framework to the subject of electricity tariffing. 
The chapter begins with a paradigm which explains the role of electricity pricing as the 
mechanism which mediates between the interests of the consumer, the supplier and the 
State. The chapter then moves through a discussion of various electricity pricing criteria to 
a specific discussion on various costing and pricing methodologies. As part of the research · 
for this dissertation, an effort was made to gain a theoretical understanding of economic 
theories of pricing, the purpose of this effort being to explain and interpret aspects of this 
theory in relation to the problem of electricity pricing. The product of this effort constitutes 
the greater portion of the second chapter. The substantive focus on economic theory in this 
chapter is justified in terms of an attempt to develop a holistic treatment of the problem of 
electricity pricing. It is should be noted however, that no claim is made that this work 
represents a complete discussion on the various theories on electricity economics. 
The third chapter presents a history of the development of the electricity supply industry in 
South Africa. The history is divided into two periods: the period from 1882 to 1948 and the 
period from 1948 to 1987. After 1948, the supply industry was nationalised and Escom as a 
single supply authority became the dominant supplier in South Africa. This chapter 
attempts to provide a background for the discussion of electricity pricing in South Africa 
which follows in the next chapter, Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 reviews past and present electricity pricing in South Africa. The significant price 
increases of the early seventies is the point at which the review of past pricing practices 
begins. The chapter then proceeds to discuss electricity pricing at present in both the 
Eskom and non-Eskom distribution industry. 
The fifth chapter focuses on electricity pricing in three very different electricity economies 












and restructuring of the UK electricity industry. The specific pricing mechanisms in 
generation, transmission and distribution are described and discussed. Finally in this 
section, some ideas are explored as to how some positive aspects of the UK industry could 
be applied to the electricity indnstry in South Africa. France on the other hand, provides an 
example of electricity pricing in a fully-developed and vertically integrated electricity 
industry. Here the focus is on describing and analysing the development of electricity 
pricing in the industry, with specific reference to the applicability of French electricity 
pricing to South Africa. The focus in the Zimbabwe study is to analyse the development of 
electricity pricing in the industry in view of the underlying political and economic forces. 
Zimbabwe electricity pricing contains an irony of particular relevance to pricing in South 
Africa. 
The formative work of the previous chapters is then used in the penultimate chapter which 
describes a possible vision for electricity pricing in South Africa. The chapter begins with a 
review of the key issues discussed in each of the earlier chapters. Then the chapter 
describes a vision for electricity pricing in South Africa. The final section of the chapter 
proposes a three phase tariff development process which - it is intended - will realise the 
described vision. 














A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRICITY 
PRICING 
This chapter attempts· to sketch a broad theoretical electricity pricing framework. The 
framework is developed firstly by focusing on electricity pricing in general and then 
progressing towards a specific focus on various aspects of pricing. In the first section a 
paradigm is developed to explain the role of electricity pricing in the triangular relationship 
between the State, the electricity supplier and the customer. From there the discussion 
focuses on various energy and electricity pricing criteria which constitute the different 
pricing policies adopted or recommended by various ·international electricity utilities and 
related institutions. The next section reviews various electricity pricing philosophies. This 
is followed by an historical review of the development of electricity costing, followed by a 
review of various cost of supply determinants. Having covered a general discussion of 
pricing, the next section discusses the embedded costing and marginal costing. This is 
followed by an analysis of various pricing applications based on marginal costs. The last 
four sections are then dedicated to four other pricing approaches namely Ramsey pricing, 
priority service pricing, competitive pricing and non-tariff pricing. The chapter concludes 
with a summary of the work covered. 
2.2 An electricity tariff paradigm 
An electricity tariff can simply be seen as a set of prices which a utility charges for the 
provision of electrical energy. However, through the structure of those prices a utility is 
able to induce its customers to change the nature of their consumption in terms of, for 
example, time of use. An electricity tariff is also a mechanism through which the State is 
able to effect national policy through, for example, redistributing wealth between different 
types of customers by inducing the utility to cross subsidise between customer classes. An 
electricity tariff can thus be seen as an entity which represents the interests of the state, the 






















Utilisation of national resources 





The State is represented as demanding the utilisation of national resources in the "national 
interest" whatever this can be taken to mean. In "command" economies the State will 
obviously play a larger role in enforcing "national interest" in the determination of the 
structure and rate of electricity tariffs than would be the case in market economies. 
The supplier has a responsibility to its: 
Shareholders: Every utility has shareholders. In the case of nationalised utilities the sole 
shareholder is usually the government. In the case of privatised utilities, the 
shareholders are private investors. In some utilities such as National Power 
and PowerGen in England, the shareholders are private as well as 
government. In private utilities the responsibility the utility owes to its 
shareholders is usually to provide them with a satisfactory financial return 












the government and the utility is thus dictated to by the government. In the 
case of para-statal utilities such as Eskom or EdF, it is debatable who the 
utility's shareholders are. The one school of thought is that the customers are 
the shareholder&·since they are the reason for the utility's existence. Another 
school of thought is that the government as well as other stakeholders such 
as trade unions and customers are joint shareholders. A third school of 
though is that the State (as opposed to the government) is the sole 
shareholder. 
Customers: The supplier also has a responsibility to its customers. Customer needs can 
be summarised as follows: The first need is that they be provided with an 
acceptable standard of service; the second need is that there should be 
choice of supply options so that the customer is able to exercise his or her 
choice to his or her perceived benefit; the third need is that the price paid for 
a specific product is fair. 
Employees: Since a supplier would not exist without its employees, the supplier has an 
obvious responsibility to ensure that its employees are adequately provided 
for. 
The demands of the customer, the responsibilities of the supplier and the interests of the 
State will determine the broad corporate philosophy. The corporate philosophy will 
influence the tariff philosophy which will, in tum, affect the three disciplines which 
combine to create the tariff. On Financial issues the tariff philosophy will influence the 
approach to costing, cross-subsidisation, and profitability. On the Marketing front, the 
tariff philosophy will, amo g other issues, influence the extent to which tariffs will be 
designed to suit specific markets or specific customers. On Engineering issues, the tariff 
philosophy will influence the choice of solutions to the supplier's generation, transmission 
and distribution constraints and the customer-metering constraints. 
The paradigm is most eloquently summed up in a United Nations report on electricity 
pricing, as follows: 
"A well formulated rate structure can discourage waste and foster the efficient use of 












benefit not only the enterprise itself but the customers and the national community as a 
whole" (United Nations, 1972:1). 
2.3 Criteria for an electri~ty and energy pricing policy 
The previous section described a paradigm which attempted to explain, in the broadest 
terms, the role of the electricity tariff. This section now attempts to focus more closely on 
the specific criteria for an electricity pricing policy, and from there to place electricity 
pricing policy in the wider context of energy pricing policy. 
Jeremy Warford in "The Objectives of electricity tariff policy" in Munasinghe and Rungta 
(eds.) (1984:63), believes an electricity pricing policy can be qualified in terms of five 
criteria: 
1. Generation of revenue 
2. Equity or fairness 
3. Administrative feasibility 
4. Social or political acceptability 
5. Impact on consumer behaviour 
The five criteria are frequently mutually inconsistent and open to subjective interpretation. 
For example, newly electrified consumers in a previously disadvantaged township might 
argue that, on account of past injustices in not having had a right to electricity supply, it is 
fair and equitable that they should receive a favourable tariff compared to that offered to 
existing customers. Similarly, existing customers might argue that it is fair and equitable 
that existing customers should receive favourable tariffs compared to those offered to new 
customers, since new customers have yet to contribute to the infrastructure necessary to 
provide their service. 
Exactly which objectives of electricity pricing are paramount depends, among other factors, 
on the politico-economic environment of the specific electricity industry. For example, the 
Electric Power Research Institute EPRI (1977) in the USA describes the goals of electricity 
pricing, in the USA, as follows (in priority order): 
1. Rates must be just and reasonable and they must effect an overall balance between 












2. Equity: Rates must not be unduly discriminatory, the general constraint being 
that differentials between classes of service and rates within classes must be based 
on some notion of cost.t>f service. 
3. Continuity: Customers have the right to be protected against unnecessarily abrupt 
changes in the structure of rates. 
4. Simplicity and clarity: These are considered essential, not only from the 
standpoint of the customer's ability to understand rates, but also from the standpoint 
of administration. 
It is interesting to contrast these criteria for a developed country against those which 
Munasinghe in (Munasinghe and Rungta (eds.), 1984:199) recommends for electricity 
pricing in the context of a developing country: 
11 1. Economic efficiency 
2. Social subsidy - Basic Needs 
3. Financial viability 
4. Comprehension, Metering, Billing 
5. Price stability, Gradualism 
6. Other Socio-political Objectives 11 
In the study described earlier the United Nations (1972:126) somewhat abstractly defines 
three desirable qualities of electricity tariffs as follows. Electricity tariffs should be: 
11 1. Equitable 
2. Practicable 
3. Politic 11 
Equitable is defined as conforming as far as possible to the public view of equity. The 
point is made that it is unwise to differentiate between one class of consumer and another. 
This should be noted for its conflict with current tariff thinking - particularly in electricity 
industries in developed countries - that a primary goal of electricity pricing is cost 
reflectivity,·which demands tariff differentiation between consumer classes. 
Practicable means that the tariff must take into. consideration the prices and availability of 












"it might be justifiable to subsidise the use of electricity for purposes threatened by 
competition, using the profits earned on the sale of electricity for other purposes to provide 
the necessary subsidy" (UnitecLNations, 1972:127 ). 
Politic is taken to mean that the tariff must encourage growth and economy, i.e. that it 
should be framed to include incentives and· deterrents conducive to those ends. 
In the context of electricity pricing in South Africa, significant price increases by Escom 
during the 1970's prompted an investigation of the pricing policies adopted in the industry. 
At the time, a critic of the industry considered that economic viability, _ economic 
efficiency, equity and socio-economic objectives should be the most important pricing 
principles (Herrmann, 1976). 
In 1989, Eskom undertook to ascertain the aims and scope of pricing policy, specifically as 
defined by many of its most significant customers. The result of this survey was the 
conclusion that, in Eskom's opinion, the most important aims of pricing policy are to 
1 ~ Promote total efficiency. 
2. Reflect true costs. 
3. Promote sound business decisions. 
Eskom's current policy is that fairness and equity, though important, should be subordinate 
to economic efficiency (Eskom 1993(b)). 
The analysis of the objectives of pricing policy thus far, has centred on electricity pricing 
policy. It is now possible to consider electricity pricing policy in the wider context of an 
energy pricing policy. In the case of the integrated planning of a country's energy resources, 
Munasinghe has developed five principal objectives of an energy pricing policy: 
(Munasinghe, 1990:33) 
1. The economic growth objective requires that pricing policy should promote the 
economically efficient allocation of resources, both within the energy sector and 
between it and the rest of the economy. This means that energy use would be at the 
optimum level when the price for the marginal unit of energy used reflects the 












2. The social objective recognises every citizen's basic right to be supplied with 
certain minimum energy needs. This may imply subsidised prices - at least for low-
income customers. . . _ . ..t:: 
3. Government should be concerned withfinancial objectives relating to the viability 
and autonomy of the energy sector. This implies that pricing policies should permit 
self-sufficiency or a fair rate of return. 
4. A pricing policy must take cognisance of the need to conserve energy. 
5. A number of additional issues lumped together as the fifth objective are that the 
pricing policy must provide for price stability and simplicity, and it must take 
cognisance of socio-political, legal and environmental constraints. 
The set of objectives. which characterise a particular pricing policy is the starting point on 
the long and winding road from pricing policy to tariff implementation. This analysis has 
sought to illustrate that setting pricing objectives requires careful consideration and 
prioritisation of a number of often mutually exclusive goals. 
2.4 Electricity pricing philosophi~s 
Charles Bonbright in Bonbright, Danielsen and Kamerschen (1988:85-179) distinguishes 
four different schools of thought on an electricity pricing policy. These are described as: 
I. Cost of service 
2. Value of service 
3. Social pricing 
4. Competitive pricing 
Cost of service 
"The price of electricity supplied to customers should be determined solely by what it costs 
to supply them, without consideration to the value of electricity to the customer, the 
customer's ability to pay, any secondary benefits to customers or society, or the price of 
competing energy sources" (Calitz et al, 1992:20). 
From the perspective of the optimal utilisation of resources, in theory at least, the cost of 












cost-based or cost-reflective. While many utilities are justifiably able to claim that their 
tariffs are cost-based, when such claims are made it must be noted that they are made in the 
context of a specific costing methodology: A problem exists in that there is considerable 
debate as to what the correct/costing methodology should be. Some argue that utilities 
should use shadow costs, while others argue for accounting costs and others still, argue for 
economic marginal costs. Each of these costing methodologies are briefly described below. 
Shadow costs 
Shadow costs are what costs ought to be and not what they (physically) are. The shadow 
costs are intended to take into account the effect of distortions in the costing and pricing of 
goods and services in such a way that using shadow costs will allow the optimal utilisation 
of resources in the national interest. Some possible sources of distortions may be the value 
of foreign exchange, the cost of capital, the cost of labour, and "actual" versus "perceived" 
societal and environmental costs. Shadow costs attempt to get closer to the "true" cost of 
providing (or not providing) a service. Unfortunately, the highly subjective nature of the 
elements which constitute shadow costs means that these costs are of more academic than 
practical value and are thus not known to be used in costing in the electricity industry. 
Accounting costs 
As will be discussed later in this chapter in more detail, the accounting valuation of costs 
entails the allocation and apportionment of specific costs to specific units of output. In the 
accounting cost methodology, costs which can be directly allocated to a unit of output are 
so allocated. Costs which cannot be directly allocated to a specific unit of output are shared 
amongst all output. This sharing, or apportionment, can be done in different ways as 
discussed later. 
Economic (marginal) costs 
Marginal costs are so called to define the marginal increase in cost given a marginal 
increase in output. As will be proved later in this chapter, an optimal allocation of 
resources results when electricity is priced at marginal cost. In practice, in many cases 
economic marginal costs are used by utilities to derive tariff structures while accounting 












the true principle of marginal costs, and in theory means that the utility will not achieve the 
stated objective of marginal costing, that is, to achieve the optimal allocation of resources . 
Value of service 
• : ~·-':.-
"The price at which customers are charged is in inverse proportion to their price elasticity 
of demand." 
Since most customers have more than one use for electricity, the price elasticity of demand 
(change in quantity demanded relative to a change in price) is not a constant function. 
Instead, customers will have varying price elasticities of demand, depending on the 
intended use of the electricity as well as factors such as local custom, prejudice, prosperity, 
climate and publicity. Furthermore, if the cost variation in tariffs is reflected in a time of 
use tariff, the price elasticity of demand will also be time variant. 
If prices are to be based on the price elasticity of demand, customers with a high elasticity 
such· as domestic customers - particularly those with access to alternative forms of energy -
will obviously use less electricity in times when the price rises. Large mines and industrial 
customers who have limited freedom to use alternative forms of energy other than 
electricity will be a captive market to the utility which is then able to increase price without 
losing sales. In this way, the utility is able to use the price elasticity of demand of different 
customers to effectively cross subsidise between these customers. 
Cross subsidisation may be justified as being in the interests of an enterprise. If 
concessions are made to customers with a high price elasticity of demand considerably 
more revenue through increased sales can be achieved, than if a similar concession was 
made to a customer with a low elasticity of demand. In addition, cross-subsidisation based 
on elasticity of demand appeals to one's sense of re-distributive justice. It would seem. fair 
that customers who do not reduce consumption even if the price increases, should be 
charged more than customers who do.reduce consumption if the price increases. 
However cross-subsidisation based on elasticity of demand will achieve fair re-distributive 
justice only when it is fairly applied, that is, it is only fair to charge a consumer with a 
higher elasticity of demand, a higher price, when the higher elasticity of demand is due to 












does not infer the reason for that elasticity of demand i.e. it does not distinguish between a 
high elasticity of demand by reason of a customer's extravagance and high elasticity for 
other reasons such as the nature of the customer's operations. For example a hospital and an 
extravagant domestic customer both have a high elasticity of demand. Re-distributive 
justice will only occur when the wasteful domestic customer and not the hospital pays a 
higher price. Therefore, for a utility to ensure redistributive justice, it must ensure that it 
has an accurate record of every customer's price elasticity of demand as well as a record of 
the reason for each customer's elasticity of demand. 
Since it is not· possible for a typical utility with more than a million customers to offer 
customised prices to every customer, the value-of-service philosophy based on price 
elasticity of demand is, unfortunately, more of academic than practical interest. 
Ability to pay 
"Electricity is an essential service rather than a luxury and people of low income should 
not be deprived of it because they cannot afford to pay the full costs of supply" (Calitz et 
al, 1992:21). 
There are some strong justifications for a pncmg policy based on this philosophy. 
However, the only way this philosophy can be implemented, given that the electricity 
supply industry is to be a self-financing industry, is if there is cross-subsidisation between 
various classes of customers. This introduces a practical difficulty in the fact that the 
n01mal classification of customers according to standard industrial classifications, would 
have to be abandoned in favour of a system of classifying customers between those with 
the ability to pay and those without the ability to pay. In practice this is almost impossible 
to do without applying a generalist view that all existing commercial and industrial 
customers are wealthy, say, and that all existing domestic customers are poor and hence all 
domestic customers will receive a low price while all industrial and commercial customers 
will receive a high price. This generalisation will obviously be to the benefit of those 
customers who are on the "right" side of the generalisation but not to those on the "wrong" 
side of the generalisation. Hence applying this pricing philosophy to such customers will be 
defeating the stated objectives. However, the approach will probably be right for about 















Almost every electricity utility interested in selling electricity does to a certain extent 
incorporate competitive pricingjnto its tariffs. This is particularly the case when the price 
of alternative energy sources is competitive with the price of electricity. The extent to 
which a utility will alter the price at which it sells electricity in response to competition is 
obviously dependent on the goals of that utility. 
However, competitive pricing as a tariff philosophy goes beyond the alteration of prices in 
response to alternative energy sources. Rather, competitive pricing stipulates that price will 
be determined by the interaction of supply and demand. An example of the competitive 
pricing philosophy exists in the electricity supply iridustry in Britain. In this industry, 
competition exists between suppliers through the operation of a Power Pool in which 
competing suppliers bid to sell electricity. A particular generator wins the right to generate 
if his bid is more competitive, price-wise, than a bid from a competing generator. 
Competition also exists on the distribution side of the industry in that no single distributor 
is given a monopoly over customers in any specific area. Many distributors may compete, 
on price and service, to supply a single customer. A fuller description of the privatisation of 
the UK electricity supply industry is presented in Chapter 5. 
The proponents of competitive pricing argue that competition will lead to cost-effective 
and efficient operations. Detractors of this philosophy argue that suppliers will not enter 
the market unless a considerable rate of return is possible and that electricity, as a natural 
resource, should not be subject to profiteering. The arguments between the proponents and 
detractors essentially mirror the arguments for or against market economies. 
2.5 Electricity costing: A brief historical review 
Costing for the supply of electricity is complicated by the fact that electricity is a non-
storable product. Since not all costs can be directly allocated to a particular unit of output, 
the way in which costs are shared or accounted for by prices not only affects overall 
efficiency but also creates incentives or disincentives amongst the utility's customers. The 
history of the development of electricity costing is an interesting one not least because 













As a simplification, an electricity supplier can be thought of as supplying its customers 
with two services: 
1. The energy (kWh) whic]J..he or she consumes; 
2. The readiness to supply the energy he or she wants whenever he or she needs it. 
This readiness consists of the generation, transmission and distribution 
infrastructure which has been established in order to supply that consumer. 
The cost to the consumer for the first service is entirely dependent on the amount of energy 
consumed (a variable cost), while the cost to the consumer for the second service is fixed, 
in the short te1m, in that this cost is not dependent on whether that particular consumer 
purchases energy (a fixed cost). 
By definition, the variable cost is directly proportional to the number of kWhs supplied. 
The fixed cost will be largely dependent on the cost of the necessary generation, 
transmission and distribution equipment. These costs are in tum influenced by the kW 
capacity of the equipment (generation and transmission) and hence it is reasonable to 
specify the fixed costs per unit of electrical capacity (kW). 
It is interesting to find that the origins of this costing philosophy can be traced back to 1882 
when John Hopkinson, in a presidential address to the American Institute of Electrical 
Engineers, expressed the view that , 
" ... the expenses of any undertaking could be divided into two classes, expenses which are 
quite independent of the extent to which the undertaking is used, and expenses which are 
absent unless the undertaking is used and which increase in proportion to its use" 
(Hopkinson, 1892:33 in Hausman and Neufeld, 1982). 
Maximum capacity at this time was estimated by the number of installed lights and heaters. 
It was only in 1896 when Arthur Wright successfully used the.ammeter at his Brighton 
utility, that he was able to meter each customer's maximum demand and hence implement 
the "Hopkinson Two-part tariff'. 
However, Wright was later to adapt Hopkinson's principles for the derivation of a tariff 
which had no customer-specific charge per kW. For the Brighton utility that he directed, 












were £13 255 pa. After considering the load pattern of his customers, Wright separated 
costs 'to calculate a kW maximum demand charge and kWh energy charge in the same way 
that Hopkinson had proposed. Wright then took the argument one step further by saying 
that "Theoretically it might. be.,.~. said that the standing charges ought to be divided into 
amounts proportional to the maximum demand of each consumer at the day and at the very 
time the maximum load occurred on the mains each year ... however it is impossible to 
determine in practice and would not necessarily be equitable to the consumers who might 
or might not have used their maximum demands at the exact moment in question." (Wright 
1896:44, in Hausman and Neufeld, 1982) 
In a sense contrary to his argument above, Wright made no attempt to differentiate price for 
those customers whose maximum demand occurred away from the time of the system 
maximum demand. Wright's argument was that the peak and off-peak consumer were 
different people whose consumption patterns were not amenable to change and that it 
would have been unfair to the peak consumer not to charge the off-peak consumer any of 
the standing cost. He was opposed in this view by engineers from Westinghouse and 
General Electric, amongst others, who argued that off-peak electricity was essentially a by-
product and that off-peak customers should at most be charged only a portion of the fixed 
charge (Hausman and Neufeld, 1982). Both General Electric and Westinghouse had by this 
stage developed practical time of use meters which could differentiate between two time 
periods. 
However, Wright argued against the use of these meters saying that the time for which the 
meters were set would never perfectly correlate with the central station load and hence the 
tariffs would not accurately reflect costs. "However much Barstow (Engineer . at 
Westinghouse) may modify his time limits for charging full price, unless he alters his time 
switch every day together with an additional alteration for Sundays, holidays, and 
thunderstorms, he can never hope to collect the full price for exactly when the peak occurs 
... He is therefore. driven to the necessity of extending the period of high charge for much 
longer than is absolutely necessary to cover the fixed cost." (Wright 1898 in Hausman and 
Neufeld, 1982). 
Furthermore, Wright argued that it was the consumer's contribution to the annual peak that 













In the end, Wright's arguments achieved wider acceptance than the more complicated 
arguments of the time of use theorists. With hindsight, perhaps many of Wright's 
objections to time-based tariffs were focused more on principle than on practice. However, 
it is nevertheless interesting to.}>bserve the sophistication of the costing debate at such an 
early time in the industry's history. This is especially remarkable in view of the fact that it 
was more than half a century before time of use tariffs were eventually first used in the 
electricity industry. 
2.6 Cost of supply determinants 
There are a number of factors 'Yhich may affect the cost of supplying different customers. 
These include: 
1. The quantity of energy supplied 
2. The maximum demand of supply 
3.' The load factor of consumption 
4. The diversity between customers 
5. The location of the customer 
6 The customer's voltage of supply 
7 The customer's power factor 
8. Time of use 
9. The quality of the supply 
The first two factors can be thought of as the product which the customer purchases, i.e. 
the customer purchases energy (kWh) and maximum demand (kW), the maximum rate of 
supply. The remaining seven factors specify the nature of the product purchased. If any two 
customers purchase the same quantity of energy and have the same maximum demand but 
are different in respect of any of the other seven factors, then a truly cost-reflective tariff 












Quantity of energy supplied 
The quantity of energy supplied is measured in Watt hours. As discussed in the previous 
section, the costing methodgl,ogy first introduced by Hopkinson separated variable 
(running) and fixed (standing) costs in electricity supply. The variable or 'running' cost 
represents the total of all variable costs which are incurred in generating energy (kWh). In 
practice the proportion of these costs as a proportion of total supply costs varies 
considerably depending on the type of power station used. For example, a large coal-fired 
thermal station has a much smaller component of variable costs in its total costs than a 
small emergency gas-fired station, where the high cost of fuel and maintenance and the 
relatively low capital cost means that running costs are a much larger component of total 
costs. The cost of energy supplied is strictly the variable component of a utility's costs. 
However, in the pricing policy of many utilities, the fixed capacity charges are sometimes 
factored into the energy charge. 
Maximum demand 
Hopkinson was the first to assert that the fixed component of costs is directly proportional 
to the maximum demand of a consumer or class of customers. Maximum demand for tariff 
setting purposes is the integrated demand over a half-hourly or hourly period and not the 
instantaneous peak demand. A simple method of allocating costs to the maximum demand 
was illustrated earlier in Wright's application of the principle to his utility in Brighton. In 
· fact, as will be illustrated in detail later in this chapter, this method of allocating standing 
charges introduces a high degree of cross-subsidisation between various customers. 
Load factor 
Load factor is defined as the ratio of average demand to maximum demand. The load factor 
can be calculated for a number of different time periods. For example, daily, monthly or 
annually. The system load factor is a measure of the degree of utilisation of the components 
comprising that system. A utility will be able to minimise the cost of supply (per unit of 
output supplied) when the cost of operating the system can be amortised over a longer 
duration of supply. In theory, a system with a 100% load factor will allow for the lowest 
costs per unit of output. In practice a 100% load factor would not be optimal. Firstly, in a 
typical power system it is necessary that an enterprise retain a margin of reserve capacity to 












power system contains different types of generating plant. A common way of classifying 
generating capacity is between base-load, mid-merit and peaking power stations. This 
classification indicates the most economic means of operation, that is, base load plant is 
plant which is most economic .... aJ1y operated when it is operated for a long duration (high 
load factor) while peaking station is most economically operated for short durations (low 
load factor). As a result of these two constraints,. for a practical system there will be a 
certain optimal load factor at which the marginal costs (marginal change in cost with a 
marginal change in output) of operating that system are minimised. This is illustrated in the 





LOAD FACTOR C%1 
Figure 2. Load factor versus marginal cost of supply 
This figure illustrates the relationship between marginal cost (measured in c/kWh) and 
load factor for a practical power system consisting of several base load, mid-merit and 
peaking stations. As the figure illustrates, the marginal cost continually decreases until the 
load factor, Y is reached. At this load factor, the most economical operation of the installed 
capacity has been reached. To the right of point Y the cost of supply begins to increase 
since it then becomes necessary to use more of the relatively uneconomical mid-merit and 












It is clear that customers with a high load factor encourage the use of economical base load 
plant. On the other hand those consumers with intermittent demand (low load factor) cause 
the utility to construct relatively uneconomical peaking plant. This implies that cost-
reflective electricity tariffs shOJl,ld differentiate between customers with high load factors 
and those with low load factors. In practice this is not always the case. 
4. Diversity factor 
Diversity factor has been described as, "the most important and elusive of all the factors 
involved in the assessment of electricity costs" (United Nations, 1972:28). Conceptually, 
diversity is quite straight forward: It is the ratio of the sum of the maximum demands of all 
individuals forming a group, to the coincident maximum demand of the group. For a 
customer with multiple points of supply, diversity exists between those points of supply. 
Diversity also exists between customers in a particular customer class and finally diversity 
exists between customer classes. (Here the assumption is made that customers in close 
geographic proximity and who are fed by a common point of supply are grouped together 
to form a customer class). Figure 3 illustrates the various levels at which diversity may 
exist. 
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The first level at which diversity exists is between two or more points of supply of an 
individual customer. As illustrated in Figure 3 above, such a customer's actual maximum 
demand will be the diversified sum of the demand at each separate point of supply. Moving 
up one level, the customer Y'§:•.contribution to the C Customer Class maximum demand 
will be the diversified maximum demand between customer Y and other customers (in 
Figure 3 Xis the only other customer). Similarly the contribution of customer category C 
to the system maximum demand will be the diversified maximum demand of all customers 
classes, A, B, C and D. Cost-refl~ctj.y~_p_riying1eq~ires that if the div~rsi~y_ between the 
customer class demand and the system demand is high, the contribution of that customer 
---- - -- ---· ~ --- -T - - -~ •• -- -··. --
class's de~and to the system demand will be lo~ and hence the allocation of fixed cos~ to_ 
that customer class should be low (this is obviously assuming that fixed costs are allocated 
according to maximum demand). Similarly, if the diversity between the demand of a 
customer and the customer class is high, the allocation of fixed costs to that customer 
should be low. This result may not seem intuitively obvious in the case that a particular 
customer has a high diversity with the demand of the customer class that he or she is in, but 
yet may have a low diversity with the system. However, it must be remembered that 
diversity exists at several progressive levels: firstly between the customer class and the 
system; secondly between the customer class and the individual customers in that class and 
thirdly between a customer's different points of supply in the case that he or she has two or 
more. 
Location 
The cost to a utility of supplying a consumer with electricity will depend to some extent on 
his physical location. There are two connected, but separate, infrastructures which deliver 
electricity to a customer's point of supply. The first is the high voltage transmission 
network. Obviously the more remote a customer is, the longer will be the length of the 
transmission network necessary to serve that customer. The second infrastructure is the 
distribution and reticulation network. This infrastructure begins at a major substation in the 
transmission network and ends with the service connection to the end-user. Once again, 
the more remote a customer is from the source of energy, the greater will be the size of the 












Voltage of supply 
Customers who are supplied at a higher voltage will not cause the utility to incur the 
exp!nse of establishing the jpfrastructure necessary to transform to lower voltages. 
Furthermore, customers who take power at higher voltages are, in most cases, causing the 
utility to incur less electrical losses than customers at lower voltages. Most electricity 
tariffs do carry surcharges for supply at lower voltages. 
Power factor 
Both the fixed and variable cost components of supplying electricity will depend upon the 
power factor at which it is supplied. The power factor is the ratio of kW demand to kV A 
demand. Low power factor electricity is more expensive than high power factor electrcity 
since electrical loads with low power factors require larger currents than similar loads at 
higher power factors. A low power factor load thus "wastes" electricity and also causes 
higher losses (as a result of higher currents) than would high power factot loads. The 
charge for power factor correction equipment is often factored into electricity tariffs by 
offering different charges for kW or kV A maximum demand. 
The actual methodology of sharing power factor related costs amongst customer classes 
and finally amongst customers, is a complicated process and will not be discussed further 
here.1 
Time of use 
Almost since the beginning of the electricity supply industry, debate has existed as to 
whether it is fair to allocate costs to customers based on the extent to which a particular 
customer's demand coincides with the system or aggregate maximum demands. Section 2.5 
very briefly detailed the contribution made by the original pricing pioneers to this debate. 
Today, incorporating time of use into electricity costing is almost universally accepted as a 
logical principle and that in the realm of power system economics such allocations are 'fair' 
and that prices based on such cost allocations are 'cost reflective'.2 However, time of use 
2 
A full description of the process is contained in United Nations 1972, Electricity Costs and Tariffs: 
A General Study, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, p55) 












tariffs may differ greatly in terms of both their derivation and their final form. Some of the 
issues which may affect a time of use tariff include: 
Whether time of use tatj}Js should be based on embedded costs or marginal 
costs ? (This subject is dealt with in section 2.7 of this chapter). 
If the tariff is to be based on marginal costs, should these be short run 
marginal costs or long run marginal costs? (This subject is dealt with in section 
2.7.2 of this chapter). 
How many different rating periods should be used ? 
What proportion of costs should be charged to a time differentiated maximum 
demand charge and what proportion of costs should be charged to a time-
differentiated energy charge ? 
These are but a few from a long list of considerations which any tarrif designer will have to 
contend with in the design of a time of use tariff. 
Quality of supply 
As with the production of any product, or the provision of any service, the quality of the 
product or service is directly proportional to the cost incurred in producing the product or 
delivering the service. In the context of electricity supply, this means that providing 
electricity with a high degree of reliabilit  and strictly limited voltage and frequency 
deviations from a standard, is naturally more costly than providing a service which is less 
reliable and of inferior quality. 
Many electricity utilities offer the customer the option of purchasing an inferior product but 
at a reduced price. An example is an interruptible supply contract where the customer is 
willing to have his supply interrupted in exchange for a discount on the basic price. Such 
* Calitz AC and Campbell K JC, 1991. Consider your verdict: The A to To/ Electricity Pricing, 
Elektron, Johannesburg 
*Analysis of various pricing approaches, prepared for Electric Utility Rate Design Study: Electric 
Power Research Institute, February 1977, California: Topic 1.3 pg 15 to 27. 
* Calitz AC, 1989. Priorities for Pricing Policy Development and Time-of-use Electricity Pricing 
in Eskom: Internal Eskom Report, Eskom, Sandton, pp 23 -29 
*Mountain B RA, 1990. An Appraisal of Eskom 's Proposed Time-of-use Electricity Tariff and its 
Effect on the Electricity Costs to a Gold Mine, Undergraduate Engineering Thesis, UCT, pp 47 -62 
* Munasinghe Mand Rungta S (Eds.), 1984. Costing and Pricing Electricity in Developing 












tariffs are frequently determined, per customer or group of customers, on the basis of the 
short-term avoided cost of the utility, that is, the costs which the utility could avoid if it did 
not have to supply those customers . 
. .... ·: 
2. 7 A discussion on embedded and marginal costing 
The previous sections of this chapter have attempted to identify and explain a wider 
context against which any electricity costing theory and subsequent pricing philosophy may 
be viewed. This section now attempts to describe and explain two different costing 
approaches which are used in the electricity supply industry: embedded costing; and 
marginal costing. Perhaps one of the biggest debates through the history of electricity 
pricing has been that of embedded costing (otherwise known as absorption costing or fully 
distributed costing) versus marginal costing as the basis of price setting. The debate really 
began in the 1950's when major utilities such as Electricite de France began to implement 
tariffs based on marginal costs. Today marginal costs are almost universally used as the 
basis of tariff structures in most major electricity utilities. However, while many utilities 
today pay homage to marginal costs, in many electricity undertakings, embedded costs are 
still used in the derivation of their tariffs. In view of the fact that embedded costing has 
been the basis of electricity pricing for such a long period in the history of the industry, it is 
constructive to ex-plain the principles and applications of this costing principle. 
This section begins with a description and explanation of embedded costing. Two different 
ways of calculating embedded costs are then described and explained. The next part of this 
section then attempts to define and explain marginal costs and to describe the proof that 
marginal costs are economically efficient. Following on from this, the problem of the 
Second Best in marginal costing is explained. Finally, having established the theoretical 












2.7.1 Embedded costing 
In the electricity industry, there are some costs such as fuel and water which can be directly 
allocated to a specific unit of output. Such costs are otherwise known as attributable costs. 
There are other costs which cciii not be directly allocated to a specific unit of output. An 
example of such costs are the capital costs of generating plant, or the capital cost of the 
Transmission and Distribution network. Such costs are common to all output and thus must 
be shared amongst the output. Embedded costing, as somewhat abstractly inferred by the 
name, is a costing methodology through which the cost per unit of output is calculated 
firstly through the allocation of direct costs to specific units of output and secondly 
through apportioning common costs amongst all units of output so that each unit of output 
has all costs "embedded" into it. Embedded costing is an approach which seeks to 
determine an accounting valuation of costs. As will be discussed later, marginal costing is 
an approach which seeks to determine an economic valuation of costs. 
To restate the explanation above of embedded costs, the following formula may be 
produced 
Embedded Costi = Directly allocated costi + fi *Common Cost 
Which reads, the embedded cost of producing a specific unit of output, i, equals the costs 
directly allocated to that product (attributable costs) plus a proportion of the common cost, 
given by a factor, fi, multiplied by the total common costs. The proportion of common 
costs to be apportioned among specific units of output is based on the value of the factor fi. 
There is much debate as to exactly how common costs should be apportioned between 
units of output and thus how the factor fi should be calculated. Two frequently used 
methods of calculating the fraction fi are known as the Relative Output Method and the 












With the Relative Output Method the fraction.fi is calculated as 
where Qi is the quantity of product i produced 
(Q1+Q2+ ... +Qm) is the total production 
Applying the Relative Output Method to costing in the electricity supply industry where, . 
for example, a kilowatt-hour could be distinguished as being produced during the peak 
period or during the off-peak period, the amount of common costs attributable to a 
kilowatt-hour produced during the off-peak period will be pro-rata the off-peak kilowatt-
hours to the total kilowatt-hours. 
Another method of calculating the factor, fl, is the attributable cost method where the 
fractionfl is calculated as follows 
fl = Attributable Cost of product i I Total Attributable Cost for all production 
As stated earlier, the attributable cost of producing product i is the cost which can be 
directly allocated to that product. Using the attributable cost method, common costs are 
apportioned among specific units of output pro-rata with the attributable costs of that 
output. 
Embedded costing in a number of forms including the Relative Output and Attributable 
Cost Methods, were almost universally used in electricity costing until marginal costs 
began to gain more popularity. Currently, there is a small minority of electricity utilities in 
the developed world who use embedded costs. As the theory discussed so far has tried to 
illustrate, embedded costing is essentially an accounting (as opposed to economic) 
approach to costing. 
The Electric Power Research Institute, in a 1977 Electricity Utility Rate Design Study, 
(EPRI, 1977) lists several practical objections to embedded costing: 















Embedded costs are largely derived from accounting records which do not 
always reflect true economic depreciation of assets. 
The utility's books of ~ccount may reflect arbitrary write-offs of plant that are 
no longer useful and vapous other adjustments, such as plant acquisitions, customer 
contributed capital and timing differences between tax accruals and tax payments. 
Embedded costs are calculated using the average current· costs to the utility based on its 
historic investment costs, that is to say sunk costs are used in the calculation of future 
revenues. This is perhaps the single most important argument against embedded costing: 
Economic theory holds that for efficient resource allocation it is the actual resources used 
or saved by consumer decisions that are important and not the amount of revenue which 
must be collected to recover historic sunk costs. 
From a review of embedded costing, the discussion now focuses on marginal costing. 
2.7.2 Marginal Costing 
It was mentioned earlier in this chapter that one of the key debates in electricity pricing has · 
been that between marginal costing versus emb~dded costing as the basis for costs upon 
which electricity tariffs should be based. As long as the cost of electricity was continually 
declining in real times which it was up until the late 1960's there was l~ttle controversy over 
which was the more suitable costing practice. Howeve~, from the late 1960's a number of 
circumstances changed in such a manner as to cause an almost continual real increase in 
the cost of generation. As a result, the focus of the electricity industry, like that of many 
·Other industries, was increasingly drawn towards pricing policies which would optimise the 
utilisati6n of available resources. 
The application of the theory of marginal cost pricll:ig in the derivation of time of use 
electricity tariffs was first formulated· by Boiteaux in France in the early 1950's and 
subsequently by Steiner in America, eight years later. Marginal cost based pricing today is 
widely used in electricity utilities jn the developed world. 
This section attempts to explain the fundamentals of economic marginal costing. Although 
this is an engineering dissertation, the principle of marginal costing is of such relevance to 












welfare economics and the theory of consumer behaviour, is necessary. This section begins 
with the definition of marginal costs. The section then continues to consider marginal 
costing in the context of the theory of welfare economics. Finally, the concepts of Short 
Run Marginal Costs and Long _jun Marginal Costs are explained. 
Marginal Costs 
The broadest definition of marginal costs is that they are the cost of society's resources 
which must be used to produce one additional unit of some commodity. Altemativ~ly, 
marginal costs are defined as the value of resources which must be used to produce one 
additional unit of some commodity or the value of resources that would be saved by 
producing one less unit of that commodity. If price charged is lower than the marginal cost, 
the value of the last unit of consumption to the consumer is less than what it costs society 
to produce it and consequently more resources are being devoted to the production of the 
commodity than is "socially" efficient. 
Marginal costs and welfare economics 
In 1937 Hotelling first published the idea that prices based on marginal costs would 
optimise Social Welfare (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1979:25). Before aspects of this proof are 
reviewed, it is necessary to define the term "welfare economics". Salvatore describes 
welfare economics as follows, "(welfare economics) ... examines the conditions for 
economic efficiency in the production of output and in the exchange of commodities, and 
equity in the distribution of income" (Salvatore, 1991:563). As such, welfare economics is 
concerned with the optimal allocation of society's scare resources and the optimal 
allocation of goods among consumers. This is to be clearly distinguished from the everyday 
usage of the term "welfare". 
In welfare economics, the Net Social Benefit is defined as the sum of the producer's surplus 
(profit) and the consumer's surplus. Further, the producer's surplus is defined as total 












W = (TR - TC) + S (1) 
where w = Net Social Benefit 
,.~: 
TR = Total Revenue 
TC = Total Costs 
s = Consumer's surplus 
The Net Social Benefit is maximised when the sum of the consumer's and the producer's 
surplus are maximised. However, since an increase in the consumer's surplus is 
commensurate with a decrease in the producer's surplus it is necessary to find a level at 
which the two may be optimally balanced so that the Net Social Benefit may be found. 
Hotelling proved that this optimal level will be achieved when goods are priced at their 
marginal costs. In deriving the proof, a number of assumptions were made: 
1. The producer produces a single good. 
2. The proof assumes a partial equilibrium framework i.e. that the rest of the 
economy in which the electricity supply industry operates, has already adjusted to 
marginal cost prices and there is an absence of externalities, or other factors which 
may distort a state of perfect competition. 
3. Consumer surplus is equivalent to the area under the individual's declining 
demand curve. 3 
4. For any output, profits are measured by the area to the left of the industry's 
(increasing) marginal cost curve. This requires that there are no fixed costs and that 
the industry's output is supplied along the marginal cost curve. (See Figure 4) 
5. 
3 
The producer will not sell at a price less than marginal cost. 
A consumer's demand curve maps the relationship between the quantity of a product demanded 












Hotelling's proof is illustrated in Figure 4 below. 
Price 
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Figure 4. Demand and Supply Equilibrium Under MC-Pricing 
Hotelling's contention is that when the producer's marginal cost curve intersects the 
consumer's demand curve at a price Pl, the sum of the consumer's surplus (area ACB) and 
the producer's surplus (area BCD) is maximised. To prove this, he took a hypothetical 
price, P2, which meant that the consumer's demand would not be met at a price equal to 
marginal cost. At P2, the consumer's surplus is calculated as the area AEP2 and the 
producer's surplus is calculated as the area P2EFD and hence there is a net loss (a 
deadweight loss) given by the area ECF. Hence only at Pl, when the producer prices at 
marginal cost, will the Net Social Benefit be maximised. 
However, while this proves that marginal costs have to be used to achieve economic 
efficiency (the maximisation of the Net Social Benefit), there are a number of other 
important considerations. Firstly, the reasoning behind Figure 4 is restricted to a single 
point in time and no distinction is made between long-run and short-run costs. Secondly for 
pricing at marginal cost to be welfare-optimal it has to clear the market (the Net Social 
Benefit must be positive), and thirdly marginal cost pricing does not maximise the 












profits in theory marginal costs should equal marginal revenues. With reference to Figure 
4, such a configuration corresponds to price P2 and thus a welfare loss (area ECF). 
That the Net- Social Benefit :tlll}St be positive in order to achieve welfare optimal pricing 
with marginal costs, deserves closer attention. Teplitz-Sembitzky illustrates this problem as 
follows: (Teplitz-Sembitzky, 1992:21) 
A simplified short-run cost function is given by 
C(X) = aX + F (2) 
Where, a: 
X: 
Constant unit operating costs equal to marginal costs 
Quantity of supply 
F: Fixed capacity costs 
In addition, suppose the demand is given by the linear inverse function 
P(X) = c- dX (3) 
P(X): Unit price as a function of output 
c,d: Parameters characterising the demand 
Now with reference to equation (1) the "Net Social Benefit" is 
x 
W = ( P(X)dx - C(X) (4) 
oJ 
w~ich from (2) and (3) yield 
w = cX - dx212 - aX - F (5) 
This quadratic has two real roots provided that 












Now differentiating (5) with respect to X and setting the derivative equal to zero gives 
X = (c-a)/d 
• _J.·;
(7) 
which substituted back into (2) says that the maximum of social welfare occurs when 
demand is met at a price equal to marginal costs. However, since pricing at marginal costs 
does not recoup the fixed cost component, there will be a negative producer's surplus(loss), 
that is, the market clearing price has not been obtained. Hence investing in production and 
selling the output will only be welfare-optimal if the net consumers' surplus is greater than 
the fixed costs. This is a very significant conclusion . 
. The problem of the second best 
The problem of the second best, as it is known in economic parlance, is that in any real 
economy, prices must differ from true marginal cost in order to achieve the maximisation 
of the social welfare function. Perhaps a more accessible explanation of the problem of the 
second best is that, in a real economy, economically efficient prices are different from true 
marginal cost. The problem of the second best is of such critical importance that it merits a 
fuller explanation. 
One of the underlying assumptions to the argument of welfare maximisation through 
marginal costs is that marginal cost pricing for a regulated industry is optimal only when 
the balance of the economy is competitive, that is, when there is no distortion in prices 
anywhere in the economy. In practice in a real economy this is not the case. Gordian in 
(EPRI, 1979:21-7) lists a number of distortionary factors including: 
1. Regulatory considerations 
One purpose of a regulatory agency is to achieve and maintain an efficient allocation of 
resources for a particular group or society. This may involve the alreration or distortion of 













Not only do taxes distort the price of labour and capital by their very existence, but their 
structure is such that they cre~t;y internal distortions between different types of capital and 
labour. 
3. Subsidies 
To the extent that they violate marginality conditions, subsidies are a frequent source of 
distortion. 
4. Wage regulations 
Certain government regulations (e.g. minimum wage legislation) distort the market prices 
of labour by setting limits on wage levels. 
5. Public services: monopoly and limited competition 
Public services are typically priced at levels that are not necessarily close or related to 
marginal cost. 
The theory of the Second Best is that, as a result these distortionary factors (amongst 
others) there is zero probability that price will equal marginal cost for commodities. The 
theory of the Second Best will be explained here through the use of the transformation 
curve and indifference curves (these are both defined later). 
Consider a hypothetical economy in which energy is supplied through either electricity or 
gas. Figure 5 shows an example of one transformation curve and two indifference curves 





















Producer's possibilities and customers indifference curves 
The producer's transformation curve shows the upper limit of all outputs available to 
society when all existing resources are being utilised. In figure 5, they show the different 
combinations of electricity and gas production. For example as illustrated in the curve, it is 
possible to produce a large amount of electricity but only a small amount of gas at the same 
time, and vice versa. The indifference curve represents the various combinations of goods 
which have the same value to the consumer. Since all combinations on an indifference 
curve offer the same satisfaction, in Figure 5, the consumer is indifferent (to whether to 
choose electricity and gas), at any two points on the curve. The level of satisfaction of a 
given consumer can be improved by moving to an indifference curve that represents greater 
satisfaction, this curve would be further from the origin. In figure 5 at Point A, the 
consumer is on the lower indifference curve. This is a non-optimal solution since the 
consumer can substitute gas for electricity to increase his overall level of satisfaction (in 
figure 5, move further from the origin). Such a substitution leads from point A to point B. 
If the substitution is carried past point B, the consumer's level of satisfaction will decrease. 
This is illustrated at point C. 
When goods are priced at marginal cost, the economy will rest at point B. This is proved 
as follows: Under competition, producers seeking to maximise their profits, will produce 
any two goods until the rate of transformation between the two goods (which is the slope of 












divided by the price of electricity). Consumers trying to maximise their individual 
satisfaction, will allocate their available means so that the rate of substitution on their 
highest attainable indifference curve is also equal to the ratio of the prices. Under marginal 
cost pricing, the price ratio is .. ~e same for both producers and consumers and point B is 
attained. At point B, the slopes of the transformation curve and the highest attainable 
indifference curve are equal to the ratio of the prices of the two goods. 
The problem of the second best exists when the optimal allocation of resources is violated 
through distortionary factors in such a way that the rate of transformation is not equal to the 
indifference trade-off to the consumer. When this condition arises, as it always does in 
practice, the cost to produce one more unit of output and what the consumer pays for that 
additional unit will be different. This difference is denoted by a constant, c. Given such a 
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Producers possibility and customers indifference curves 
At point D, the objectives of satisfaction maximisation by customers and profit 
maximisation by producers are met. Yet the condition of welfare maximisation is violated; 













To achieve point D it will be necessary that the distortion in the pricing of the one product, 
is applied in equal measure to the other product so that the original ratios are restored 
(Pg/Pe) and hence the slope of the transformation curve and highest indifference curve will 
once again be equal to the. ptjces of the two goods and welfare maximisation will thus 
occur at point B. This condition is then referred to as second best optimality. 
At the beginning of this section is was asserted that the theory of marginal costing is of 
such relevance to the electricity industry that it merited a review of the theory underlying 
the justification of marginal costs in the electricity industry. Having progressed from a 
definition of marginal costs to a review of the maximisation of social welfare with 
marginal costs and finally an explanation of the problem of the second-best, it is possible to 
take a step back and question what relevance this has to practical rate making. 
An eloquent answer to this question, specifically on the value of the second best theory, is 
to be found in (EPRI, 1981:23-5) 
" ... the fundamentals of second-best theory leads us to the conclusion that the theory is 
merely an addition to a body of welfare analysis that is itself of dubious relevance for 
discussing any non-trivial policy problem ... we (are) unable to commend any part of 
second-best theory to the attention of practical rate-makers or regulators ... " 
Perhaps the real value to be gained from this theoretical review of the problem of the 
second best, is recognition that in practice it becomes difficult to defend marginal cost 
pricing from the perspective of welfare economics. Rather, it is much easier to defend 
marginal costing from the perspective that it accords with business-like behaviour 
(competitive pricing) and that it is directed towards achieving the optimal utilisation of 
resources. 
SRMC and LRMC 
Having established the theoretical framework for marginal cost electricity pricing, it is 
possible to focus on an issue of more practical relevance: the arguments for and against 
short run or long run marginal costs. 
The difference between short run and long run costs is that with short run costs, some costs 












. supplier, in the short run, the capacity cost of generating plant is fixed while the running 
costs are variable. In the long run, both the capacity and running costs are variable. 
Mtinasinghe distinguishes between short run and long run marginal costs as follows, 
(Warford and Munasinghe (~d~, 1982:23): 
" ... SRMC may be defined in economic terms as the cost of meeting additional electricity 
consumption with fixed capacity. LRMC is the cost of meeting an increase in consumption, 
sustained indefinitely into the future, when needed capacity adjustments are possible." 
To explain Short Run Marginal Costs (SRMC) and Long Run Marginal Costs (LRMC) in 
more detail, consider the following short run cost function for an electricity utility 
C(X) = c.X + B(X).X (8) 
where c denotes the unit operating costs which are equal to marginal costs, and B(X) 
denotes the unit capacity costs that vary with the size of the capacity installed and X is the 
quantity produced. (Different types of power stations have diff rent unit capacity costs. For 
example, the capacity cost of a gas-fired power station is much lower, per unit, than the 
q1pacity costs of a large coal-fired station) 
The long-run counterpart of this function is the first differential of this function with 
respect to time, 
LRMC = C'(X) = c.X + B(X) + B'(X).X (9) 
where C'(X) denote the first differential of the short run cost function with respect to time 
With sufficient capacity in place, short run costs become relevant to decision making at the 
margin. This is illustrated in Figure 7, for the case of the demand curve DlDl. In this case 
·the SRMC would be c. In the special case that demand actually equals the installed 
capacity, that is, the intersection of demand curve DoDo and SRMCo, the short run 
marginal cost exactly equals the long run marginal cost. In the case that demand exceeds 
the installed capacity, the short run marginal cost will be the cost that clears the market. In 
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Figure 7. LRMC under Constant Returns to Scale 
In the case that SRMC > LRMC, investment in additional capacity is warranted. Once the 
additional capacity has increased the existing capacity to its optimum level, X2, welfare 
maximisation requires that the price be adjusted downwards so that LRMC = SRMC2. In 
an optimally planned system therefore, LRMC and SRMC are equal. This is illustrated in 
Figure 7 as the intersection of the SRMC and LRMC curves. 
The question remains, should prices be based on SRMC or LRMC ? Opinions on this vary. 
In Munasinghe and Warford (eds) (1982:52) Munasinghe argues that LRMC will provicie a 
more stable basis in price setting than SRMC. The principle argument behind this is that 
demand is volatile and investments in capacity are lumpy and hence SRMC will result in 
wide price variations and hence introduce uncertainty in the medium to long term decision 
making of the utilities. Furthermore, " ... the large price fluctuations of SRMC will be 
disruptive and unacceptable to customers." This practical problem may be avoided by 
adopting a LRMC approach which provides the required price stability while retaining the 
principle of matching willingness to pay and incremental supply costs. 
Teplitz-Sembitzky in (Teplitz-Sembitzky, 1992:27) is somewhat disparaging of this 
opinion. While he agrees "that the stability argument advanced by Munasinghe looks 












information about future prices", he questions why electricity customers should be 
protected against volatile tariffs, when in other energy markets (e.g. oil) prices are allowed 
to fluctuate. 
. .. -
However, although LRMC may fail to accurately recover costs it tends to keep accounting 
losses at a lower level than does SRMC pricing. This is always true in the case where the 
utility has excess capacity. However, perhaps the ~trongest argument against LRMC is that 
LRMC can only be calculated with any certainty for models which assume a perfectly 
known future. In practice this is not possible and hence LRMC would appear to have more 
use in theory than in practice. · Teplitz-Sembitzky goes so far as to say that 
" ... Long Run Marginal Costs are a misleading benchmark for electricity pricing. Unless 
the power sector invests and operates in a steady-state equilibrium, LRMC cannot be 
justified on efficiency grounds." (Teplitz-Sembtizky, 1992: v) 
On balance between the arguments of Teplitz-Sembitsky and Munasinghe, it would seem 
that there is no particularly strong case for either method: SRMC comes closer to welfare 
maximisation but introduces large fluctuations in the price, while LRMC comes closer to 
the ideal of full cost recovery and will provide stability, but will not, in theory, maximise 
welfare. 
Practical perspectives on the theoretical basis underlying marginal costing 
The analysis of marginal costing thus far has discussed this costing methodology in the 
context of welfare economics. The analysis has also dealt with the theory of the second best 
and the theory underlying long run and short run marginal costs. It is clear that the 
derivation of the proof of the maximisation of the social welfare function through marginal 
costs is based on a number of assumptions that have no basis in reality and hence the proof 
only has value as the solution to a highly theoretical problem. Further, the problem of the 
second best was described earlier as "merely an addition to a body of welfare analysis that 
is itself of dubious relevance for discussing any non-trivial policy problem." This section 
therefore attempts to provide some practical perspectives on marginal costing. 
The first perspective is that in about 100 years since the first centrally controlled electricity 
power system, marginal costing has only gained widespread acceptance in the last 40 years. 












1950's. Today, American utilities are forced to calculate marginal costs in terms of 
legislation passed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and organisations such as 
the World Bank prescribe that tariffs be based on marginal costs so that customers are 
charged the amount which COIJ~ctly reflects the value of resources required to supply them 
(Munasinghe, Gelling and Mason, 1988). 
A practical problem with marginal costing is that marginal cost-based tariffs (whether 
LRMC or SRMC) will not recover total accounting costs in times when the supply 
authority has an excess of installed generating capacity. The converse is true in times when 
the installed capacity is not sufficient to meet the customer's demand: In these times the 
marginal cost will far exceed the average cost and hence pricing at marginal cost will lead 
to the utility making considerable accounting profits. 
Furthermore, marginal costs represent the economic cost of supply and, as illustrated in 
Figure 7, these vary widely during periods in which a utility has excesses or shortages of 
installed of capacity. Pricing at the short run marginal cost will lead to tariffs with large 
price swings and hence tariffs based on these costs fail to achieve the desired quality of 
"rate stability". This problem can (theoretically) be overcome by using long run marginal 
costs. However as discussed earlier, long run marginal costs can only be calculated with 
any certainty for models which assume a perfectly known future. 
Finally it is impossible to argue that strict marginal costing applied in a real economy 
would achieve the theoretical objectives it is intended to achieve. However, as a basis to 
electricity pricing, marginal costing can justifiably claim to be aimed at optimising the 












2.8 Pricing applications based on marginal costs 
Having established the theoretical basis to marginal cost pricing, it is possible to review 
some practical pricing methojs based on marginal costs. The two most widely used 
applications of marginal costs are in time of use tariffs and in deterministic spot pricing 
Time of use pricing 
Section 2.5 presented a brief historical review of electricity costing. Part of this review 
discussed the arguments first put forward by Wright that theoretically "charges ought to be 
divided into amounts proportional to the maximum demand of each consumer at the day 
and at the very time the maximum load occurred on the mains each year." His claim was 
based on intuitive reasoning without any theoretical explanation to substantiate his 
intuition. The theoretical explanation to prove that marginal cost peak load pricing was 
welfare-optimal was first proposed by Boiteaux in 1957 in France. Steiner, in America 
eight years later, published his own contribution to the subject - unaware of Boiteaux's 
earlier proof (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1979:25). In France, Boiteaux's contribution had a 
large impact on pricing and was one of the factors leading to France's adoption of marginal 
cost time of use tariffs in the late 1950's. The Steiner-Boiteaux proof uses the logic of 
Welfare Economics to prove that pricing according to time of use will maximise the Net 
Social Benefit It is felt that reviewing these proofs here will not add value to this 
discussion. An elementary exposition of the Steiner-Boiteaux model is to be found in Crew 
and Kleindorfer (1979), while a more detailed exposition is to be found in Teplitz-
Sembitzky (1992). 
A special case of time of use pricing is known as spot or real time pricing. In essence, spot 
pricing boils down to continuous-time peak load pricing defined in the face of stochastic 
demand and supply. Welfare optimal spot pricing will theoretically relate spot market 
prices to the marginal cost prices of economic theory and in so doing, the Net Social 
Benefit will be maximised. 
Conceptually, the idea of real time pricing has been around for at least as long as the idea 
of peak load pricing. In 1957, one of spot pricing's present day detractors expressed the 
idea that, "theoretically, 'the invisible hand' can replicate the allocation of supply in the 
wholesale market from minute to minute so as to minimise the fuel costs" (Westfield, 1957 












strawberries in ideal competitive markets (which marginal cost pricing is to stimulate) 
must at each location be forever changing so as to clear the markets at the point of equality 
of short-run marginal cost with price, so the rule for the price of electricity must aim to 
equate at each location sho11 ... ,run marginal cost with price at each moment in time" 
(Westfield, 1988). 
Both of these quotes reveal the essential attribute of spot pricing i.e. it is a method which 
attempts to continuously relate price to marginal cost. fu fact, this is a task not easily 
achieved mostly because of the highly temporal and stochastic nature of electricity supply 
and demand. This, amongst other reasons, has resulted in spot pricing being the subject of a 
considerable amount of controversy. Before the arguments for or against spot pricing are 
reviewed, it is necessary to present the mathematical basis. 
The starting point for spot pricing is the same as for peak load pricing with multiple 
technology (different types of power stations, for example baseload, midmerit and 
peaking). This starting point assumes that there is a single public utility which seeks to 
maximise the Net Social Benefit. This utility owns and operates multiple generating plants 
and sells to independent customers, who have stochastic demands. From here the model is 
exte11ded in four ways: 
1. Demand and supply are separated from each other by a transmission network. 
2. Lines of this transmission network are subject to stochastic outages. 
3. Both demand and supply are stochastic. 
4. The utility can set and communicate prices instantly, and can set a different price 
for each customer location at each moment. 
Further, assume that demand for electricity, X, is a function of price, p, and an independent 
random variable, 0. There are constant unit operating and capacity costs, denoted by c and 
B, respectively. 
From this poS!tion the expected total surplus (as in conventional welfare economics) is 
derived as the sum of the expected consumer surplus and the expected profit (supplier 












E(CS) = 0f { ofXp(x,0)dx-p.x} f(0)d0 
. The expected profit (producer..s:urplus) can be expressed as 
( 
E(1t) = 0 J {[p(X,0)-c]X }f(0)d0- BK 













The demand for electricity at any time 
Independent random variable (for example temperature) 
Distribution function of theta 
Total available capacity 
Unit operating costs 
Unit capacity costs 
Price of electricity - which is a function of demand and an 
independent random variable, 0. 
The theoretical treatment of the spot pricing problem is to find prices so that the total 
expected surplus, E(CS) + E(1t) is maximised. Bohn et al (1982) and Schweppe et al (1988) 
describe solutions to this problem. It would not be appropriate to review these solutions 
here. 
Moving the discussion from theory to practice, views on the validity of spot prices in the 
electricity industry are divided. Berrie (1987:335-41), lists the principal advantages of spot 
pricing as follows: 
1. System capacity will be used more efficiently because price will reflect the 
operating cost of the marginal plant or the market clearing price when demand 
exceeds capacity. When demand is less than capacity, customers will benefit from 
the fall in price and will be encouraged to increase purchases. 












the required capacity investment is lower. 
3. Because spot pricing more accurately reflects cost and demand conditions, it can 
be used as an efficient means of co-ordination in a decentralised system. Efficient 
merit order running c~. be achieved Jithout the need for integration of ownership 
and control. Large monopolistic companies can be replaced by smaller competitive 
ones, thereby securing the benefits of competition, notably greater efficiency and 
lower prices. 
4. In a less centralised system with spot prices, generating companies will acquire a 
better understanding of the needs of their customers, which will lead to a better 
forecasting and investment policy. 
Westfield quoted earlier as one of the conceptual pioneers of spot pricing, is ironically now 
one of its most vigorous critics. Westfield suggests the following disadvantages of spot 
pricing (Westfield, 1988:378-384): 
" 1. For most customers real time responses to unexpected price changes would be 
impossible or uneconomic. 
2. Those customers whose technology enables them to respond quickly are unlikely 
to find it worthwhile to do so. 
3. Investment in generation and transmission acilities would be less well 
co-ordinated. 
4. The risks associated with competition would lead to smaller units with shorter 
lives and construction periods, than would be economically efficient, thereby 
increasing operating costs. 
5. The added risks of competition would raise the costs of capital. 
6. Environmental costs would be more difficult to accommodate. 
7. Fluctuating spot prices would confer windfall gains on investors at the expense of 
customers, and these gains would not be reclaimed by regulatory procedures. " 
A more general criticism of spot pricing levelled by Teplitz-Sembitzky, Littlechild and 
Westfield is that the spot pricing models have "aimed to determine the policies that would 
be socially optimal in a static world of perfect information and altruistic authorities" 
(Littlechild, 1988:398-404). Teplitz-Sembitzky (1992:60) make a more cynical comment, 
"It seems that . . . the concept of real time pricing often serves as a romantic retreat for 












That is to say, one should not become oblivious to the institutional and technical 
difficulties that are likely to hamper the implementation of efficient spot prices." 
A practical discussion of spo}: pricing is incomplete without a discussion of the kind of 
structural regime which is most conducive to the emergence of spot prices. For example, if 
some of the benefits of spot pricing depend upon prices reflecting costs, and if this in tum 
requires effective competition to achieve, the benefits of spot pricing may be less in a 
monopoly regime. It is interesting to note Littlechild's conclusions after research into the 
deregulation of industries in the UK and the USA, that "moves towards deregulation and 
privatisation in the UK and the USA are more likely to foster the spot pricing of electricity 
than to discourage it" (Littlechild, 1988:398-404). This conclusion is consistent with 
Bernstein's study of spot pricing in the Chilean electric power sector (Bernstein, 1988:369-
78). 
In terms of the applications of spot pricing in the African context, one has to consider 
several aspects: 
L . The spot pricing regime developed will vary considerably depending on the 
. industry structure. For example, in the UK the spot market is designed merely to 
facilitate trade between largely privately owned concerns. In a monopolist regime, 
one has to consider that the spot pricing mechanism developed will be subject to 
the pricing policy of that regime. 
2. There are further crucial implementation issues, such as: 
2.1 It is necessary to have advanced metering technology and electronic 
communication capabilities. 
2.2 Spot pricing relies on the ability to manage huge a~ounts of data .. 
2.3 Part of a spot pricing system is a complex billing system. 
2.4 It is necessary to establish a pool of technologically advanced personnel 
who will be able to meet the design and implementation demands of a 












2.5 If necessary, solutions will have to be found to the problem that an 
unsophisticated customer base might find it impossible, too expensive, or 
not worthwhile to respond to the signals and service options that spot 
markets are supposed to provide. 
It is interesting to note the advice of Teplitz-Sembitsky in (Teplitz-Sembitzky, 1992:v) " ... 
when many electric utilities in developing countries are on the verge of a financial collapse, 
pricing policies guided by first-order conditions of global welfare maximisation are 
misplaced. Rather than requiring the utilities to pine for an optimum optimorum,. emphasis 
should be placed on strategies that help restore the solvency of the power sector. For that 
matter, pricing has to be relieved of sacrosant efficiency objectives and should come to 
grips with more mundane and immediate commercial ends." Sioshansi (1988:353-9) also 
warns against spot pricing, on the basis of political resistance by customers, especially low 
income domestic customers, who would be exposed to higher prices. 
In conclusion, this section has reviewed the application of marginal costs in the 
development of time-differentiated tariffs. The. spot-pricing model in which the price of 
electricity is based on marginal costs which are recalculated at short time intervals, 
attempts to maximise pricing efficiency. It is universally agreed that in a theoretically 
perfect world, spot prices will maximise welfare and thus optimise efficiency. However, 
although spot pricing has been widely used in several countries specifically as part of pool 
electricity exchanges, opinion on the practicality and efficiency of spot prices is sharply 
divided. 
2.9 Ramsey Pricing 
The theory of Ramsey pricing dates back to a 1927 paper by Frank Ramsey in which he 
showed that tax on a commodity which is inversely proportional to that commodity's price 
elasticity of demand (change in demand as a result of a change in price) will lead to 
optimal excise taxation. 
In pricing parlance, Ramsey pricing is classified as Linear Break-even Pricing. Linear, 
because prices do not vary with the energy produced/sold/purchased and break-even 
because prices are calculated subject to the constraint that the utility will cover its costs. 












subject to the constraint that prices will allow the utility to break even. This compares to 
the fully optimal, so called first best marginal cost prices which do not necessarily break-
even. 
. .. ... ::: 
The logic of Ramsey pricing can be explained as follows: 
Suppose that all prices are set equal to marginal costs. Where a fixed cost exists, as 
discussed earlier, the firm will fail to break-even. To prevent this situation arising, it is 
necessary to include a mark-up over marginal costs in such a way that a Pareto optimal4 
solution is obtained (this is the solution to the problem of the second best as explained 
earlier). To achieve this it would seem reasonable to increase prices in markets in which 
the price elasticity of demand is low. By following this strategy the markets will be altered 
as little as possible from the price-equal-marginal-cost equilibrium which, as was proved 
earlier in this chapter, will maximise the Net Social Benefit and hence provide the first-best 
solution. In other words, 
Where Pi is the price in market i and Ci is the marginal cost of supplying customers in that 
market. 
Now define the proportionality constant, ¢, as the constant that adjusts markups in all 
markets uniformly up to the point where the firm breaks even. Hence, 
where µi is the price elasticity of demand for customers in market i. 
What this formula says is that for any pair of markets served by a regulated firm the 
percentage deviations from marginal cost, weighted by the price elasticity of demand, 
should be equal for both markets to the mark-up, ¢. This is know as the Inverse Elasticity 
Rule (IER) and p is commonly known as the Ramsey number. 
4 Vilfredo Pareto was a nineteenth century Italian economist and philosopher who defined "a 













Two observations can be made: 
1. Ramsey prices, if they exist, will fully distribute a utility's costs across outputs. 
The allocation of cost§', is implicitly determined by the Ramsey pricing solution, 
unlike the formula for apportioning fixed costs as described earlier in the section on 
embedded costing. 
2. In order to deduce the Ramsey solution one has to know the different demand 
functions and the price elasticity of demand in each of the different markets. 
The latter observation is a significant limitation to utilities adopting Ramsey pricing. This 
is because it is practically very difficult to establish the demand curves of a utility's 
customers when those customers range from demand inelastic commercial customers to 
some industrial customers with a high elasticity of demand. 
From an organisational perspective, Ramsey pricing can only be rigorously applied in a 
monopolist or highly regulated industry. It is difficult to imagine that in a competitive 
industry, a utility would offer prices to a customer based on their perception of that 
customer's price elasticity of demand. Rather, the prices offered would be based on the 
firms own costs and other offers from competitor firms, to that customer. 
Leaving these considerations aside, the relevance f the Ramsey-pricing rule has frequently 
been questioned either because a utility does not seek to maximise the Net Social Benefit 
(in many cases a utility seeks to maximise profit) or because a regulatory authority which 
could be required to enforce Ramsey prices has little or no knowledge about the customer's 
elasticities of demand. Or, as Bonbright puts it, "The problem of determining what 
surcharges will impose the least serious harm in the form of curtailments and distortions of 
use of service when the rates as a whole must yield total revenue requirements ... depends 
on a knowledge of cost functions and of demand functions that practical rate makers 
simply do not and cannot possess" (Bonbright, Danielsen and Kamerschen, 1988:301). 
Furthermore, Ramsey-pricing per se provides no incentive for a utility to cut costs, just as 
the basis on which it was derived was not to reduce .tax but rather to apportion the tax in 
proportion to the tax payer's ability to pay. Ultimately, Ramsey pricing applied to an 
electricity utility has been described as "more of a theoretical curiosity than a workable 












2.10 Priority Service Pricing 
The concept of priority servic~ pricing as an alternative to spot pricing is relatively new. 
Wilson (1989:1) presents a comprehensive overview of the subject of priority service 
pricing. Wilson's argument is that spot pricing is rarely used to ration supplies because of 
"technological limitations and pervasive transaction costs." Wilson develops the theme that 
a state enterprise can promote substantial efficiency gains by substituting what he called 
priority service for spot markets. 
The idea underlying the priority service pricing approach is that the utility can induce 
customers to self-select their order of priority in obtaining service, should supply fall short 
of demand. Hence customers will value reliability by paying a premium depending on the 
priority ranking they select. Typically the premium is paid in advance, irrespective of 
whether or not the services have to be rationed. There are two distinct advantages of this 
scheme: 
1. Compared to random rationing in which customers would be cut-off at random 
should demand exceed supply, with priority service pricing the customer will be 
better off because capacity is allocated to consumers in accordance with their 
willingness to pay for service reliability. Customers who would be disadvantaged 
by an outage would pay a higher premium than those who would not bother about 
service interruptions (Teplitz-Sembitzky, 1992:87). 
2. A public enterprise that offers a single service quality (such as Eskom's 
commitment to meet the demand of every customer) has no direct measure of 
customers' willingness to pay for capacity increments that improve the quality of 
service. In contrast, customers' selection of priority service conditions clearly 
indicate their willingness to pay for quality improvements. 
Taken to its theoretical optimum, priority service pricing will result in ex-ante (before the 
event) purchase choices that optimal spot pricing would generate ex-post (after the event). 
The theoretical rationale of priority service pricing is presented in Teplitz-Sembitzky 












Let 0 denote the consumer index that ranks the willingness to pay for reliability. In 
particular, let 0 represent the value (Rands) that Type-0 customers attach to a unit of 
output (kWh) supplied with probability (1-s), where s denotes the supply (per unit) that 
. will be available per unit of gemand (kW) at some specified instant. (Both 0 and s are 
uniformly distributed on the unit interval.) Alternatively, s can also be interpreted as a 
service order in the sense that the consumer type 0 will be served first as long as supply 
exceeds s; that is the lower the service order, the higher is the priority in being served. 
Thus, efficient rationing on the basis of priority service contracts requires that 0 = 1-s. 
Now let P(s) denote the price that customers are induced to pay for service order, s. If 
reliability is costless, efficient priority service pricing requires that the class 0 customers' 
willingness to pay for service order s is large enough to make up for the outage costs lower 
priority customers would experience in the event of a shortfall. This condition can be 
expressed as 
1 1 
P(s) = (0ds = ( (1-s)ds = 0.5( 1-s)2 = 0.5 02 
) SJ 
That is, the premium on reliability increases with the service priority. (This result is 
intuitively obvious.) 
Priority service pricing is offered as a practical alternative to spot pricing. However, 
attempting to implement priority service pricing as a single pricing principle (as opposed to 
a pricing option) will be impossible unless the utility is able to have direct control over the 
power supply to every customer and is able to rank every customer according to a priority 
service schedule. The logistics of achieving this is formidable and hence the real value of 
priority service pricing at the moment is to show that in a theoretical optimum the 
advantages that spot pricing achieves ex-post can be achieved with priority service pricing, 
ex-ante. 
In practice many utilities use the principle of priority service pricing in optional, 
interruptible tariffs. It is important however, not to confuse priority service pricing with 
interruptible tariffs. Priority service pricing refers to a pricing principle that governs the 












technique whereby the marginal cost at certain periods is compared with the customer's 
willingness to pay that marginal cost. If the willingness to pay is less than the cost, then the 
customer can enter into an ex-ante contract with the utility to forsake his right of supply at 
certain times in return for a ch~per tariff from the utility, the savings being shared between 
the two parties. An interruptible tariff is therefore better defined as an entrepreneurial tariff 
in a marginal cost environment than as an element of priority service pricing. 
2.11 Competitive pricing 
The revival of the competitive paradigm in electricity pricing has largely been in response 
to dissatisfaction with the performance of nationalised monopoly electricity industries. The 
proponents of competition in the ESI argue that: 
I. Consumer prices will be brought down by creating competition amongst the 
suppliers and retailers of electricity. 
2. Investment decisions will be made on the basis of competitive market forces and 
not by bureaucrats. 
3. The industry will be governed by competitive forces generated by the market and as 
such will be free from harmful government intervention. 
There is a considerable body of opinion, however, that the electricity supply industry is a 
natural monopoly and hence attempts to introduce competition will result in the non-
optimal utilisation of resources. Before possible means of competitive pricing are 
explained, it is necessary to focus on the natural monopoly argument. 
Put simply, a natural monopoly exists when it is cheaper for a single firm to produce the 
required output than it is for two or more firms. Teplitz-Sembitzky uses a more rigorous 
definition to define a natural monopoly: A natural monopoly exists when, "relative to some 
range of output, the underlying cost function is sub-additive over this output range" 
(Teplitz-Sembitzky, 1990: 14 ). 
Figure 10 illustrates a sub-additive cost function defined as: 












= Fl +F2 +cX for X > X*, with Fl > F2 
where Fl, F2 are the fixed costs incurred in producing a specific level of output, c is the 
variable cost of production and X is the quantity produced. 
C (Total costs) 
F2 
F1 
X1 X* X2 
x 
Figure 10. Sub additive costs 
The cost function is sub-additive over the whole range of outputs since the combined fixed 
costs of two or more finns, each incurring Fl, exceed the fixed cost of a single producer, 
i.e. A.Fl > Fl + F2, A. ~ 2. 
In addition to the idea that sub-additive fixed costs define a natural monopoly, in the 
presence of sunk costs, markets are no longer contestable. In the highly capital intensive 
electricity industry, the fixed cost element of the cost function is to a large extent, sunk. 
That is, fixed costs cannot be recovered in the short-to-medium term. These sunk costs 
erect barriers to entry by subjecting potential entrants to retaliatory behaviour. Consider the 
distribution, transmission and generation systems: 
Investments in distribution systems are almost entirely sunk. The network has no other use 
than to distribute electricity to customers who are expected to buy electricity. On the other 












system. A distribution system also tends to exhibit strong economies of scale. Thus 
distribution qualifies as a natural monopoly with a high degree of sunk capital expenditure. 
A similar argument applies "'to transmission. Transmission is locked between power 
generators and distributors. Given the immobility and almost complete lack of alternative 
uses, investments in a transmission system are almost entirely sunk, thus constituting a 
barrier to entry which increases the potential for monopoly pricing as a result of economies 
of scale. 
Sunk costs also play a role in power generation. Power stations are generally highly capital 
intensive and immobile and as such, investments in generation are largely sunk. Generation 
also exhibits economies of scale at the unit (larger units are more economical than smaller 
units) and plant (plants with more generating units are more economical than plants with 
less units). However certain minimum unit and plant sizes are necessary before scale 
economies exist. This renders generation, like transmission and distribution, a natural 
monopoly. 
Hence if electricity generation (supply) and distribution is a natural monopoly, there is 
clearly no point in arguing the case for pricing to be based on competition since, as 
economic theory maintains, creating competition in a system in which there is a natural 
monopoly would result in a gross misallocation of resources. For example to create 
competition in the distribution industry would require that multiple distribution networks 
be constructed so that independent distributors can compete. It does not require an 
elaborate economic proof to show that such a situation would be sub-optimal! 
If we accept the idea that electricity supply is a natural monopoly and further that the 
electricity market it is not a contestable market,5 the question arises whether it is possible 
to introduce competition in the ESI. To attempt to answer this, possible types of 
competition in the electricity industry will be described under four headings: 
5 The Contestable Market Theory says that "if the market served by a multi-product 
natural monopoly is contestable in the sense that rival firms can enter or exit the market without 
losing any of their investments, there will be no axiomatic need for price or entry regulation." A key 
assumption underlying the theory is that there are negligible costs in entering and exiting the market. 
This hypothesis applied to the electricity supply industry says that price will be regulated by the 
threat of entry of new competitors to the monopoly market and it is this competitive force which will 












* Third-party access competition 
* Franchise competition 
* Wholesale comp.etition 
* Incentive competition 
Third party access competition 
Third party access competition refers specifically to the situation in which an independent 
distributor can get access to the distribution and reticulation network which is owned by 
another party. The distributor using the network would pay the owner of the network an 
appropriate amount for the use of the network. Since no single distributor has sole right to 
use the network, the distributor which uses the network is the one that beat other 
distributors for the custom of a single, or group, of end-users. In this situation, the 
organisation that owns the distribution network is not material since ownership of the 
network does not imply sole use of the network. 
The distribution industry in the UK is a good example of a competitive distribution 
industry where competing distributors have the right to use the existing distribution 
infrastructure. As is discussed more fully in the chapter on pricing in the restructured UK 
industry, the Office of the Electricity Regulator (OFFER) stipulates very accurately the 
amount that may be charged by the owners of the distribution network for the use of the 
network (the wires business). Since all distributors using the distribution network are 
committed to pay the same amount in respect of the use of the network, there is no 
competition at this level. The other cost of distribution is incurred in the "supply business" 
(the supply business refers to the tariffing, marketing, buying and administrative, etc. 
functions of the distributors). Here the force of competition is used to ensure that the costs 
incurred in "supply business" functions, is minimised. 
Franchise competition 
If in view of sunk costs, power markets can not be made contestable there is, at least, the 
option of competition for the exclusive right to serve the markets. The right is granted on 
the basis of a well defined contract to perform specific functions, for example, to distribute 
electricity to a particular area. The principal selection criterion centres on service quality 












contract period in question. Pricing, in terms of both structure and level in a franchise 
agreement, will be structured by the competing prospective franchisees in order to win the 
contract. If after winning the franchise, the franchisee_ desires to maintain the contract, its 
pricing will have to be compe!i.tive with that of its potential competitors. It is in this sense 
that franchise competition will regulate the price level and structure. It is obvious that 
considerable responsibility rests with the franchisor to ensure that correct criteria are set for 
tariff evaluation. 
Wholesale competition 
The concept of wholesale competition refers to a system in which utilities will be offered a 
choice of "independent" power producers from whom to purchase electricity. An example 
of this is the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURP A) in the USA, which 
stipulated that electric utilities had to buy 3 to 4 percent of total US generating capacity 
from qualifying co-generation and independent power producers. 
The PURP A regulation is ultimately a case of fabricated wholesale competition. A system 
of true wholesale competition would be one in which there are a number of independent 
·electricity generating companies who compete to sell electricity in a deregulated wholesale 
market. Such an arrangement presents two possibilities. Firstly the wholesalers are not 
allowed to enter into contracts with distribution companies or other large end-customers 
and are instead constrained to sell their full production to a centrally co-ordinated power 
pool; or secondly, the wholesalers are free to sell power directly to distributors and/or large 
end-customers. 
In the case of the former pool arrangement, the distributors would meet their power needs 
with purchases from the pool, while on the other side of the pool, the pool authority would 
have to re-contract power from independent wholesalers. In this case, the price at which the 
pool would purchase power would be dependent on competition amongst the independent 
wholesalers. An example of such an arrangement is the UK Power Pool. 
In the case of the later, wholesalers/generators have the opportunity to undertake 
transactions with the distribution systems and end-users. This allows competition between 
the supplier and the consumer and price between these two parties will be set on the basis 












likely to face pervasive co-ordination problems, be difficult to manage, and will result in 
vertical integration by contract (i.e. customer/distributor/transmitter/ supplier contracts). 
Incentive competition . . .. J.:: 
The final type of competition to consider is artificial competition created through centrally 
determined incentives. A general problem inherent to the concept of incentive competition 
is that performance incentives only work on the basis of clearly defined performance 
targets. This tends to become a preclusive focus i.e. incentives to compete could lead to 
heavy competition in the area in which the incentive is set, at the expense of other 
neglected areas. 
Incentive competition may be in the form ·Of sliding-scale price regimes, indexing or 
yardstick competition, amongst others. 
Sliding scale price regimes 
Unlike conventional Rate of Return regulation, a sliding scale scheme allows prices to vary 
if the actual rate of return deviates from the predetermined, comparator rate of return on 
investment. This approach provides basic incentives for cost-efficient performance but 
depends on conventional accounting procedures. This means that decisions will be based 
on embedded costing information. As such, decisions will be based on the wrong economic 
signals. Furthermore, sliding scale adjustments focus on the average level of prices and 













Indexing of utility prices pursues two objectives: It attempts to neutralise the effect of price 
changes which are not under tl}e control of the utility; and it is designed to create incentives 
for cost savings. Prices can be indexed with respect to selected, easily monitorable cost 
items but there is also the option of using broad-based indices such as the Consumer Price 
Index or Retail P1ice Index. An example of the later is the RPI - X formula used to index 
prices in the restructured UK ESL 
Index-based "minus-x" schemes limit the upside on prices by allowing prices to rise no 
more than a specific price index less X points to allow for efficiency improvements. The 
advantage is that net revenues are made dependent on the difference between actual and 
expected efficiency improvements. Thus they provide an incentive to beat expected 
efficiency improvements in order to realise a profit. 
However, efficiency changes provide an incomplete picture of utility performance. For 
example if customers are willing to pay a higher price for bett r service, the utility may not 
be able to charge such higher prices in view of the indexing constraint. 
Yardstick(benchmark) competition 
The idea behind the yardstick approach is to measure the performance of a particular utility 
relative to the sector's average performance. This would eliminate many of the deficiencies 
associated with single-valued performance measures. For instance, if tariffs are set equal to 
a sector's average costs per unit of output, the individual utility's costs become a choice 
variable which can be used to influence the individual utility's rate of return. Of course, this 
discounts any external factors which may be beyond the control of a particular utility. 
Yardstick competition is only relevant if there are a number of utilities, relatively 
comparable in terms of function, regional characteristics, technological standards, 
accounting principles etc. An example of where yardstick competition could be useful for 
improving efficiency and hence prices is in the current South African electricity 
distribution industry. If similar distributors were adjudicated against a common set of 
benchmark ratios, it would be possible to rank the performance of each distributor against 












distributor and the common benchmark would translate into profits for that distributor and 
visa versa for unfavourable variances. 
2.12 Non-tariff pricing 
The content of this chapter so far has concentrated on tariff principles based, to a greater or 
lesser extent on rigorous economic analyses. However, it is unrealistic to expect all 
customers to conform to the strait-jacket of tariffs specified according to their customer 
category classification. This is particularly the case for large customers who are able to 
significantly influence the financial viability of the utility. For most electric utilities non-
tariff pricing will be an element of their pricing strategy and hence any formulation of a 
framework for analysing electricity pricing would be incomplete without a review of this 
pricing technique. 
Non-tariff electricity pricing, has been defined as the process of "determining the price 
parameters for individual customers on a case-by-case individually customised basis" 
(Calitz, 1991 :36). In terms of the various pricing philosophies explained in Section 1.3, 
non-tariff pricing can be defined as a combination of the cost-of-service, value of service 
and competitive pricing philosophy: Cost of service because the utility offering the 
customised tariff is unlikely to offer a tariff which will not recover at least its marginal 
operating costs; value of service because considerations of the customer's price elasticity of 
demand will weigh heavily in the determination of customised contracts; and competitive 
pricing in the case of utilities concerned with market share and competition with other 
utilities or alternative energy sources. 
Calitz (1991:39) describes seven different sources of pressure for non-tariff electricity 
pricing. Four significant sources are: 
1. Surplus generating capacity 
As explained earlier, in times of excess generating capacity, the short run marginal costs 
are considerably lower than average costs. This leaves a margin between marginal costs 













2. Pressures exerted by the customer 
Large customers have called for specially negotiated customised contracts for themselves 
for large bulk supplies. Utilities, particularly para-statal utilities, have often structured 
customised contracts in attempts to display customer-focus. However, displays of this kind 
are limited to those that will at least show some financial return on investment. Most often 
customised deals are based on mutual economic benefit. An example is Eskom's recent 
Alusaf contract where Eskom and Alusaf negotiated a mutually beneficial pricing deal. 
3. Maturity 
A mature industry requires increased capability to measure costs on individual items and to 
price accordingly. Maturity implies that customers demand a higher degree of pricing 
sophistication and will not tolerate tariffs which are not cost-reflective. 
4. Pressures stemming from shortcomings of tariffs and competition in the energy 
market. 
The previous sections in this chapter have attempted to illustrate the various short-comings 
and advantages of various tariff mechanisms. Some customers may switch to alternative 
energy sources so as to avoid some of the general short-comings of tariffs applied to 
specific classes of consumer. This will lead to the utility negotiating special contracts so 
that this custom will not be lost. 
Similarly, competition from alternative sources of energy will lead to pressure for the 
utility to negotiate special contracts for those customers who have a high price elasticity of 
demand for electricity. 
There are a multitude of different possibilities for customised tariffs such as: 
*Linking the price of electricity to the price of commodities (Eskom-Alusaf contract). 
*Avoided-cost-based tariffs. 
*Co-generation and self-generation based contracts. 












A common thread in any customised contract is the process of balancing risk and return 
between the customer and the supplier. Clearly this principle of tariff setting is totally 
abstracted from the micro-economists' world of analytical tariff theories . 
. -""· .~ 
Customised pricing is widely accepted internationally and in South Africa. There is no 
doubt that it has a place in the pricing strategy of any electricity utility since it would be 
foolish to ignore requests for customised contracts, particularly if doing so would result in 
decisions contrary to the national interest. However, customised tariffing - by definition - is 
an exception to the general pricing practice adopted by any particular utility and as such 
should not be considered as more than a niche element of a broader pricing philosophy in 
any particular electricity utility. 
2.13 Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to sketch a broad theoretical electricity pricing framework. The 
chapter began with a description of a paradigm in which the tariff was described as the 
mechanism which arbitrates between the customer, the supplier and the national interest. In 
this paradigm electricity pricing is best described as the art of compromise. The chapter 
then reviewed some views of the criteria which should be used in developing an electricity 
and energy pricing policy. The specific criteria used in defining a pricing policy will 
determine the specific philosophy characterising that policy. On this subject, the cost of 
service, value of service, social pricing and competitive pricing tariffing philosophies were 
described. Moving from the general to the specific, a brief discussion of what has come to 
be known as "the first great pricing debate", illustrated some of the key arguments on 
electricity costing. Since electricity costing is ultimately the basis of electricity pricing, the 
chapter then focused on nine factors which influence the cost of supplying different 
consumers. The bulk of the chapter then focused on a critical review of various costing and 
pricing approaches, specifically: Embedded costing; marginal costing; pricing applications 













CHAPTER 3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY 
3.1 Introduction . ,;·-
Electricity has been a vital part of the development of South Africa for just over 100 
years. The purpose of this chapter is to review the development of the electricity 
industry in South Africa so as to provide a background to the current structure of the 
industry and the state of electricity pricing in the South African electricity industry. This 
chapter reviews the history in two periods: the developments prior to the nationalisation 
of the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company in 1948 and the developments 
since then. At the beginning of the first period, the generation industry developed in a 
fragmented and decentralised fashion, reacting to the need for electricity by 
communities, mines and industries. There was a mix of private and public ownership of 
the generation and distribution industry at this time. As the generation industry 
expanded it became progressively more centralised. In 1948 the nationalisation of the 
Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company marked the end of private ownership in 
the industry and the beginning of a whole new era in the development of the industry. 
From 1948 onwards the responsibility for generation and transmission rested almost 
entirely with the Electricity Supply Commission. 
3.2 The first period: 1882to1948 
Reading the history of this period, one is filled with a sense of romance that 
characterised the pioneering development of the industry. Individuals such as Dr 
Charles Merz, Dr Hendrik Van Der Bijl, Dr Bernard Price and Sir Robert Kotze are 
revered as formidable engineers who shaped the development of an enormously 
significant industry. The flavour of the time is perhaps best conveyed in a letter Dr Van 
Der Bijl wrote shortly before his death, 
"Our inspiration was derived from faith in the future of our country. Still a young and 
vigorous land in a world grown old and perhaps weary, South Africa possesses 
abundant resources which her virile people will not leave undeveloped ... it will be our 
endeavour to play our part not as those who follow where others lead, but as pioneers" 












The nature of the industry Van Der Bijl, (then Chairman of the Electricity Supply 
Commission) left at his death at the end of 1948, was vastly different from the nature of 
the industry which he started in, in 1923. Indeed, in the history of the industry from 
1882 to 1948 the development.-Of the generation industry was from private ownership to 
public ownership, from fragmentation to consolidation and from private control to 
public control. The distribution industry did not mirror these changes and instead 
became progressively more fragmented. 
Kimberly Municipality commissioned its first large scale electricity reticulation system 
in 1890, Johannesburg followed shortly thereafter in 1891, Pretoria in 1892, Cape 
Town in 1895 and Durban in 1897 (Escom, 1973). In each province, legislation based 
upon regulations introduced by the Board of Trade Regulations in Great Britain was 
created to regulate the new power utilities. This regulation governed the provision of 
electricity for public purposes. In terms of pricing, the approval of the Administrator of 
each province had to be obtained for tariffs. By 1905 there were a number of gold 
mines and a few other industries who had their own generating facilities. In addition 
there were 24 municipalities who had built their own generation and reticulation 
facilities. The nine largest, in 1905, are listed in the table below: 
Undertaking Annual Sales Number of Customers 
[GWh] 
Rand Central, Brakpan 10 28 bulk 
De Beers, Kimberly 9 1000 +bulk 
General Electric, Germiston 8.6 493 +bulk 
Durban Municipality 4.4 3167 +trams 
Cape Electric Tramway Co. 3.4 Trams 
Johannesburg Municipality 3.3 2420 
Cape Town Municipality 1.8 1332 +trams 
Pietermaritzburg Municipality 1.1 1068 +trams 
Pretoria Municipality 1 1300 
Table 1. Electricity supply in South Africa in 1905* 
*Source: Christie (1979) 
However, in 1905 the price of electricity was very high: The cheapest bulk power tariff 
in South Africa in 1905 was one penny per unit and the price for domestic customers 
was as high as a shilling. These prices were considerably higher than in Britain, where 
the efficiencies of steam turbine generating technology had not yet reached South 












Much of this changed with the development of gold mining methods which were more 
electricity intensive. The increased demand from the mines lead to the formation in 
· 1906 of the Victoria Falls Power Company (VFP), as a subsidiary of the British South 
Africa Company which Cecil Rhodes had established. At the time, the objective of the 
VFP was to generate electricity from the Zambesi River at Victoria Falls and transmit it 
to the Gold Mines on the Reef. However as a result of pressure from influential coal 
barons on the Reef, VFP began to construct large coal-fired plant for the supply of 
electricity to the gold mines on the Rand. At this point "and Transvaal" was added and 
the VFP became known as the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company (VFTPC). 
The VFTPC subsequently purchased a number of strategic concessions, the Rand 
Central Electric Works and the share capital of the Rand Mines Power Supply 
Company by 1909. (A fascinating account of the intrigue and "romance" which 
characterised the formation of VFTPC is to be found in (Christie, 1979) ). 
At almost the same time as the VFTPC was formed, in 1909 the Earl of Selborne - the 
Govenor-General of South Africa, established a commission "to enquire into the 
desirability of the establishment of large electric power companies in the Transvaal" 
(Report of the Power Companies Commission, 1909). The Power Companies 
Commission as it became known, recommended that large undertakings "should be left 
to private enterprise" and "private enterprise will for the most part eventuate in the 
formation of large power companies" (Report f the Power Companies Commission, 
1909). However, the Commission also recommended that 
"Since the supply of electric power leads to the establishment of a virtual 
monopoly in a commodity which has become practically a necessity of modern 
civilisation, it should, while being left as far as possible to private enterprise, at 
the same time be placed under government control and subjected. to regulations 
which shall secure the equitable supply of power, the public safety and public 
interests generally" 
At the time, the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company Limited and the Rand 
Mines Power Supply Company, its subsidiary, were practically the only private 
companies selling power in the country. These companies argued against any form of 
State control of their businesses. The commission however refuted these arguments 
saying that companies have "taken steps which have had the effect of eliminating 
competition within considerable areas, with the result that they are now in possession of 












exercise that power to the detriment of customers and potential competitors and so to 




The Commission thus requested the government to pass an act which would oblige 
power companies to obtain a licence from the relevant minister. However, in addition to 
these requirements, the Act also sought a means of broaching the issue of industry 
ownership. The Commission had recommended in 1910 that the industry remain in 
private hands mainly because of the need to attract foreign investment in industry in 
South Africa and also because the need for State capital for growth meant that the State 
was simply not in a position to finance the construction of a major power company 
(Report of the Power Companies Commission, 1909). As a quid pro quo the 1910 
Power Act contained a provision for the State appropriation of the industry after a 
period of 35 years. Setting a limit of 35 years was considered as a long enough time for 
private investors to obtain a return on their invested capital. The industry fought the 
issue of 35 years tooth and nail, arguing that experience in Britain had indicated that 42 
years was the period of time that was required so as not to deter the investment of 
capital from electrical enterprise. In the event, the Act settled on 37 years. 
With regard to tariff regulation, the commission recommended that "it would suffice if 
the State have the right of supervising prices, such right to be only sparingly exercised" 
(Report of the Power Companies Commission, 1909). The recommendation was that 
"no maximum prices should be fixed, but the price charged should be subject to 
revision by the government on the application of any 10 customers, or any number of 
customers taking not less than 5% of the power companies' output. In addition, the 
Commission recommended that the companies be allowed "to earn a dividend of 10 to 
12 percent of the capital invested in remunerative plant" (Report of the Power 
Companies Commission, 1909). Finally the Act prescribed that undertakings applying 
for a licence were obliged to submit a schedule of standard prices which the applicant 
proposed to charge customers. Application was to be made to the Minister of Mines 
who was obliged to refer the application to the Power Undertakings Board for eventual 
hearing of the application. The Board was entitled to modify or approve the schedule of 
standard prices charged by undertakings. 
The Transvaal Power Act of 1910 was finally passed three days before the creation of 
the Union. The Act had made it possible for VFP and Rand Mines Power Company to 
obtain licenses for their vast new systems. The power industry then surged forward so 












Rosherville and Vereeniging) with a total installed capacity of more than 160 MW. The 
considerable centralisation of power supply led to large-scale reductions of electricity 
tariffs so that by 1915 the price had been reduced to 0.525d per kWh (Escom, 1973). At 
the same time, the VFTPC was·able to report increasing profitability (Christie, 1990). 
At this stage it is should be emphasised that the Power Act of 1910 regulated all 
undertakings supplying power to others, except the municipalities who were separately 
regulated by the Provincial Administrations as had been established by the provincial 
ordinances in 1905. However, the 1910 Power Act also stipulated that municipalities 
did not have a sole right to supply electricity in their area of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, 
undertakings applying for a licence to supply within a municipality's area of supply 
were subject to a veto from either the Governor or the Local Authority Council unless it 
was a supply in respect of the mines, railways or some government department. 
The 1910 Power Act thus marked the end of an era of fragmented and uncontrolled 
development of the power supply industry, but not of the distribution industry. 
Furthermore, through the resultant establishment of a Power Undertakings Board, the 
first regulator had been brought into being. For the moment the principle of private 
ownership, under benign government control, had been entrenched. 
The next significant stage in the development of the industry was driven by the 
railways. Here the prime focus was to achieve a means of transporting coal from the 
Natal coal fields, over the escarpment and onto the Reef or from the coal fields to the 
coast for export. Electric locomotives had by this stage achieved a level of significantly 
greater efficiency than steam locomotives. The problem the railways thus faced was to 
obtain a source of electricity to power their electric lines. Various possibilities existed: 
one was to purchase from municipalities; alternatively power could be bought from a 
private firm which would be specifically set up to sell electricity to the South African 
Railways (SAR). With regard to purchasing from private firms, SAR feared that private 
firms would be subject to strikes and further that the financing requirement would 
stretch the railways beyond their means. The SAR therefore wanted a state-owned 
electricity supply institution "to prevent the railways from having to take supply from 
outside firms" (Christie, 1979). To find a solution to the problem, the Government 
commissioned Dr Charles Merz, a consulting engineer from London "to study the 
general question of electric power supply" (Electric Power Supply in the Union of 












At the time that Dr Merz began his study (1920) there were more than 58 electricity 
undertakings in the Union. These included 40 municipalities and 18 private companies 
of which the VFfPC and Rand Power Supply were by far the largest (Electric Power 
Supply in the Union of Soutl1,.1Africa, 1920). The conclusions and recommendations 
contained in the Merz report greatly influenced the subsequent development of the 
electricity supply industry (Morgan, 1993). The Merz report recommendations were 
inter alia that: (Electric Power Supply in the Union of South Africa, 1920) 
1. An act should be passed by Parliament providing for the regulation and 
unification of the supply of electricity and others forms of power throughout the 
Union. 
2. Priority be given to the development of an electric power supply infrastructure 
to meet the needs of industry and transport. 
3. Dr Merz recommended that an Act should be passed by Parliament to provide 
for the establishment of a small body of commissioners with a mandate to 
encourage new schemes for the development of electric power supply, and 
generally to administer the Act in accordance with the principle explained in his 
report. 
After Dr Merz presented his report to General Smuts (the Prime Minister) in April 
1920, a committee under the chairmanship of Sir Robert Kotze, the Government 
Mining Engineer, wa.S appointed to investigate the implications of Dr Merz's report 
(Escom, 1973). This committee drew up a draft Electricity Bill, which was introduced 
into the House of Assembly in May 1922. The Bill was then referred to a parliamentary 
Select Committee, which took written and oral evidence from various parties. The 
Kotze Committee, the Select Committee and Dr Merz then considered various 
alternative forms of organisation in the supply of electricity. The most important were 
the following: (Board of Trade and Industry Report, 1977) 
1. Private enterprise supply companies, without st'!-te control. 
2. Private enterprise, but subject to publicly administered licensing restraints, to 
price controls, and to control over the means of financing activities. 
3. Supply by municipalities, railways or a Government Department. 
4. Supply by a State-owned corporation having its own equity capital, but subject 
to restrictions over the level of profits. 
5. Supply by a state-appointed board or commission, financed by loans and . 












Dr Merz rather ignored the issue of ownership. The thrust of his argument centered on 
two principles: Firstly, centralised generation was necessary to ensure the efficient 
operation of the system, and secondly the industry should be regulated by a commission 
which would control the indu~try. His argument for the latter principle was as a result 
of the British Electricity Act (1919) which provided for a commission who were given 
power to formulate schemes for the establishment of a joint electricity authority in any 
electricity district (Board of Trade and Industries Report, 1977). Such schemes could 
require the transfer of electricity undertakings to the joint electricity authority and no 
new generating station could be established without the consent of the Commissioners. 
Sir William Hoy, General Manager of the South African Railways, giving evidence to 
the Select Committee expressed his opposition to the supply of electricity to the 
railways by private enterprise (Report of the Select Committee on the Electricity Bill, 
1922). 
Sir Robert Kotze, Government Mining Engineer, disfavoured power supply directly by 
the state. His arguments were that, "Private enterprise does work more cheaply and 
more efficiently than the government, and that is why an attempt is made in this bill to 
get away from purely government control, and the Commission will be more efficient 
than a purely government establishment" (Report of the Select Committee on the 
Electricity Bill, 1922). 
Mr Bernard Price, Chief Engineer of the VFTPC argued vehemently against state 
ownership of the industry and said that in terms of the Transvaal Power Act of 1910, 
profits generated by the company in excess of a stated return on investment had to be 
shared in stated proportions between the consumer and the company (Report of the 
Select Committee on the Electricity Bill, 1922). 
Regarding the question of whether the supplying body should be a commission financed 
by loan money, rather than a corporation financed at least partly by equity capital, the 
arguments were based ~pon two successful current examples of commissions, i.e. the 
Rand Water Board (which gave evidence before the select committee) and Ontario-
Hydro which was financed through government secured debt capital. The Board of 
Trade and Industry Report (1977), in a discussion on the events leading to the 1922 
Electricity Act, concluded on these different views as follows: 












because electricity, it was believed, should be supplied at cost and cost would in 
tum be minimised by centralisation. The railways also opposed the intervention 
of private enterprise in the industry. 
2. Controlled private ente_rprise was not favoured because centralisation was 
necessary to reduce cost and because the Transvaal Power Act of 1910 had in 
any case provided for the demise of the VFf PC after 35 years. 
3. Municipalities and the railways were not regarded as the ideal vehicle because 
of the need for centralisation. 
4. Government departments themselves were not regarded as providing optimum 
efficiency in electricity supply. 
5. A State Corporation with equity capital was not regarded as necessary, in light 
of the success which the Rand Water Board and the Ontario Power Commission 
had enjoyed - both of which had no equity capital. 
6. On its own merits and also by elimination, a State-appointed Commission 
financed by loans and subject to licensing, price and other restraints, operating 
at cost, was favoured. 
The Electricity Act of 1922 concluded the work done by Dr M rz, the Kotze Committee 
and the Select Committee. The Act repealed the Transvaal Power Act of 1910 and was 
the first Electricity Act to apply to the Union as a whole. The first chapter of the Act 
provided for the establishment of a Commission (to be known as the Electricity Supply 
Commission) consisting of not less than three and not more than five members. 
Members were selected on the basis of specialist technical expertise " ... each member 
shall be selected for his knowledge and practical experience in business or 
administration, including, in so far as the Govenor-General may deem expedient, 
knowledge and experience in electricity supply and its techniques" (Section 1(1) of the 
Electricity Act of 1922). The Commission was established as a body corporate in law 
and had responsibility for, inter alia, the establishment, acquisition, maintenance and 
workings of undertakings for an efficient supply of electricity; and the investigation of 
new or additional facilities for the supply of electricity within any area and for the co-
ordination and co-operation of existing undertakings so as to stimulate the provision, 
wherever required, of a cheap and abundant supply of electricity (Section 3(a) and (b) 
of the Electricity Act of 1922). As such, all undertakings with the exception of the 
municipalities and South African Railways and Harbour Administration, who wished to 
supply a sizeable amount of electricity had to apply for a licence to a control board 
established for this purpose. Again the municipalities escaped the regulatory provisions 
which applied to the rest of the industry. In deciding whether to issue a licence, the 












supply electricity, the only significant proviso being that any action must be in terms of 
the "public interest" (Section 6(4) of the Electricity Act of 1922). 
With regard to electricity pricing, the 1922 Act stipulated that prices charged were to 
cover the cost of production (including distribution, maintenance and administration), 
amounts required for interest on money raised by way of loan, and a reserve fund for 
the replacement of obsolete plant and machinery. The Act provided for a schedule of 
standard prices as a condition of the licence granted by the board. In addition, any 
surplus profits had to be shared between a licensee and its customers as follows: The 
licensee was obliged within six months after the completion of each financial year of 
the undertakings, to distribute to the undertakers' customers, pro-rata to their payments, 
twenty-five percent of the surplus profit of the undertaking for that year (Section 25 (2) 
(a) and (b) of the Electricity Act of 1922). (This share was increased gradually from 
25% to 50% and finally to 70% before 1948.) 
With regard to the Commission itself, the Act stipulated that as far as practicable, the 
Commission's operations should be carried out neither at a profit nor at a loss and as 
such it was not subject to the regulations described above. 
The 1922 Act also allowed licensees to charge prices above or below those in their 
schedule of standard prices, in any or all of the following circumstances: (Section 26(1) 
of the Electricity Act of 1922) 
(a) "the amount of electricity consumed" by a customer justified a discount/premium 
in his/her bill, 
(b) a customer with "uniform or regular demand" was entitled, at the suppliers 
discretion, to a discount, 
(c) supply could be discounted/surcharged for specific customers based on "the time 
when, or during which, the electricity is required," 
(d) "the expenditure of the licensee in furnishing the supply" could be reason for a 
discount/ surcharge, 
(e) any "special circumstances" not included above could be reason for discounts or 
surcharges. 
Finally, the Electricity Act of 1922 also contained the provision that the Govenor-












private undertakings. However a period of 38 years had to have expired since the time 
that the licence was first issued to the undertaking. 
In summary, in terms of the .trends explained in the introduction to this chapter, the 
1922 Electricity Act resulted in a further centralisation of the industry, increasing 
government control and increasing government ownership. Private ownership was not 
rejected but it became subject to a higher degree of control and the further expansion of 
private industry was limited. 
After the passing of the 1922 Act the activities of the Commission began a rapid 
expansion. Only three days after the first meeting of Escom, a conference was held with 
the Railways and Harbours Administration for the take-over of the Colenso Power 
Station from the railways. This was followed by the construction of the Congella Power 
Station near Durban and the Witbank, Klip, Vaal and Salt River Stations. 
One of the first disagreements between the privately owned industry and the 
commission took place in 1923 when VFTPC applied in May 1923 for permission to 
erect a power station at Witbank to meet the increase in the demands of the gold mines 
after the Rand revolt. Escom, as it became known, opposed the application. Smuts (the 
Prime Minister) personally intervened and concluded a compromise whereby the VFP 
' was to build and operate the station, while the commission would finance the project 
and thus own it. This set a precedent which meant that it was the end of the road for 
private sector expansion of the generation capacity. It is clear that the Commission 
intended to become the sole owner of generation capacity in South Africa. An era of 
private sector ownership of the means of production of electricity had given way to 
ownership by the Commission, which effectively meant ownership and control by the 
government (Morgan, 1993). 
In the 1930s, with the discovery of new gold fields, the industry headed into a sales 
boom. Between 1935 and 1936 sales increased by 51 % and this was repeated again 
between 1936 and 1937 (Escom, 1973). The increasing efficiency achieved through 
more advanced generation technologies meant that by 1940, the price of electricity was 
O. l 755d per unit (Escom, 1973) This compared to more than 1 shilling per unit sold to 
domestic consumers in 1905. 
Up to 1946 it seemed that the rapidly expanding Escom and the existing private 
generators had successfully co-existed. Sir Bernard Price, a director of the VFTPC in 












private enterprise". The essential principle behind the arrangement of supply by the 
VFfPC was the regulation and control of the profit motive via the sharing of surplus 
profits on a predetermined automatic basis. Dr Price commented that the arrangement 
had operated to the entire satisfaction of the mining industry and other customers of the 
company. 
However, Price's attempts to get Escom to leave the VFfPC as a private concern, were 
to no avail. Hence on 1July1948 Escom successfully negotiated a take-over of VFP for 
14.5 million pounds. The takeover of the VFfPC provided Escom's Rand Undertaking 
with a well established power system, able to meet the demands for further 
development. The year 1948 thus marked the end of any significant private ownership 
of generating capacity in the industry and the beginning of a new era of public 
ownership and centralised control under the Electricity Supply Commission. 
3.3 The second period: 1948 to 1987 
After the expropriation of the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company, Escom 
became the dominant player in the supply industry. Indeed, from 1950 to 1974, Escom's 
electricity sales increased by an average of 8.8% per annum (De Villiers Commission of 
Enquiry, 1984), and between 1945 and 1955, with the purchase of VFTPC, the capacity 
of Escom's power stations doubled (Escom, 1973). 
However by 1957 Escom was still, (defacto), "regulated" by the 1922 Act. In 1958 a 
new Act, the 1958 Electricity Act was passed, consolidating the amendments that had 
been made to the 1922 Act. In terms of the new Act, Escom was split into a number of 
separate undertakings, each of which had to separately account for the costs used to 
derive the prices they charged. Section 14 of the Electricity Act of 1958 repeated the 
provisions of the 1922 Act, that the price charged for electricity was to cover: 
1. The cost of production, including distribution, maintenance and 
administration. 
2. The amounts required for interest on money raised by way of a loan, 
redemption of any securities for those loans and other expenditure incidental 
thereto. 
3. The amounts set aside for the Reserve Fund. 













In 1971, the 1958 Electricity Act was amended to allow the Commission to establish a 
Capital Development Fund through which appropriations from revenue could be made, 
in order to decrease the ratio of•Escom's debt to its retained earnings. In the same year, a 
second amendment was approved whereby Escom had the authority to amalgamate the 
power stations from two or more undertakings and to supply electricity from one 
undertaking to another. This laid the basis for the establishment of the Central 
Generating Undertaking on 1 January 1972, which enabled Escom to operate all its 
power stations and other plants as an integrated system (De Villiers Commission of 
Enquiry, 1984). The creation of a centrally planned and controlled power industry is 
ultimately what Dr Merz had recommended in his report in 1922 - "An Act should be 
passed by Parliament providing for the ... unification of the supply of electricity and 
other forms of power throughout the Union" (Electric Power Supply in the Union of 
South Africa, 1920). 
The next major development in the history of the industry was the De Villiers 
Commission of Inquiry into the Supply of Electricity in the RSA. The purpose of this 
inquiry, following shortly after the Board of Trade and Industry Rep01t in 1977 which 
was motivated by customer dissatisfaction concerning unacceptably high tariff 
increases, was to investigate the legislation, structure, cost effectiveness, pricing policy 
and functions of existing institutions involved in the supply of electricity in the 
Republic of South Africa. Although not stated as such, it would appear that the 
continuing extraordinarily high price increases was one of the principle motivating 
factors for the De Villers Commission Inquiry. 
The most important recommendations of the De Villiers Inquiry were as follows: (De 
Villiers: 1984) 
1. The. principle of operating at neither a profit nor a loss should be discarded in 
favour of a sound assets and income structure complying with certain 
requirements. 
2. The industry should be integrated and production costs (excluding 
transmission and distribution costs) should be centrally pooled. 
3. A permanent Board of Control, whose Chairman should be appointed by the 
State President, would be responsible for the supervision of an independent 
Escom management board. 












The recommended Board of Control made provision for a high degree of customer 
representation by agricultural, mining, municipal and commercial customer sectors. For 
the first time in the history of Escom, customers were comprehensively represented on 
its controlling body. ,..-. 
Accordingly, the Electricity Act was amended in 1985 and 1986 to effect some of the 
recommendations of the De Villiers Inquiry. The Electricity Act of 1958 was repealed 
in its entirety by the new Electricity Act of 1987. Eskom, as it was renamed, was 
exempt from applying for a licence by the Electricity Control Board, which hence forth 
only had limited jurisdiction over Eskom's activities. 
In terms of tariffing issues, the current control structure ensures that Eskom has 
jurisdiction over tariff level while the Electricity Control Board has jurisdiction over the 
tariff structure. 
The positive developments in the supply industry did not, however, spill over into the 
distribution industry. Municipal electricity distributors are still administrated according 
to provincial ordinances dating back to 1905. This means that the municipal electricity 
distributors are regulated firstly by their local councils and secondly by Provincial 
Administrations. This method of control has been effective in ensuring that the local 
authority electricity distribution industry succeeded in meeting the needs of the white 
residents who were able to vote for their respective local authority councils. However, 
with a clear line drawn between the relatively affluent whites and the disenfranchised 
blacks, the development of electricity distribution in the black areas remained almost 
totally neglected. These structural defects were exacerbated by the establishment of the 
Bantu Administration Boards in 1973 and Black Local Authorities in 1982 which took 
over the supply of services to black townships. Without the industrial and commercial 
customers which had financed the electrification of white areas, these apartheid 
creations failed, and in so doing precipitated the current crisis in electricity provision to 
black areas (Steyn, 1993). 
The fragmentation of the distribution industry was exacerbated by the creation of 
fragmented "Self-Governing" and "National States" each of whom had the right to 
supply inside their own areas of jurisdiction. In addition, Eskom distributes electricity 
to most rural areas as well as in many Black Local Authority areas, whose distribution 













This chapter has reviewed the development of the electricity supply and distribution 
industry in South Africa. From .fragmented and decentralised beginnings at the start of 
. _ . .,,,,:,.-
the century, the supply industry became progressively more centralised so that today 
more than 96% of South Africa's electrical energy is generated centrally in a single 
organisation. Further, while the supply industry was largely privately owned in the first 
quarter of the century, progressively larger portions of the supply industry became 
publicly owned so that by 1948, after the purchase of the Victoria Falls and Transvaal 
Power Company, almost the whole of the bulk supply industry was publicly owned. 
The trend of centralisation in the supply industry was not mirrored in the development 
of the distribution industry which instead became progressively more decentralised. 
Today there are a large number of local authorities, Regional Services Council 
distributors, distributors in the fragmented "Self-Governing" and "National States" as 
well as Eskom, who are involved in electricity distribution. In addition, distribution is 
regulated (to a greater or lesser extent) by separare authorities. The implication of these 














PAST AND PRESENT ELECTRICITY PRICING IN THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY AND 
DISTRIBUTION INDUSTRY 
The purpose of this chapter is to review past and present electricity pricing in South Africa 
with a view to setting a background for a future electricity pricing strategy. The chapter 
begins with an historical review of electricity pricing in Eskom. This provides a 
background to the second part of the chapter which discusses electricity pricing policies 
and practices currently used at each of five interlaces in the industry: Eskom Generation to 
Eskom Transmission; Eskom Transmission to International Customers; Eskom 
Transmission to Eskom Distributors; Eskom Distributors to end-customers and non-
Eskom distributors; finally non-Eskom distributors to end-customers. Finally the chapter 
reviews electricity pricing in the non-Eskom distribution industry at present. 
4.2 A history of Escom pricing and costing policies 
In the first period of the development of the South African electricity supply and 
distribution industry from 1882 to 1948 as discussed in the previous chapter, the price of 
electricity was continually decreasing in real terms. This resulted from continually 
improving plant efficiency, an abundance of cheap coal and labour, a virtually unabated 
growth in demand and consumption, and cost savings through improvements in economies 
of scale. To a certain extent this trend continued in the second phase of the industry. From 
1950 to 1970 for example, there was only a nominal 3.87 % increase in price (De Villiers 
Report 1984:5). 
This section focuses specifically on pricing in Escom from its formation in 1922 up to the 
time that it was reconstituted through the Eskom Act of 1987. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Escom was created through the 1922 Electricity Act. 
Essentially the only provision in this Act relating to pricing by Escom was that Escom 
should price electricity so as to make neither a profit nor a loss. 
Although Escom was created as a single national parastatal corporation, its activities 













undertakings. As Escom developed, it became necessary to define Escom's pricing policy 
more clearly. To this end, the Electricity Act of 1958 prescribed three principles for Escom 
pricing as follows: 
1. Escom undertakings should not show any surpluses or deficits. (Section 14) 
2. Each of Escom's undertakings must be separately taken into account when 
prices are assessed or adjusted, and separate accounts must be kept for each 
undertaking, with a fair allocation of overhead and administration charges. (Section 
16) 
3. One consumer group should not subsidise another. (Section 14) 
However, the further development of the Escom power system lead to an ever-increasing 
gap between the costs of generating electricity in the coal-rich areas in the Eastern 
Transvaal and the cost of generating electricity in other parts of the country. This was one 
of the contributing factors which lead to the establishment of a national transmission 
network which fully interconnected the previously separated regional undertakings. The 
development of the national grid thus lead to a situation where it was possible to operate 
Escom's power stations in order of economic merit. Accordingly, all Escom's power 
stations were transferred to a separate undertaking, namely the Central Generating 
Undertaking (CGU). All power stations were then operated in a centrally controlled, 
integrated system. 
The establishment of the CGU was authorised in terms of a special permit issued by the 
Electricity Control Board. This permit stipulated the approved method of allocating the 
CGU's costs to the distribution undertakings. The basic principle was that the excess 
generating cost of the power stations previously operated by the Cape Western, Natal and 
Border Undertakings, compared with the generation cost of the remaining power stations, 
must continue to be carried by the power stations concerned (Board of Trade and Industry 
Report No 1889 1977:48). This principle was changed twice subsequently. With the first 
amendment, the excess generation costs (energy related) arising from the operation of the 
coastal power stations which had annual station load factors of more than 0.2, was 
excluded. In the second amendment, the excess generation costs to be charged to the 
coastal undertakings was limited to the interest and redemption charges of the power 
stations involved. 
The 1958 Electricity Act, as amended, described the method of cost allocation to the 












ti Prices for electricity should cover the cost of production including distribution, 
maintenance and administration, (the costs incurred by the Central Generating 
Unit), and interest on loans, redemption of loans and annual contributions to the 
Reserve Fund and the Capital Development Fund. " 
The permit of the Central Generating Unit prescribed that the costs of generation (or 
purchase of electricity) including the cost of reserve plant, the cost of interconnection of 
power stations, investigation and research costs, and overhead and administration charges, 
should be allocated to the separate undertakings on the basis of kW demand and kWh 
consumption of each undertaking (Board of Trade and Industry Report No 1889, 1977:48). 
The differences in the cost of supply to the different undertakings is contained in Table 1 
which lists the 1976 costs per unit of energy (kWh) sent-out, in each of Escom's eight 
undertakings. 
Undertakine: Lare:e Power Users Small Power Users Domestic Users 
Border 2.77 5.46 4.6 
Cape Eastern 3.25 6.8 8.2 
Cape Northern 2.04 4.6 3 .. 24 
Cape Western 1.95 4.2 3.91 
Eastern Transvaal 1.36 3.5 2.46 
Natal 1.8 3.7 4.07 
Orane:e River 1.34 5.4 7.4 
RandandOFS 1.31 2.8 2.02 
Table 1. Cost to per kWh sent-out in 1976 
(Source: Board of Trade and Industry Report No 1889,1977:16) 
The most important factors causing the differences in costs between undertakings, 
according to the BTI Report, were as follows: 
1. Excess capacity costs 
In terms of the CGU permit issued by the Electricity Control Board, the excess generating 
cost of the power stations previously operated by the Cape Western, Natal and Border 
undertakings, compared with the generation cost, must continue to be carried by the power 












above, with the first and second amendment to the original CGU permit the allocation of 
the excess capacity costs to the coastal undertakings was progressively diminished. 
2. ·Location 
The 1958 Electricity Act stipulated that costs incurred in the transmission of electricity 
were to be allocated to the undertaking to which the electricity is transmitted (Section 
23(6)(b) of the Electricity Act of 1958, as amended). Expressed in cents/kWh, this cost 
varied from 0.14 c/kWh for the Cape Western Undertaking, to 0.001 c/kWh for the Rand 
and OFS Undertaking. 
3. Age of undertakings 
According to the principles of fund accounting which were practised in Escom at this time, 
each loan could be linked to a specific asset, or group of assets. Hence newer undertakings, 
or those in which there was significant growth, had assets which had a higher historical 
cost than that of similar assets which, in the case of older undertakings, had been 
purchased some time back (and hence had a lower historical cost.) 
4. Operating expenses 
A number of factors such as the regional density of consumers, the size of the supply area 
and human resources costs amongst others, led to differences in the operating expenses of 
the different undertakings. The ratio of operating expenses to electricity sold (kWh) for 
1976 ranged from 30 in the case of the Cape Eastern Undertaking to 7 in the case of the 
Rand and OFS Undertaking (Board of Trade and Industry Report No 1889,1977:56). 
5. Mix of consumers 
The mix of consumers, i.e. whether sales are predominantly to a few v~ry large consumers 
or to a large number of smaller consumers, has an influence on the costs of an undertaking. 
In the case of those undertakings with low consumption levels per consumer (Cape 
Western, Cape Eastern and Natal) , the cost per unit consumption was naturally higher 












6. Load factor 
In the same way that the number and size of consumers has a direct impact on the costs per 
unit consumption, so the load factor of the undertaking's consumers will have an effect on 
the cost per unit consumption. That is, the higher the load factor the lower the cost per unit 
consumption will be, because the fixed costs, i.e. loan charges, transmission costs and 
generation capacity-related costs allocated from the CGU, are distributed over higher 
consumption figures. For 1976, the Border Undertaking had the lowest load factor of 0.58 
and the Rand and OFS had the highest load factor of 0.75 (Board of Trade and Industry 
Report No 1889,1977:56). 
Allocating costs to consumers 
After having determined the full costs pertaining to each undertaking, these costs were 
translated into service charges, demand charges and consumption charges in a number of 
specific tariffs. In 1977, Escom offered three tariffs: Tariff A for large users i.e. those 
whose demand exceeded 100 kW/kVA; Tariff B generally applicable to loads not 
exceeding 100 kW/kVA; and Tariff C for domestic customers within a proclaimed 
residential area. 
Tariff A consisted of a monthly service charge to compensate Escom for consumer-related 
costs; a fixed demand charge per kVA based on the maximum demand during a particular 
month - to cover the demand-related costs or part thereof - and an energy charge per kWh 
consumed. 
In 1976, Tariff A revenue accounted for 97% of Eskom's total income (Board of Trade and 
Industry Report No 1889,1977:61). The method of allocating costs to consumer groups 
with Tariff A was explained in the BTI Report as follows: 
"After determining the total costs of each undertaking, deduct the income expected from 
Tariff B and Tariff C consumers, income expected from extension charges with Tariff A 
consumers, and the income expected from the service charge in Tariff A. The remainder is 
divided into demand-related and consumption related costs." 
However, there was also a transfer of some demand-related costs into energy-related costs. 
This transfer from demand-related costs to energy-related costs was justified on account of 












consequently a transfer from demand-related cost to energy-related costs takes place to 
prevent the overcharging of low load factor consumers who make a larger contribution to 
diversity" (Source: Board of Trade and Industry Report No 1889, 1977:61). 
The transfer of demand-related costs to energy-related costs would appear to be logically 
correct. However, while the transfer from demand-related to energy-related costs was 
justified in terms of load factor/diversity considerations as explained above, this 
justification would appear to be a smoke-screen, since in actual fact nothing was done to 
determine the relationship between load factor and diversity for the consumers in each of 
the undertakings. Instead, the extent to. which demand-related costs were transferred into 
energy-related costs was based on a set of subjective factors. The BTI investigation 
described these factors as follows: (Board of Trade and Industry Report No 1889,1977:63) 
" 1. It may be desirable to set the tariffs of two adjoining undertakings with similar 
cost structures, but with different load and diversity factors for instance on such a 
level that average costs per kWh are the same; 
2. An excessive bias (transfer of demand-related costs into energy-related costs) 
in the Escom tariff may raise the tariff energy charge rate to a level above those of 
the municipalities which are generating themselves; and 
3. The higher the bias the lower the incentive to improve monthly load factors. " 
One is left with a great sense of disappointment that the considerable amount of work that 
took place in allocating costs objectively to each of the different undertakings, was all but 
lost in the end-tariff which allocated costs to the demand and energy charges in Tariff A in 
a highly subjective manner. 
Tariff B (for customers with loads not exceeding 100 kW or 100 kVA) consisted of a 
service charge for each point of supply to cover consumer-related costs, unit charges at a 
high rate for the first 500 kWh consumed per month, and unit charges at a lower rate for 
the balance of kWh consumed. Tariff C for domestic customers was structured in the same 
way as Tariff B with the exception that the first energy block was actually 300 kWh 
instead of 500 kWh. The charges for the first block were originally determined at twice 
those of the second block. However, the BTI Investigation reported that no exact cost 
calculation was carried out to determine the magnitude .of the charges in the first block. As 
with Tariff A, one is left with a sense of dis~ppointment at the subjective and essentially 
arbitrary manner in ·which the final tariffs reflected costs which had been rigorously 












The BTI investigation made a number of recommendations of relevance to pricing in 
Escom. These included recommendations relating to Escom's accounting policy, control 
over Escom, and possible geographical equalisation of tariffs. These recommendations are 
explained below: 
Accounting policy 
The essence of the recommendation on accounting policy was that fund accounting6 be 
discontinued in faveur of current cost depreciation accounting. The recommendation was 
made as a result of what had occurred since the Electricity Amendment Act no 49 of 1971 
- which gave Escom the authority io establish a Capital Development Fund - had been 
passed. The percentage of Escom's costs attributable to its contribution to the Capital 
Development Fund increased from 5.5% in 1972 to 25.8% in 1977 (Source: Board of 
Trade and Industry Report No 1889, 1977:84). (It increased further to 32.5% in 1979 (De 
Villiers 1983:205)). The BTI report argued against the existence of this fund since it was a 
"device for earning profits under the guise of costs." The sharply increasing contributions 
to the Capital Development Fund had lead to a greater proportion of capital expenditure 
being financed out of retained profits. This meant sharply lower debt/equity ratios than the 
BTI recommended ratio of not less than 4: 1 (Board of Trade and Industry Report No 
1889,1977:152) which was advanced as a suitable ratio on account of the fact that Escom 
bonds were underwritten by the State. In the BTI report a higher debt to equity ratio was 
also justified in terms of the argument that in the electricity industry, consistent income 
means that the industry is intrinsically a low risk industry. 
Control over Escom 
The BTI report also recommended greater government control of the industry through the 
regulation of profits, and therefore prices, through the Department of Industries (Board of 
Trade and Industry Report No 1889, 1977:158). In addition, it was recommended that the 
existing Electricity Control Board, should have control over the generation and distribution 
of electricity and the tariff structure. The theme of stronger direct government interference 
in the running of Escom was also supported by recommending "liaison and consultation" 
between the Department of Finance, the new Capital Projects Evaluation Group (in the 
Department of Finance) and the Electricity Control Board. It is interesting to note that the 
report made no recommendations on municipal distributor pricing. Rather it came to a 
6 The accounting concept of creating a fund and then making a specific investment so that the 












timid conclusion that "the different Provincial Administrations should perhaps control . the 
electricity tariff levels of municipalities in terms of profitability in order to prevent 
excessive surpluses" (Board of Trade and Industry Report No 1889, 1977:151). The BTI 
Report then referred this recommendation to the Inter-departmental Committee of Inquiry 
into the Finances of Local Authorities. 
Geographical tariff equalisation 
As a result of the magnitude of the differences in the costs between Eskom's different 
undertakings - as shown in Table 1 earlier- the BTI report argued for a greater 
geographical equalisation of the Escom tariffs, through greater cost pooling. It was argued 
that all costs excepting transmission and distribution costs incurred by the distributing 
undertakings themselves, should be pooled. If this recommendation was to be enacted it 
would have meant that it would have been necessary to alter Section 14 of the 1958 
Electricity Act. 
It is uncertain exactly what effect the recommendations of the BTI investigation had on 
Escom. Certainly, the high price increases before the time of the BTI investigation 
continued after the investigation. (The average annual increases in the average selling price 
from 1977 ~o 1982 per year, were 48.2%, 16.5% 6.1 %, 6.1 %, 12.7% and 22.9% 
respectively (De Villiers Report 18/1985:36)). Furthermore, the existing legislation was 
not altered to effect any of the BTI recommendations. 
The De Villiers Commission 
Continued price increases exceeding the rate of inflation was one of the reasons that the 
State President appointed a Commission of Inquiry into the supply of electricity in South 
Africa. The Commission's report heralded a whole new era in the history of Escom. 
The essential recommendation of the Commission was that Escom should have a two-tier 
control structure consisting of an Escom Board of Control (to be known as the Eskom 
Council) and a Management Board. It was recommended that the function of the Eskom 
Council would be "to see that the business is managed properly" and the role of the 
Management Board was to "run the business properly." This process was intended to 
mirror a similar process that occurs in private corporations through the interaction of 
shareholders and management. Indeed the type of control structure which the De Villiers 












of key aspects of Escom, as recommended by the BTI investigation, to a situation whereby 
the State was at arms length with Escom. Furthermore, as a consequence of the De Villiers 
recommendations, for once in the history of Escom, customers were represented on the 
controlling body (the Eskom Council). 
With regard to electrieity pricing there were a number of relevant recommendations in the 
report of the De Villiers Commission. Firstly it was recommended that "Escom should 
assume a leading role in the conservation of energy and electricity while preventing prices 
from rising too rapidly and the generation of electricity from making excessively high 
capital demands oil the economy. Its (Eskom's) objective should be the maximum 
utilisation of resources and capital in the economy through the optimum use of energy and 
electricity" (De Villiers 1983: 16). In line with this recommendation was the principle that 
"operating at neither a profit nor at a loss must be discarded in favour of a sound assets and 
income structure complying with the condition that the interest coverage ratio should be 
greater than 1.05 and the assets/liability ratio should be maintained at 3:2" (De Villiers 
1983:16). 
With regard to tariff structure, the De Villiers Commission recommended that the concept 
of different undertakings within Escom be discarded and that the tariff structure be 
modified so as to: (Source: De Villiers 1983:16) 
1. Distinguish between maximum demand and.actual consumption when 
allocating unit cost. 
2. Determine the unit cost of transmission to an agreed reference point and th.at of 
distribution from the reference point to the customer, on the basis of the cost per 
km for various voltages and loads. 
3. Allow pooling of costs so that tariffs for individual groups of customers may 
be built up from mean pooled costs. 
In line with the· objective of savings and efficiency, was the recommendation that· 
customised price deals and time of use based tariffs should be ·developed (De Villiers 
. 1983:210); 
However, despite this emphasis on ·efficiency and conservation, the De Villiers 
Commission argued against the use of marginal costing in the industry·'(De Villiers 
1983:192). This is a subject which merits closer attention since the issue of marginal cost-












The De Villiers Commission recommended the use of the consumer . privileged 
philosophy for the following reasons: (De Villiers 1983:192) 
II 1. 
2. 
Historically it has been a policy in South Africa. 
The vast majority of countries South Africa has to compete with in the 
export market pursue this philosophy. 
3. The economy built on this basis will be disrupted by a change in this 
philosophy. (Tariffs would have to be increased by approximately 35% if a 
price policy tending to long-term marginal costs were pursued.) 
4. The possible advantages of more efficient appropriation of resources · 
which have been regarded as an important advantage of the consumer-
neutral philosophy are vague and uncertain and could in any case be 
defeated by other stumbling blocks in the South African economy which 
still differs much from a classical free-market economy. 11 
It is difficult to see why the first reason justifies the use of the consumer privileged 
philosophy. Historically, fully-distributed costs had been used in the electricity industry 
until Steiner-Boiteaux proved that time of use based peak load pricing would result in 
economically efficient prices. Since then, marginal costs have come to be used in almost 
every power utility in the developed world. Hence the argument that marginal costs should 
not be used in Escom because historically it has never been a policy, is hardly convincing. 
The second reason provided is factually incorrect: The electricity supply authorities of all 
of South Africa's major trading competitors have pursued the consumer neutral philosophy 
for decades. 
The third reason is true of a change in any economic policy. Arguing that marginal costs 
should not be used because changing to marginal costs would disrupt the economy, is an 
unconvincing argument. 
The fourth reason is also incorrect if the experience of marginal cost based pricing 
particularly in France and Britain is anything to go by. Here the electricity utilities have 
been able to achieve considerably improved utilisation of resources through the use of 













Since Escom was formed in 1922, pricing has gone through some far-reaching changes. 
Although Escom was initially made up of a number of largely independent undertakings, 
the industry developed to the stage where its functions could most economically be 
achieved though the establishment of a national transmission network and a central 
generation undertaking. As discussed, Escom spent a considerable amount of effort in 
quantifying the costs which should be allocated to each separate undertaking and the 
principles underlying the cost allocations were entrenched in law as amendments to the 
1958 Electricity Act. Although since 1922 the real price of electricity was continually 
decreasing, this trend changed during the early 1970s. This resulted in two major 
investigations: one by the Board of Trade and Industry and one by an appointed 
Commission chaired by Dr De Villiers. The Board of Trade and Industry, and the De 
Villiers Commission sought to deal with the problem of excessive price increases in very 
different ways. The BTI approach was to increa5e the amount of direct government control 
whereas the De Villiers Commission's recommendations centred on putting the 
government at the same arms length that it was at when Escom was created in 1922. The 
De Villiers Commission also focused on getting much greater customer involvement in the 
control of the industry. These differences were reflected in the recommendations on 
pricing policy. Amongst other recommendations the BTI report focused on increasing the 
degree of direct government control of Escom. The De Villiers report on the other hand 
focused on economic efficiency and although it rejected the use of marginal costs by 
Escom it focused on the development of pricing mechanisms, such as time of use and 
customised tariffs, which would come closer to achieving the goal of "the optimal 
utilisation of resources". Through the Eskom Act and Electricity Act of 1987, both of 
which are still in existence today, many of the De Villiers Commission's recommendations 
took effect. 
4.3 Electricity pricing in Eskom at present 
Having discussed aspects of pricing in Escom's history, it is possible to focus on pricing in 
Eskom at present. This section reviews pricing at five interfaces: Firstly from Eskom's 
Generation Group to Eskom's Transmission Group on the Generation Tariff, secondly 
from the Transmission Group to the Eskom Distribution Group, thirdly from the 
Transmission Group to International customers and finally from the Distribution Group to 












4.3.1 Pricing between Eskom Generation and Eskom Transmission 
Electricity is "sold" between Eskom's three conceptually independent businesses: 
Generation, Transmission and Distribution. The Generation Tariff accounts for sales 
between Generation and Transmission, while the Transmission Tariff accounts for sales 
between Transmission and Distribution. Since Eskom supplies more than 96% of South 
Africa's electrical energy, an examination of these internal pricing mechanisms is vital to 
an understanding of electricity pricing in South Africa. 
The Generation Tariff was first introduced in 1992 with a cryptic description of the 
objective of the tariff being "to induce the Power Stations to adopt a behaviour which is 
commercially oriented and consistent with Eskom's objectives" (Eskom 1992(a)). Broadly, 
the tariff that has been applied is made up of two parts: 
* 
* 
A standby charge which the power stations charge the Transmission Group for 
providing capacity (MW) as and when it is required. 
An energy component which compensates the power stations for energy 
(GWh) sent out on the Transmission system. 
The standby charge has a long term component designed to generate one third of the 
capacity charges budget; and a short-term component designed to recover two thirds of that 
budget The energy component recovers the production costs of generation. 
A new Generation Tariff, yet to be finalised, has been proposed for 1994. Broadly, the 
Generation Tariff charges for a number of "services" as well as the supply of electrical 
energy. The monthly bill sent to the Eskom Transmission Group will consist of a number 






Capacity and Standby, including bonuses and penalties 
Energy delivered, including bonuses and penalties 
Start-up costs 
Synchronous condenser operation 
Primary frequency control, including fixed payments and penalties 
The most significant charges are for capacity and delivered energy. The capacity charge is 












offered by Generation. This charge is calculated in cents per MW and is the same for all 
power stations. Penalties are applied if the capacity offered by Generation is not sufficient 
to meet the capacity demand by Transmission. Similarly, bonuses are applied if the amount 
of capacity actually required by Transmission exceeds the amount of capacity contracted 
for. 
Energy charges are calculated annually and are split between fixed and variable rates. The 
energy charge is intended to reflect true production costs plus a negotiated margin. Based 
on these rates, and keeping in mind the centrally planned production optimisation plans, 
Transmission can, with limited discretion, increase the load from particular power stations 
so as to attempt to optimise all costs and risks which are under their control. 
To understand the Generation Tariff correctly it is necessary to understand the conflict 
between the desire for optimisation through competition, and the practical constraint that 
Esko·m is a centrally planned monopoly. On the one hand, the Transmission Economics 
Department (the Eskom department responsible for the development and maintenance of 
the Generation and Transmission Tariffs) is attempting to introduce as much competition 
into the pricing process as possible. On the other hand, Generation in Eskom is structured 
as a single, centrally planned business. This means that with the Generation Tariff, the 
capacity charge in cents per kW is the same for all power stations, despite the fact that the 
two costs (return on assets & depreciation) making up this capacity charge actually varies 
considerably amongst the different power stations. If there was true competition between 
individual power stations, the different capacity costs between the different power stations 
would need to be used. 
The only differentiation between individual power stations in the proposed Generation 
Tariff, is in respect of the energy charge which is made up of a fixed and variable rate. 
This variable rate, per power station, is based on the variable costs of that station such as 
the cost of coal and various other operational costs which are be affected by that particular 
station's operational efficiency. With the Generation Tariff, the Transmission Economics 
Department attempts to induce economically efficient behaviour by maximising the 
amount of generated energy from those power stations which have the lowest short run 
marginal cost, and in so doing attempting to get stations to compete so as to minimise their 
input costs and operational costs. In this too, they are limited since the operation of 
Eskom's power stations is determined through a centrally planned and pre-determined 
production optimisation schedule which stipulates the extent to which each power station 












It is meaningful to compare the operation of the UK Power Pool (explained in Chapter 5) 
in which the principle of pure competition is the driving force, and the proposed future 
Generation Tariff in Eskom in which there is an attempt to introduce competition into 
what is a highly controlled and centrally planned environment. Broadly, it can be 
concluded that the Eskom Generation Tariff aims to reflect the costs of operations - as far 
as these have been economically ascertained - in an attempt to induce economically 
efficient behaviour through the creation of limited competition. 
4.3.2 Pricing between Eskom Transmission and Eskom Distribution 
The Transmission Tariff, which is used to price electricity sales between the Transmission 
Group and the five Eskom Distributors, was first implemented at the beginning of 1992. 
At the time, the tariff was similar to the proposed time of use tariff options, Tl and T2, 
which Eskom offered to external customers. It consisted of four time f use energy charges 
and a maximum demand charge, which was levied on maximum demand recorded during 
the peak or standard tariff periods. Each Distributor was billed based on the recorded 
electricity consumption at each of the Main Transmission System (MTS) substations 
within the area of supply of that Distributor. 
The level of the Transmission Tariff was set so that the total revenue requirements of the 
Generation Group and Transmission Group could be recovered. The Tranmission Tariff 
recovers revenue from the five Distributors in three ways: 
* Revenue from "Base Sales" 
* Revenue from "Budgeted sales to Customer Incentive Scheme (CIS) 
customers "7 
* Revenue from "Growth Sales" 
In calculating the revenue to be derived from Base Sales, the total budgeted fixed costs of 
the Generation and Transmission Groups for the present year was divided by the total 
kWhs sold by the Transmission Group for the previous year, to calculate a c/kWh charge. 
7 Customer Incentive Scheme customers purchase electricity on customised tariffs which differ 
from standard tariffs in terms of price and frequently also in terms of structure. Most customised 
tariffs are mutually beneficial to Eskom and to the particular customer. There are approximately 30 












This charge was multiplied by the total metered kWh at each MTS substation for the 
previous year so that a figure for total "Base Sales" revenue could be derived for each 
Distributor. 
For Revenue from Budgeted CIS sales, the charge was based on the short-term marginal 
costs of Generation and Transmission. This average marginal rate was the same as the 
marginal rate paid by Transmission to Generation, plus the marginal costs of 
Transmission's losses. The variable energy rates of the base load power stations were used 
in calculating the average marginal energy costs for Generation - in 1993 this was 0.93 
c/kWh. To account for extra losses, an extra 0.02 c/kWh was added. In addition, for every 
extra kW of capacity that Transmission purchases from Generation in an hour (standby 
charge), Transmission pays an extra 1.5 c/kW. The cost of CIS sales to the Distributors 
'was thus calculated to be 0.93 + 0.02 + 1.5 = 2.45 c/kWh. 
The revenue from "Base Sales" was meant to recover the full budgeted fixed costs of the 
Generation and Transmission Groups. Hence the tariff for electricity sales above budget 
(growth) was meant only to cover the marginal variable costs. In calculating the price at 
which growth sales was to be charged, the price of the CIS sales of 2.45 c/kWh was 
increased to 3 c/kWh "to give the Distributor an incentive to budget their CIS deals as 
accurately as possible." (Eskom 1992(b)) 
Since January 1994, a whole new tariff structure has been implemented by the 
Transmission Economics Department, which is intended "to be as cost reflective as we can 
make it on our current level of computational abilities." (Eskom 1993(c)) The tariff 
structure is relatively complex and consists of three parts as follows: 
1. A network charge designed to recover Transmission's own revenue 
requirements. 
2. A time of use charge designed to recover the total fixed and proportional 
variable components of the costs of Generation and proportional Return On Assets. 
This is by far the largest component of the tariff. 
3. An hourly marginal. energy rate designed to recover the proportional variable 
components of the cost of Generation and Transmission. 
The network charge is a fixed monthly payment in respect of a point of supply (MTS 
substation) determined on the basis of the historical relative use of the system by that 












calculated to recover Transmission's revenue requirements. The practical calculation of the 
network charge is a relatively complex process which is based on simulating load flows at 
various points in the transmission network. 
The time of use charge is based on the negotiated baseline load for every point of supply. 
This baseline load for 1993, is defined as the total metered kWh (excluding CIS sales) at 
all MTS (Main Transmission System) substations during 1992. During 1992, this figure 
totalled 127 024 GWh. With knowledge of the half-hourly energy consumption for every 
MTS substation for every day of the previous year, it is possible to calculate the time of 
use charges for all energy metered at each MTS substation. The charge so calculated is 
known as the time of use charge. 
The hourly marginal energy rate is applied to consumption in excess of the baseline load. 
The rate is made up of nvo items: 
The marginal cost of supply which, in tum, is a function of the sh rt-term marginal cost 
of generation at the short-term marginal power station and the short-term marginal 
transmission cost up to the point of supply. For each hour in the yeai, the short-term 
marginal cost of generation is equal to the variable energy cost of the marginal station for 
that hour, plus the variable hourly cost of capacity at that station. The marginal station is 
determined by an economic dispatch procedure that dispatches the stations according to 
their variable costs, after consideration of the system constraints. The Generation Group 
deems the marginal capacity cost to be equal for all the stations.· This has to be seen as a 
most unfortunate simplification since the actual marginal capacity cost will vary 
. considerably, based on the type of power station used. For example, a large thermal power 
station has a much higher marginal capacity cost than a small gas-:fired station. Ultimately 
the fact that the average marginal cost is used, means that the hourly marginal operating 
cost is a misnomer since the "marginal operating cost" is actually a combination of the 
marginal energy and awrage capacity rates. 
The marginal outage cost is equal to the loss of load probability multiplied by the value 
of the unserved energy. It is intended that these rates will be made available initially a 
week ahead and later on every working day at 14h00. 
To evaluate the proposed Transmission Tariff, it is necessary to firstly take a look into the 
past. Until 1978, there was very little cost pooling between the different regional 












accounts, and price accordingly. The 1977 Board of Trade and Industry Report and 1983 
De Villiers Reports both recommended a greater integration of what were then Eskom's 
. eight regional electricity undertakings. However, the present structure of Eskom was 
determined only in early 1992 when the existillg five Distributors came into existence. At 
the same time that these operations began to function, the Transmission Tariff was created 
for the pricing of electricity between "Eskom Corporate" and the five conceptually 
autonomous Eskom's Distributors. The main purpose of the Transmission Tariff is to 
encourage efficient behaviour, i.e. it is intended as a mechanism to reflect the cost 
structure and not the actual costs of supply.s 
The initial version of the tariff used in 1992 was very similar to the end-user time of use 
options, Tl and T2. Since then, in terms of tariff design, the Transmission Tariff has made 
considerable progress. The latest structure is probably the most sophisticated tariff 
structure currently used in the South African electricity industry. The degree to which the 
tariff reflects the costs of supply is commendable. However, the Achilles heel of the 
Transmission Tariff thus far has been implementation. The most significant problem here 
is metering problems on the :MTS supply points. These problems have so far been dealt 
with to varying degrees of success .. 
An important consideration in the current tariff structure is that the tariff is intended to 
encourage the Distributors to induce their customers to optimise their pattern of 
consumption so as to minimise the amount that they pay for their electricity purchases, to 
the mutual benefit of the Distributors and of Transmission. Since the network charge and 
time of use charge are practically fixed payments, the hourly energy rate is the part of the 
current tariff that allows Distributors the freedom to optimise their operations. However, 
this freedom is something of a mirage since Distributors do not have freedom in deciding 
the structure or price level of the external tariffs which they apply and hence their actual 
ability to alter the consumption pattern of their customers is limited. 
4.3.3 Pricing between Eskom Transmission and International Customers 
The import and export of electricity between South Africa and her neighbours currently 
amounts to a very small percentage (in Eskom terms) of electricity generated. In particular 
for 1993, total net exported energy is expected to be of the order of 1600 GWh, earning a 
total sales revenue of the order of RIO million. Eskom's Transmission Group is responsible 
for all pricing contracts with International Customers. Currently there are contracts 












between Eskom and ZESA (Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority), SW A WEK 
(Namibian Supply Authority), (EdM) Electricite de Mocambique and (BPC) Botswana 
Power Corporation. 
The philosophy governing the development of some international tariffs at present and all 
international tariffs in future is that tariff structures and price levels for these customers 
should be based on a set of pricing principles which are commonly used to conduct inter-
utility trade. In this regard, Eskom has a particular interest in the power pools in existence 
in North America and Europe. 
Eskom's Chief Executive, Dr McRae, has long been known for his vision of establishing 
an inter-connected Sub-Saharan electricity network. The main purpose of such a network 
would be to inter-connect the coal-fired power stations in Southern Africa with possible 
hydro-powered stations in Central Africa. The technical arguments that Transmission put 
forward in favour of establishing such a power pool in Sub-Saharan Africa are as follows: 
(Source: Eskom 1993(a)) 
"1. Power Pools result in improved reliability and quality of supply through 
mutual assistance when problems arise. 
2. Power pools result in the optimised use of existing Generation and 
Transmission facilities, by generating at the cheapest generating units in the whole 
pool rather than in each area of control taken individually. 
3. Power pools result in greater economies of scale and the development of the 
cheapest primary energy sources in the whole pool rather than in each area of 
control taken individually. " 
In the Southern African Power Pool, Eskom identify various possible types of transaction: 
(Eskom, 1993(a)) 
1. System (Firm) Power 
In this transaction, a reliable supply of capacity and energy is provided from one utility to 
another utility. In this type of transaction, a tariff normally has a large capacity component 
and a small energy component. Examples of such transactions are the current contracts 












2. Capacity Power 
Capacity power may be sold between two utilities to replace generation in either system. 
The direction of the power flow and its load factor will be dependent on the marginal cost 
of generation of the two systems. Tariffs for capacity power have a commitment charge for 
capacity and the energy charge will be equal to the marginal cost of generation in the 
seller's network plus a charge for transmission losses, plus a profit margin. 
3. Reserve Capacity 
Reserve capacity in one system is used to provide the required spinning reserve or 
operating reserve in another system. Pricing in this mode, in principle, is based on the 
fixed costs of new peak load plant, but in a competitive situation utilities with reserve 
capacity may discount the price they charge for reserve capcity. 
4. Surplus energy 
Surplus energy in one system may be dumped at a low price to another system. An · 
example of such a contract is the purchase agreement between SW A WEK and Eskom, in 
the case that the hydro station on the Ruacana River is spilling. 
5. Economy energy 
Energy may be sold by one utility having a low marginal cost to another utility having a 
higher marginal cost. Energy sold in terms of an economy energy contract is not backed-up 
by capacity and as such is interruptible. Normally the contracts split the saving in marginal 
costs between the two parties. 
6. Emergency energy 
An emergency energy contract describes the sale of electricity to provide short-term 
assistance to another system which may be experiencing difficulties. The marginal cost of 
generation of peak load plant, perhaps less a discount, is often used as a price basis to such 
transactions. 
These various methodologies describe a pricing system distinctly different to that which 












transactions should not be based on standard tariffs since such tariffs do not make 
provision for "volatile and frequently large commitments which characterise inter-utility 
trade" (Eskom 1993 (a)). 
Matimba-Bulawayo 400 kV line 
The beginning of the proposed power pool (from Eskom's side) is the 400 kV 
interconnection between Matimba in South Africa and Insukamini (Bulawayo) in 
Zimbabwe which involves ZESA (Zimbabwe), BPC (Botswana) and Eskom. This line' will 
link Eskom's 23 000 MW network with that of ZESA (1700MW) plus ZESCO (Zambia) 
(1000 MW) plus BPC (190 MW) plus SNEL (Zaire) (2500 MW). In terms of the 
agreement for the 400 kV line, ZESA will commit themselves to taking 400 MW of 
capacity in 1995 and 1996 and 150 MW thereafter. The Capacity Power contract has a 
two-part structure consisting of a capacity charge and an energy charge. The capacity 
charge is based on the capital plus fixed operating costs of base load plant in the Eskom 
system, plus a margin intended to reimburse Eskom for backing the supply with reserve 
capacity. The capital and fixed operating costs of the new coal-fired plant at Lekwe, was 
used as a benchmark. The annual levelised costs of Lekwe have been estimated at 
R254/kW or $83/kW per annum. The capacity charge negotiated with ZESA is $87 /kW 
per annum in respect of the firm commitments described earlier. A second part of the 
agreement is that ZESA has access to capacity in excess of amounts agreed to, but with 
Eskom's consent. The premium over the basic capacity charge ranges from 5.3% to 44% 
depending upon the time when capacity is required. 
The energy rates in the contract comply with the pool concept that energy should be traded 
at marginal costs plus a small margin. The rates are set according to the estimated marginal 
cost of generation plus 3% for transmission losses plus 10% for profit. The charges vary 
according to time of use in the same way as the end-user time of use tariffs described later. 
The uneven distribution of natural resources in Sub-Saharan Africa has meant that South 
Africa has an immense wealth of coal to power its considerable electrical network. 
However, her neighbours, by virtue of their hydrography all have the potential to develop 
considerable hydro-powered generating capacity. The development of a Power Pool to link 
the independent networks in Sub-Saharan Africa, could thus be mutually advantageous. 
The success of such a power pool is dependent on the pricing mechanisms which govern 
the trade between the different participants. The current thinking on this matter has been 












Saharan Africa such as exists in Nordel in the Nordic countries and Nepool in North 
America, is still no more than a vision. Turning this vision into reality is perhaps 
ultimately dependent on Africa's ability to realise the hydro potential which it possesses. If 
the experience of Hydro-Electrica de Cahorra Bassa thus far is anything to go by, turning 












4.3.4 Eskom Distribution sales to non-Eskom re-distributors and end-user 
customers 
In 1992 Eskom sold more than 75 000 GWh to end-use customers in South Africa, w,ith a 
further 63 193 GWh to other distributors for redistribution to the end-customers. The 
revenue from these sales in total was Rl2.65 billion (Eskom, 1992). The sales per 
customer category and revenue per customer category are as shown in the bar chart below: 
Figure 1. 
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These sales have been achieved through a number of different standard tariffs and, in the 
case of a select few customers, through customised tariff agreements. However, before the 
details of the different tariffs are discussed, it is necessary to review aspects of the pricing 
policy common to all tariffs. These aspects include, the current regulation governing 
Eskom prices, the pricing policy which Eskom has adopted, the method of setting the price 
level and finally, cost pooling. 
The 1987 Eskom Act 
In 1987, the Eskom Act was passed, largely as a consequence of the recommendations 
made in the De Villiers Commission study into the Electricity Supply Industry. Section 15 
of the Eskom Act stipulates the prices to be charged for electricity supplied by Eskom. The 
Act states that Eskom's tariffs "may from time be revised and amended by Eskom in 
general in order to ensure a sound financial structure", however this is subject to one 
condition: "If price amendments result in different price increases to the different 'classes 












Board, should there be any public objections to such price amendments" (Eskom Act 1987, 
Section 15 (1) (b) and Section (3)). What this effectively means is that Eskom has 
discretion over the average price level when it is uniformly applied, but not over tariff 
structure, where differences in tariff structure would result in differences in the effective 
price paid. 
Eskom Distribution pricing policy 
The first chapter examined some international opinions on the criteria of an electricity 
pricing policy. The work in this section so far has discussed the pricing philosophies which 
Eskom's Transmission Group apply in their tariffs to International Customers and also to 
Eskom's five Distributors. The final link in the Eskom tariff chain is that between the 
Eskom Distributors and the end-customers or other re-distributors. This section will 
.examine the tariff policies at this level. 
Perhaps Eskom's most thorough examination of the criteria of an electricity pricing policy, 
took place during an Electricity Pricing Forum meeting in 1989. This forum was 
specifically organised "To Determine the Principles of an electricity pricing policy for 
Eskom and the application thereof' (Eskom, 1989). The forum consisted of Eskom, 
consultants, the National Energy Council, several large industrial and mining customers 
and several municipalities. The output from this Forum was a highly qualitative list of 
criteria for an electricity pricing policy as interpreted by Eskom and some of its major 
customers. Ranked in order of importance, these criteria are illustrated below: 
Enable easy interpretation ::=JJ 
Promote Co-operation fJ 
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Promote sound business decisions 1) 
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At the least, this list of functions illustrates Eskom's customers' perception of what an 
electricity pricing policy should look like. From this list of issues, Eskom framed the aims 
and scope of electricity pricing as follows: (Eskom 1993 (b)) 
1. Electricity pricing must ensure that national economic resources are allocated 
efficiently, not only amongst sectors of the economy, but also within the electricity 
industry. This implies that prices that reflect costs must be used to indicate to 
customers the cost of supplying their specific needs, so that supply and demand can 
be matched efficiently. 
2. Fairness and equity requirements are satisfied by: Allocating costs among 
customers according to the burdens they impose on the system; ensuring a 
reasonable degree of price stability and predictability and avoiding fluctuations 
from year to year; and providing a minimum level of service to customers who may 
not be able to afford the full cost. 
3. Electricity prices must raise sufficient revenues to meet financial requirements. 
The structure of prices must be simple enough to facilitate metering and billing of 
customers. Finally, other economic and political requirements must be considered. 
Such requirements may include, for example, subsidised electricity. supply to 
electrically under-developed areas to catalyse growth. 
The actual tariffs which Eskom applies will be discussed in the context of these objectives. 
Setting the price level of end-us r tariffs 
In calculating the price level of the end-user tariffs, Eskom does not see the organisation as 
being made up of three "independent" businesses, but rather as one vertically integrated 
business with a single funding requirement in order to recover all forecast expenditure. 
Hence, the price levels of the end-user tariffs are set by examining the forecast total kWh 
consumption, the forecast revenue requirements, and hence arriving at an average c/kWh 
price necessary to recover the forecast required revenue. This average price increase (or 













Eskom's distribution operations span the length and breadth of South Africa. Ultimately, 
cost reflective tariffing demands that all costs incurred in generating, transmitting, 
distributing and reticulating power, per customer, is reflected in the charge to that 
customer. In terms of geographic tariff differentiation, a farmer in the Karoo, who has 
caused Eskom to incur considerable cost in respect of transmitting electricity to the Cape 
from the Transvaal, distributing it to the boundary of his farm and then reticulating it to the 
point of supply, would pay a much higher cost than a customer in central Johannesburg 
where the less significant reticulation, distribution and transmission network is amortised 
by a much larger number of customers. The same argument as pertains at a local level as 
described, pertains at a regional level. Until the recommendations of the De Villiers 
Commission report had been implemented, the Electricity Act of 1958 specified that each 
of Eskom's eight different undertakings were to keep separate accounts. This resulted in 
considerable differences in the price of electricity amongst the different undertakings. 
Following the recommendations of the De Villiers Commission, costs in Eskom are 
centrally pooled, with a minor surcharge for customers far from Johannesburg. 
To give some indication of the different profitabilities of the different Eskom operations· 
in South Africa, we will consider Eskom's 54 Districts to be independent business units, 
which purchase electricity on the Transmission Tariff and distribute it via a range of 
national external tariffs. It is possible to calculate the "profitability" of these different 
Districts. Such a study was undertaken by the author in terms of the (NELF) National 
Electrification Forum's (EDI) Electricity Distribution Industry Database. The Table below 
contains the results obtained in this study for the profit or loss of 54 Eskom Districts for 
the 1992 financial year. On account of the way costs are currently centrally pooled, the 
profitability of the different Districts is affected, to a limited extent by the remoteness of 
the area, and to a much greater extent by the number and type of customers in the District 
and the operational efficiency of the District. It must be noted that in terms of the point 
already made that the Transmission Tariff reflects the cost structure and not the actual 
supply costs, these figures for the profitability of different Eskom Districts should be 












District Profit/(Loss) District Profit/(loss) 
fR'OOOl fR'OOOl 
Colesburg (18586) Kuruman 11159 
Empangeni (6886) Lichtenburg (15588) 
Ladysmith (159) Lydenburg (433) 
Man? ate (12966) Middelburg 62 
Newcastle 37258 Midrand 10433 
Pietermaritzburn: 3889 Nelsoruit 3043 
Pine town 29426 Ni!!el 3526 
Bellville (29718) Parvs (895) 
Benoni 41999 Phalaborwa 6480 
Bethal 644 Pieters bur!? (6903) 
Bethlehem (13726) Randfontein 62408 
Bloemfontein (31062) Rustenburg 13652 
Botha ville (2388) Sandton 3640 
Brits 64636 Senekal (468) 
Carletonville 53813 Swellendam (10861) 
Delareyville (1876) Thabazimbe 28908 
East London 3690 Uitenha2e 19347 
Georn:e 3417 Uoin2ton 9076 
Germiston 35095 V anderbiil Park 12731 
Grabouw (3429) Vereeni!?in!? (9318) 
Grahamstown (13750) Vredenbur!! 3136 
Groblersdal (27656) Vredendal (1137) 
Harrismith (664) Vrvburg 379 
J ohannesbur!? (19802) Warmbad 2307 
Kimberly (12924) Welkom 59322 
Klerksdoro 30069 Wolmaransstad (2076) 
Kroonstad (5251) Worcester (6694) 
A review and discussion o  Large Power User Tariffs: Tariffs A, E, Tl & T2 
Tariff A is one of Eskom's oldest tariffs. Sales on Tariff A presently account for the 
greatest portion of Eskom's revenue. The Eskom tariff schedule describes Tariff A as a 
tariff for large customers with a high load factor of consumption. It is only applicable to 
customers with a load of greater than 25 kW/kV A. The Rates effective from l January 
1994 are as follows: 
Basic Charge: Rl43.47 per month 
Energy: 5.97 c/kWh 













ranging from 500 Volts to greater than 132 kV, or R34.81/kW/Month to 
R30.94/kW/Month at voltages of supply ranging from 500 Volts to greater 
than 132 kV. 
The tariff is ideally suited to Gold Mining customers who are able to maintain high load 
factors. However, most municipal distributors also purchase electricity on Tariff A. 
The basic principle behind Tariff A was first introduced by Hopkinson in the previous 
century. Hopkinson's principle is that capacity-related costs should be charged in 
proportion to the maximum demand while energy-related costs should be recovered in 
proportion to energy consumption. The remaining costs may be recovered either through a 
basic charge or by factoring them into either the demand charge or energy charge or both. 
In practice however, capacity costs are factored into the energy charge. This is justified on 
the basis.of the load-factor/coincidence9 factor relationship explained as follows: 
" Load-factor is directly proportional to co-incidence factor, i.e. given two customers, 
if both customers have a high load factor, there is a greater probability that their 
maximum demands will coincide. Hence high load factor customers do not contribute 
much to diversity and consequently a transfer from demand-related costs to energy 
related costs takes place to prevent the overcharging of low load factor customers who 
make a larger contribution to diversity. " 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, until Eskom developed national tariffs in 1986, the 
methodology of calculating the amount of the capacity charge which should be transferred 
to the energy charge was driven by practical considerations arising as a consequence of the 
financial independence of the eight regional electricity undertakings. The magnitude of the 
capacity cost transferred to the energy charge varied considerably amongst the different 
undertakings. The transfers expressed as a percentage of demand-related costs before any 
transfer, were calculated by Escom as follows: Border Undertaking 8%, Cape Northern 
Undertaking 30%, Cape Western Undertaking 18%, Eastern Transvaal Undertaking 20%, 
Natal Undertaking 18%, Orange River Undertaking 28 % and Rand and OPS Undertaking 
28% (Board of Trade and Industry Report No 1889, 1977:63). 
Revenue recovery between the demand charge and energy charge was determined based on 
the premise that for a 100% load factor customer, 60% of the revenue should be recovered 
from the demand charge and 40% of the revenue should be recovered from the energy 
9 The load factor of a customers demand is a measure of the degree of continuity in his/her 













charge. The amount of the total revenue to be recovered through the demand charge would 
have a minimum of 60% for I 00% load factor customers and this proportion progressively 
increases as the customer's load factor decreased. This leads to the obvious conclusion that 
low load factor customers on Tariff A are paying an inordinate amount for capacity and 
hence are effectively subsidising high load factor customers. 
Besides the objection to Tariff A on account of load factor-based cross-subsidies, Tariff A 
also results in time of use cross-subsidies since the charges in the tariff are based on the 
average capacity and operation costs of all generation equipment. The time-variation in 
these costs are not reflected in the tariff at all. Hence customers who have a greater 
proportion of their consumption at the time of the Eskom system peak periods, are 
effectively being subsidised by customers who maximise their consumption in the off-peak 
periods. 
Judged against Eskom's stated pncmg criteria, i.e. economic efficiency through cost 
reflective tariffing, Tariff A is therefore a failure! The tariff is applied to a wide range of 
customers who have varying load factors and since there is a single tariff, the consequence 
is cross-subsidisation between the different customers. A consequence of this cross-
subsidisation was the decision by Cape Town City Council to construct the Steenbras 
pumped storage station built in 1979 in order to reduce the amount that the Council paid 
Eskom in respect of the demand charge on their maximum demand. Since the high demand 
charges of Tariff A did not reflect Eskom's capacity costs, and since Cape Town City 
Council decided to build Steenbras in an attempt to avoid this charge, Tariff A clearly had 
a detrimental effect on the industry. The failure of the tariff to reflect cost differences 
between customers of varying load factor or time of use, has been recognised for some 
time and has provided impetus for the development of the time of use options currently 
offered (Calitz et al, 1989). However, Tariff A still remains by far the most significant 
tariff in terms of sales and revenue. It is most unfortunate that such a primitive tariff 
mechanism still plays such a significant role in electricity pricing in the industry. 
Tariff E 
Tariff Eis intended for customers who are able to shift load into the off-peak periods i.e. 












The tariff charges applicable from 1January1994 are as follows: 
. Basic Charge: 
Energy charge: 
Demand charge: 
R318.87 per month 
5.91 c/kWh 
R32.36/kV NMonth to R28.54/kV NMonth for voltages from 
500 Volts to greater than 132 kV, or 
R34.81/kW/Month to R30.94/kW/Month for voltages from 500 
volts to greater than 132 kV. 
Minimum Charge: If the sum of the revenue from the demand charge and the 
energy charge work out to be less than 9.57 c/kWh, then a minimum 
charge of 9.57 c/kWh applies. 
Tariff Eis ideally suited to large industrial customers, such as the steel and ferrochrome 
industries, who are able to minimise their load during the period from 7h00 to 23h00. 
Tariff E was first introduced in January 1986, in response to recommendations made by 
the Association of Municipal Electricity Undertakings (AMEU), the De Villiers 
Commission and Ernst and Whinney (Calitz, 1989). Its introduction coincided with 
Eskom's use of uniform national tariffs. By the end of 1988, there were 157 large Eskom 
customers on Tariff E. These customers have a non-simultaneous maximum demand of 
3800 MW (Calitz, 1989). 
It seems surprising that a utility the size of Eskom with the sophisticated technology at its 
disposal, took so long to apply Tariff E which is, at best, a hesitant step towards time of 
use tariffing. In a report first published before June 1986, Eskom argued against the 
development of an off-peak tariff since the load factor of Eskom's system was extremely 
high, with an annual load factor exceeding 75% and a daily load factor in excess of 80% 
(Escom, 1986). Furthermore it was argued that apparent slack-time10 is fully utilised by 
Escom in carrying out essential maintenance work and any incentives that might lead to 
still higher load factors through off-peak tariffs could necessitate additional capacity 
having to be installed to maintain acceptable reserve plant margins (Escom, 1986). 
Essentially the same objections that were raised in respect of Tariff A earlier, i.e. the over-
simplified nature of the tariff, means that it fails to reflect the actual cost of supplying the 
different customers who choose the tariff. Leaving these considerations aside, in view of 
the fact that mostly large customers have chosen Tariff E, Eskom has been able to effect a 













significant load shift into the off-peak night time periods hence achieving the desired goal 
of a high system load factor. 
Tariff Tl and T2 
The recently developed time of use tariffs are based on the time of use variation in 
marginal costs and as such seek to address the time of use criticism that was levelled 
against Tariff A. Currently Tariffs Tl and T2 are available only on an optional/voluntary 
basis. Tariff Tl is available for customers with a maximum demand of greater than 1 
MV A while Tariff T2 is available for supplies from 100 kV A to 5 MV A and is 
furthermore not applicable in rural areas. The tariff charges applicable from 1 January 
1994 are as follows: 
Connections fees: Tariff Tl: R 3500 
Tariff T2: R 1750 
Tl Winter: April-September 
Basic Char.ge: [Rands] 50.74 
Ma.Ximum demand charge: Rl0.82/k.V NMonth 
Energy Charges 
Peake/kWh 19.54 
Standard c/k.Wh 10.95 
Off-peak c/k.Wh 6.29 
Reactive energy c/k.V ARh* 2.28 







* Only for reactive energy in excess of 30% of kWh recorded during peak and standard 
periods. 
T2 Winter: April-September Summer: Jan-Mar: Oct-Dec 
Basic Charge: 50.74. 50.74 
Enern:v Charges 
Peake/kWh 29.79 26.81 
Standard. c/k.Wh 10.95 9.84 
Off-peak c/k.Wh 6.29 5.65 












The times of the peak and standard periods vary between winter and summer, with the 
summer having a five hour peak from 7h00 to 12h00 during weekdays, while winters have 
a three hour peak period from 7h00 to 1 OhOO and a two hour peak from 18h00 to 20h00 
during weekdays. 
By the end of 1993, the time of use option had been chosen by more than 270 customers 
with a total revenue of over Rl.5 billion Rands or approximately 8% of Eskom's 1993 
income. The largest time of use customer is Durban Electricity which is Eskom's second 
largest customer after Alusaf. 
The subject of Time of use tariffs was addressed by Eskom in earnest for the first time in 
January 1989 (Calitz, 1989). Up to that time and since 1978, "time of use pricing (had) 
been addressed repeatedly, without any major progress in that direction" (Calitz, 1989). By 
the end of 1989 however, the development of a time of use tariff was firmly on the road 
although the process met considerable resistance en route. Eskom motivated the 
development of time of use tariffs for three particular reasons: (Calitz, 1991 (b)) 
" 1. To contribute to the efficient allocation of national economic resources, not 
only among different sectors of the economy but also within the electricity supply 
industry. 
2. To adequately reflect the cost of supplying electricity in meeting any type of 
demand pattern so that decisions affecting the use of electricity can be based on the 
true costs of providing it. 
3. To provide customers with·incentives to adopt consumption patterns that lead 
to a more effective use of electricity and thus to reductions in supply costs. " 
The time of use tariffs are developed from the marginal cost philosophy described in detail 
in the second chapter. In particular, the basis of the tariff structure is Long Run Marginal 
Costing (LRMC) defined in a similar way to that of EdF in their tariff policy. The tariff 
level however, is established by scaling the marginal cost derived structure so that the 
revenue generated from the tariff will achieve Eskom's short-term revenue requirements. 
The LRMC basis was chosen in preference to (SRMC) short run marginal costs because "it 
(LRMC) reflects the full costs of supplying extra load on a long term basis, and is thus 
appropriate to a tariff on which long term decisions will be based" (Calitz, 1991). This 












In arriving at the winter and summer charges during each of the respective periods, it was 
necessary to determine the LRMC of Generation and Transmission for each hour in a 
typical winter and summer week. These were established by computing the extra cost of 
supplying an extra unit of load from a generation system having an optimal mix of base, 
intermediate and pea.king power stations. The computation results in a marginal cost in 
c/k.Wh for each hour of the week, plus a capital related cost (Rlk.W) in the hour of peak 
demand. These costs are used as the basis to the rates for Tariff Tl. It should be noted 
however, that the maximum demand charge in Tl is applied to the peak as well as standard 
period to reduce the danger of the system peak shifting into what is defined as the. standard 
period. 
The rates for T2, which has no demand charge, are calculated by allocating the capacity 
related costs described earlier, to each hour of the week in proportion to the system Loss of 
Load Probability (LOLP). Since the LOLP is only really significant during the peak period, 
this means that the capacity related costs are effectively factored into the peak period only. 
This is evident in the tariff rates for Tl and T2 which are the same during the off-peak and 
standard periods but are considerably higher during the peak periods in tariff T2. 
During the development of the tariff there was extensive interaction between Eskom and 
the municipalities, mines, industrial customers and various consultants. Most of these 
bodies put up considerable opposition to aspects of the proposed tariffs (Calitz 1991). In 
particular, municipalities opposed the substantial reduction in the proportion of total 
revenue which was to be derived through the demand charge in the Tl tariff th:µi was 
derived from the demand charge in the existing A tariff. The municipal opposition was 
generated because municipalities pay Eskom for their diversified maximum demand while 
they (the municipalities) are paid for the sum of the individual demands of their customers, 
and hence through diversity they receive substantial financial benefit. The loss of the 
diversity benefit with the proposed time of use tariffs, according to the municipalities, 
placed Eskom in an advantageous position to compete with municipalities in the 
distribution of electricity. A second concern which the municipal distributors had, was that 
they would be unable to pass on Eskom's time of use tariff to their own municipal 
customers because of prohibitive metering costs. A third concern was that because 
municipal distributors have less control over their load than industrial customers, they 
should be given a special, more favourable tariff. The nature of these concerns would seem 
to indicate that the municipalities essentially had no logical opposition to time of use based 
tariffs. Rather, their opposition indicated their unwillingness to change to a tariff, that in 












There were also concerns, mainly from mining customers, that the proposed tariffs would 
result in high load factor customers paying more than they would on Tariff A. As 
explained earlier, the calculation of the demand charge of Tariff A meant that low load 
factor customers were effectively cross-subsidising high load factor customers. Hence 
Eskom argued that time of use tariffs do not penalise high load factor customers, but rather 
charge customers the true cost of supplying their particular type of demand pattern. It 
would seem that this argument is only half right, since it is impossible for one set of 
demand and energy rates to accurately reflect the cost of supplying customers of different 
load factors. The Tl Tariff will recover the correct amount of revenue through the demand 
and energy charges only for those customers whose load curve matches the forecast system 
load curve, as used in the calculation of the demand and energy rates in the LRMC 
methodology (explained earlier). If the tariff is to be cost-reflective, customers with a 
lower load factor than the forecast system load factor would have to have a greater relative 
energy component, while customers with a higher load factor would have to have a greater 
relative demand component. This .could only be achieved if there was a range of time of 
use tariffs with different relative demand and energy charges which the customer could 
choose from, as is the case with the time of use tariffs offered by Electricite de France. 
However this does not detract from the fact that the time of use tariffs, Tl and T2, are light 
years ahead of the rest of Eskom's external tariffs. Besides the rural time of use tariffs, they 
are the only tariffs which are based on a costing principle which seeks to achieve economic 
efficiency -I As a result of this, the tariffs have been structured in a manner which it is 
believed will achieve the optimal utilisation of the customer's and utility's resources by 
encouraging customers to adopt a pattern of consumption which. will minimise Eskom's 
capacity and operating costs. Furthermore, in developing the time of use tariffs, Eskom 
took a relatively thorough look aC-the -charges for reactive energy and voltage 
differentiation in the cost of supply. Hence in Tl and T2, unlike the other large customer 
tariffs, the charges for reactive energy and voltage are more reflective of the costs which 
Eskom incur. 
A specific problem with the T tariffs which became known after their implementation is 
that they are not cost reflective when applied to rural customers. This is discussed in more 
detail in the section on the Ruraflex tariffs. 














Tariff F was designed for medium sized customers with low load factors and high 
maximum demands (mainly farmers) and was first implemented in January 1987. 
Supply on this tariff is limited to customers with a maximum demand of greater than 25 
kVA but whose voltage of supply is in the range from 500 Volts to 22 kV. The charges at 





Maximum demand Charge: R32.36 to R3 l.08 per kVA at voltages of supply from 
less than 500 Volts to 22 kV. 
Maximum Charge: In the case that the revenue derived from the energy 
charge and the maximum demand charge exceeds 27 .57 
c/kWh purchased, a maximum charge of 27.57 c/kWh will 
be applied. 
The charges are the same as Tariff A with the exception that there is an upper limit on the 
size of the bill to 27 .57 c/kWh . The Tariff is offered only at 380 and 220 volts, 11 kV and 
22 kV, these qualifying voltages contrived to limit the tariff to large power farming 
customers only (Barnard et al, 1993). 
It is clear that if in Tariff A there was a load factor differentiation in the relative sizes of 
the maximum demand and energy charges, there would have been no need to develop 












Time of use tariffing for rural custom~rs: Ruraflex 
At present 170 rural customers are on Tariff T2. Eskom is under-recovering costs on these · 
customers since no allowance has been made on T2 for the following: (Ligoff and Hager, 
1993) 
1. Recovery of about R220 of capital already recovered in Tariff D (the tariff 
generally applied to rural customers). 
2. Higher losses associated with rural networks. 
3. Higher support costs in rural areas. 
The demand amongst rural customers for time of use tariffs has therefore lead to the 
development of a tariff based on Tl but customised for rural, predominantly farming 
customers. The tariffs are known as Ruraflexl&2 although the only difference between 
the two is size of the basic charge. The Ruraflex rates are as follows: 
Ruraflex 1.(~ 50 kVA) Ruraflex 2. (> 50 kVA} 
Basic Char2e [Rands] 274.46 304.95 
Ener2V Chari?e [clkWh] 
Winter 
Peak 34.61 34.61 
Standard 13.07 13.07 
Off-peak 7.6 7.6 
Summer 
Peak 31.06 31.06 
Standard 11.72 11.72 
Off-peak 6.82 6.82 
Voltal?e oercental?e discount 
500<V 0 0 
500 ~ V < 22kV 1.86 1.86 
Reactive eneri:n' cbar2e [clkVArh] 1.14 1.14 
A review and discussion of Eskom's small power-user tariffs: Tariffs B, C, D, Sl,2,3 
Like the rest of Eskom's tariffs, the tariffs for small power users - which account for more 
than 90% of Eskom's total number of customers but for less than 4% of the total revenue -
have been shaped by political and economic developments both inside and outside the 
electricity industry. However, in contrast to large customers where the possibility of 
improving Eskom's utilisation of resources is possible through changing the consumption 
pattern of only a few large customers, small power users· do not off er the same 












large power user tariffs, practical considerations such as metering and implementability are 
frequently the most important considerations in small power user tariffs since the revenue 
generated from small users is much smaller in proportion to the cost of metering and 
administration. 
Before the actual tariffs are discussed, the range of small power user tariffs currently 
offered by Eskom are described below: 
TariffB TariffC TaritTD 
Applicable Customer Categories Small Urban Domestic Rural, particularly 
commercial consumption with farming customers 
customers conventional credit 
meters 
Basic Char~es [Rands] 
S25kVA 41.45 - 70.17 
>25 andS50 kVA 66.95 - 95.64 
>50 and $100 kVA 114.78 - 143.47 
Irrespective of demand - 34.24 -
Energy cha~es[c/kWh] 
0-500kWh 27.57 - -
500 kWh uowards 15.94 - -
0-1000 kWh - - 27.57 
1000 kWh upwards - - 15.94 
All energv - 18.62 -
Connection fees [Rands] 
Single phase 450 450 600 
Three phase 900 900 1200 
Extra An extra The connection fee 
monthly charge covers the first 200 
will be levied meters of customer-
should the connection line as 
connection costs well as metering. 
exceed the Amounts in excess 
standard costs· of this are recovered 
already factored through an 
into the tariffs. additional monthly 
charge. 
S Tariffs 
The S tariffs are applicable to single-phase pre-paid supplies. In the design of the S 1 tariff~ 
it was intended that the full generation, transmission, distribution, reticulation and service 
connection charge be factored into the c/kWh tariff. With S2 the customer pays for the 
service connection, while with S3 the customer pays for the service connection as well as 












The applicable rates at 1 January 1994 are as follows: 
Tariff St S2 S3 
c/kWb rate 24.82 21.22 18.62 
Connection fee 0 40 Actual costs 
B & D Tariffs 
Tariff B and D have a similar structure with the exception that the size of the first energy 
block in the two block structure is larger in Tariff D (1000 kWb/month) than inTariff B 
(500 kWh/month). Tariff B which is now classified as suitable for small urban commercial 
customers, was always used for rural farming customers until Tariff D was introduced in 
1982. 
There is an interesting history behind tariff D. The 1977 Board of Trade and Industry 
Report recorded strong complaints from farmers in regard to the monthly extension 
charges used with Tariff B. Nothing was changed until 1982 when farming customers once 
again put pressure on Eskom to do something about the monthly capital charges. This time 
Eskom developed Tariff D which differed from Tariff B in that the first 800 kWh were 
now at a high rate instead of only the first 500 kWh. However despite this increase, a 
decrease in the monthly capital charges allowed an average 40% reduction in electricity 
costs for all farmers (Krumm 1989). Tariff D was also linked to the Land Act making it 
compulsory for farmers to change over from Tariff B to Tariff D. 
Although the new tariff (Tariff D) was designed to incorporate the capital cost of 
providing 1 km of line into the tariffs standard charges, last minute representation to 
Eskom by the South African Agricultural Union and the Minister of Agriculture resulted in 
the capital costs of 2 km of line being covered by Eskom. To compensate, to a certain 
extent, for the extra capital costs which Eskom incurred in providing 2 kilometres of line, 
the high rate units were increased from 800 kWh to 1000 kWh per month and the basic 
charge was levied at different levels for supplies at 25 kVA, 50 kVA and 100 kVA. 
Monthly capital charges for new customers were only charged on line lengths in excess of 
2km. 
The 2 kilometre factor (as it became known) was however short-lived. In 1988, Eskom 
investigated the profitability of Tariff D and found that Eskom was not recovering the 












supply costs at a consumption level of 1000 kWh per month, whereas the actual average 
usage was in the region of 750 kWh per month. Further, since the costs of construction had 
risen drastically the cost of the two kilometre of service connection was not being 
adequately recovered by the slight alterations in the basic charges. As a result of these 
problems, a change was made during 1989 to the monthly capital charges structure 
whereby the costs of only 200 meters of line were included in the tariffs standard charges. 
For a customer connection longer than 200 meters, a Rands per meter charge was 
estimated and this charge recovered through a monthly capital charge. 
In the meantime, Tariff C - which was never the cause of particular attention - was 
changed by doing away with the high and low block rates and implementing a single rate 
tariff with an increased basic charge. 
In 1989, Eskom reached the following conclusions on their small customer tariffs: 
(Krumm, 1989) 
11 1. They provide the farming sector with a cheap source of power. 
2. They are understandable. 
3. Revenue requirements with some tariffs (Tariff D) are not met. 
4. There are cross-subsidies from existing farmers to new farmers. 
5. . There are cross-subsidies from the large power customers to small power 
customers. 
6. Conservation, wise and efficient use of electricity is not encouraged. 
7. The policy is prescriptive, the customer may not select the tariff which is most 
suitable to his needs. 
8. It is administratively complex, three groups of customers in only 4% of 
Eskom's business. 11 
As an alternative, a new policy was suggested: (Krumm, 1989:14) 
11 1. All small power users should be aggregated together as one group. 
2. A range of tariffs applicable to all customers within the group and linked to 
usage patterns, be developed. 
3. . Pricing structures would be such as to encourage effective use of electricity. 
4. Excess capital costs not catered for in the tariff shall be allocated to the 
specific customer or customers responsible for such costs. 












supported where it is deemed to be in the long term business interest. " 
These recommendations go to the heart of what in EdF tariffing is held as a crucial 
' ·" principle: Within practical limits, customers should have a wide choice of tariffs, so that 
the tariff that is chosen is the one that will minimise the cost of purchases to the customer 
and the cost of supply to the supplier. 
As valid as these recommendations are, to this day they have not been implemented 
possibly in view of other, more urgent pressures on small customer pricing, such as the 
need to provide a pricing structure for application in the electrically under-developed 
areas, to further Eskom's vision of electricity for all at affordable prices. 
This brings the discussion to the development of the single-rate S tariffs. The major 
obstacle to affordability amongst the lower income sectors was recognised to be the 
significant connection charges. The aim of the S tariffs was thus to provide electricity at 
an affordable price while still covering the costs of generation, transmission, distribution 
and reticulation. Integral to the development of the S tariffs was a simple and affordable 
prepayment metering system which would allow the metering of energy consumption but 
not maximum demand. 
The original Sl tariff came into effect from 1 September 1989. It was intended to break-
even with Tariff C at a consumption level of 355 kWh per month. At the time 355 kWh 
per month was the expected consumption level of customers who would be supplied on the 
S 1 Tariff. Tariffs S2 and S3 were subsequently developed. The difference between the 
three tariffs is that: with Sl, Eskom finances the capital cost of the bulk supply, 
reticulation network and service connection; with S2, Eskom finances the capital cost of 
the service connection or any part of the reticulation up to RlOOO per stand; and with S3 
the customer finances all of the bulk supply, reticulation network and service connection 
costs (Barnard, 1992). 
Including the Ruraflex tariffs, Eskom presently offers more than 7 different tariffs, each 
with different structures, to customers classified as small power users. In practice, 
however, customers have a limited choice. Only pre-payment customers use the S tariffs, 
only conventionally metered urban customers use the B tariff and only conventionally 
metered urban domestic customers use the C tariff. It is only fairly large rural farming 













It is suggested here that a better aitemative would be to develop two or three generic 
structures and allow customers to choose the particular tariff which allows the customer to 
choose the tariff that will allow him/her to minimise their electricity costs. Extra charges in 
terms of connection fees, transmission surcharges etc. could then be levied separately or 
integrated into the monthly charges as is done with the S tariffs. 
Customised pricing 
By recommending that interruptible supplies be offered to some large customers in return 
for compensatory tariff benefits, the De Villiers Commission had indirectly recommended 
the development of customised price agreements as an integral part of the electricity 
pricing policy in the industry. Customised price agreements account for approximately 
10% of the total electricity sold by Eskom in 1993. There have been a number of factors 
which have lead to the establishment of customised prices. Firstly, deficiencies in the 
range of standard tariffs have lead Eskom and some of its customers to seek customised 
agreements which offer both parties benefit. Secondly, considerable excess capacity in 
Eskom at present has lead to an initiative to increase sales as much as possible to recover 
at least the marginal cost of operating existing facilities. Thirdly, political pressure has 
lead to special deals with some strategic industries. Fourthly, in the case of the 
municipalities with self-generation capacity, Eskom has offered preferential agreements to 
municipalities to attempt to induce them to not use their (relatively) more expensive and 
inefficient power stations. The benefit to Eskom is an increase in sales at a time when 
Eskom has considerable excess capacity. There also appears to be a "national interest" 
benefit in the sense that through the customised tariff, the production resources of lowest 
cost are being utilised. 
The customised pricing deals are worked out by negotiating various options with the 
customer. Some customised tariffs which are currently used include: 
1. Commodity linked price increases. 
2. Block rate tariffs with customised blocks set at specific rates. 
3. Discounts on the maximum demand charge. 












A list of customers with customised price deals and their 1993 budget energy sales. are 
shown below. Unfortunately confidentiality precludes the publication of the revenue per 
agreement, but total revenue on customised price deals exceeded R360 million for the 
1993 financial year. 
Municipal Electricity Sales (GWh) Industrials Sales 
Distributors (GWh) 
Johannesburg Municipality 2012 Siltek 370 . 
Pretoria Municipality 840 Richards Bav Minerals 225 
Port Elizabeth Municipality 678 Alusaf 1622 
Cape Town Municipality 750 AECI Midland 130 
Bloemfontein Municipality 520 SASOL2 458.8 
Kroonstad Municipality 70 Atomic Enern:v Corporation 2180 
Queenstown Municipality 24 Moss_gas 220 
Sappi Neodwana 180 
Ferro Chrome Industry Hi_ghveld Steel 240 
CCT 394.6 Rand Carbide 106 
CMI 167.2 Transallovs 115 
Tubatse 80.l Silicon Smelters 537.5 
Ferralloys 8.5 Man_ganese Metal 50 
Ferrometals 157 Other 250 
Middelburg 8.5 
It is envisaged that customised pricing agreements will play a progressively larger role in 
electricity pricing in the industry, even after the existing surplus capacity has been 
exhausted. It should be noted that in the French and Zimbabwean electricity industries, 
customised agreements play a significant role in electricity tariffing. In France in 
particular, all customers on the Green C Tariff have customised agreements with EdF. 
From a tariffing perspective, customised pricing forces the utility as well as the customer 
to examine their own and each others' operations thoroughly so that the electricity tariff 
agreed to will benefit both parties. This is, after all, the ultimate objective of electricity 
tariffs and hence the development of customised agreements should have an important role 












4.4 Electricity pricing in the non-Eskom distribution industry at present 
4.4.1 Nature of the industry 
As stated earlier, the control structure of the municipal electricity distribution industry has 
remained largely unchanged since the beginning of the industry. The third chapter 
explained that provincial ordinances which took effect around the start of the century, 
placed control of electricity distribution in the hands of the local authorities, whose 
electricity departments were given a monopoly supply right inside their area of 
jurisdiction. Since only those resident within the area of jurisdiction of the respective local 
authority have a right to vote for their councillors, these councillors have generally used 
their respective electricity departments as a political tool in order to meet the needs of their 
white, mainly domestic, voters. 
Before electricity tariffs in the industry are focused on further, it is necessary to give a 
broad overview of the non-Eskom distribution industry: 
* 
* 
In the non-Eskom distribution industry there are a total .of just over 300 
electricity distributors including separate Black and White Local Authority 
municipal distributors, some of the Regional Services Councils, the "Self-
governing State's" electricity departments and the "National State's" electricity 
departments. Within the area of jurisdiction of most White Local Authorities there 
is almost 100% electrification. The break-down of the number of customers and 
sales to these customers in the electricity distribution sector controlled by the white 
municipalities, for 1992, is as follows: 
Number of customers Total GWh Sales 
Domestic 1 868 340 17 710 
Commercial 140 954 6 830 
Industrial 37 412 23 514 
Rural 16 124 405 
(Source: National Electrification Forum's Electricity Distribution Industry 
Database) 
















Authority Councils are responsible for the Electricity Departments under their 
jurisdiction. Similarly, Electricity Departments formed under Black Local 
Authorities are responsible to their Black Local Authority Councils. Municipal 
electricity distributors are regulated firstly by their local authority electricity 
councils and then by their respective Provincial Administrations, although the latter 
are not known to regulate the activities of municipal electricity· undertakings 
whatsoever. Regional Services Councils and Joint Services Boards are responsible 
for their own activities as assigned by Provincial Administrators. The electricity 
supply authorities in the "National States" and "Self-governing States" are 
accountable to their respective governments. And finally, an Electricity Control 
Board issues licenses to distributors, "controls" the activities of licensees and can 
control the Local Authority tariffs to customers outside their proclaimed Area of 
Jurisdiction. Eskom's tariffs in terms of structure are ultimately regulated by the 
Electricity Control Board. The level of Eskom tariffs is however within its own 
jurisdiction. 
On account of national political policies since the beginning of the industry, it 
has become structurally imbalanced with the relatively affluent white domestic 
customers adequately provided for, but the disenfranchised majority largely 
ignored. There are currently an estimated 4.2 million dwellings are not yet 
electrified.11 
The highly fragmented structure of the distribution industry has lead to a 
multiplicity of different tariffs with essentially no justifiable economic reason for 
the difference in most of the tariffs offered by the different distributors. This has 
lead to the absurd situation where in some cases two adjacent customers supplied 
by different distributors are forced to pay completely different prices. 
On account of the relationship between most Local Authority Councils and 
their Electricity Departments, cross-subsidisation between commercial and 
industrial customers in favour of domestic customers, has been entrenched. 
Finally, in the non-Eskom distribution industry there is a real cash flow out of 
the industry in the form of surpluses generated by the municipal Electricity 
Departments and paid into the m_unicipal Rates Fund (or similar). 
The structure of the industry has had an impact on pricing in the industry and vice-versa. 
Electricity Pricing in the non-Eskom part of the distribution industry will be dealt with 
firstly under the heading Price level and then under ~e heading Tariff structure. 












4.4.2 Price level 
All municipal distributors purchase the bulk of their electricity from Eskom. Most of these 
purchases are on Tariff A, although the largest municipal customer, Durban Electricity, 
recently converted to Tariff Tl. Some municipal distributors including Johannesburg, 
Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Cape Town and Bloemfontein have a limited capacity to generate 
electricity. As a result of excess generating capacity in Eskom at present these 
municipalities are able to benefit through significant discounts through customised prices 
designed to displace municipal self-generation. The two-part structure of Tariff A also 
allows municipal distributors to recover significant amounts of revenue through the benefit 
of diversity. These factors combined with the inelastic demand of many commercial and 
industrial customers supplied by the municipalities, allows the municipalities to generate 
significant surpluses. 
Using the National Electrification Forum's Electricity Distribution Industry Database, the 
figure for the actual surpluses generated in 95% of the non-Eskom distribution industry 
was Rl,270 billion for the 1992 Financial Year. The figure for the surpluses generated 
firstly as a Rand amount and then as a percentage net mark-up on cost, for some prominent 
non-Eskom municipal distributors are shown below: 
Distributor Surolus [R'OOO] Net mark-un [ % ] 
J ohannesbun? 215 833 23 
Pretoria 178 766 21 
Vereenigin2 26208 20 
Germiston 25443 14 
Benoni 18 522 17 
Boksbur2 16 248 13 
Durban 114 662 12 
Cape Town 92 571 16 
Pietermaritzbun? 29 559 19 
Port Elizabeth 27 028 11 
East London 12 351 15 
Bloemfontein 19 633 16 
In the survey of 16 municipalities as part of the 1977 Board of Trade and Industries 
investigation into the electricity supply industry, it was found that all municipalities 
favoured earning surpluses on their electricity distribution service. Some of the arguments 
put forward in favour of surpluses were, inter alia: (Board of Trade and Industry Report No 
1889, 1977:105) 












land and facilities. 
2. The rate of return on capital employed in municipal electricity undertakings is 
substantially lower than those of private undertakings. (At the time of the BTI 
Report, there were no private electricity undertakings in South Africa. Hence it is 
assumed that this statement is a comment on private electricity undertakings versus 
municipal electricity undertakings generally). 
3. Indirect rates are necessary to burden all inhabitants and not only the owners of 
property. 
4. Low interest loans are provided to electricity undertakings. 
5. City Councils guarantee the deficits of electricity undertakings. 
It is difficult to see why any of these reasons justify municipalities using their electricity 
departments to generate surpluses. Perhaps the real reason that municipalities use their 
electricity departments to generate a surplus, is because they can, and although they 
receive some opposition to this practice, this opposition has never been strong enough to 
cause them to change. 
Moving one level down to examine the relative price level of the domestic, commercial 
and industrial customers, the table presented below expresses the average annual price in 
cents/kWh for industrial, commercial and domestic customers. 
Distributor Domestic [c/kWh] Commercial [c/kWh] Industrial [ c/kWh] 
Johannesbur2 12.9 26.2 17.9 
Pretoria 18.3 18.3 12.8 
Vereenicin2 13.4 21.9 12.3 
Germiston 14.5 24.2 15 
Benoni 16 27 15 
Boksbura 14.2 20.5 19 
Durban 14.5 15 13 
Cape Town 14.3 19.5 13.7 
Pietermaritzbura 12.4 23.9 17.86 
Port Elizabeth 12.3 22.6 15 
East London 15 17 18 
Bloemfontein 11.4 14.7 13.8 
From the figures in this table, it is clear that there is extensive cross-subsidisation from 
commercial to domestic customers. The inconsistency of the price level amongst 
customers in the same class but in a different geographical area, is also clear. 
Relating to the issue of price level at distributor and customer level, it is pertinent to 












below indicates the boundaries of the nine political regions recently agreed to at multi-
party negotiations at the World Trade Centre. 
Province 
c::J 
~ EASTERN CAPE 
~ EASTERN TVL 
e::-a K\l/AZULU/NATAL 
c:::::;:J N 0 R TH \l/E ST 
833 NORTHERN CAPE 
~ NORTHERN TVL 
~OFS -PW'/ nmml WESTERN CAPE 
Grouping all non-Eskom distributors according to these boundaries the surpluses, per 
region, for 1992 would be as follows: 
Rel?ion Surolus [R'OOO] 
Eastern Transvaal 37 712 
KwaZulu/Natal 163 610 
North West 52 353 
Northern Cave 19 656 
Northern Transvaal 15 695 
OFS 62 963 
PWV 655 675 
Western Caoe 183 757 
Eastern Caoe 71077 
These figures clearly indicate the considerable disparity in the net income of the various 
regions. Furthermore, considerable electrification potential exists in the Northern 
Transvaal, Eastern Cape and PWV Regions. It is clear that the net income of the non-
Eskom distributors in these areas will be totally insufficient to meet the financial cost of 
electrifying these areas. Although this section does not attempt to provide answers to this 












customers and industrial and commercial customers cannot be increased, it becomes 
evident that unless there is a funds transfer (through whatever mechanism) from the more 
affluent PWV region to the lesser endowed regions, it will be impossible (unless there are 
some external subsidies) for the industry in these areas to meet the considerable 
electrification commitments they need to make. 
4.4.3 Tariff Structures 
The considerable price level differences between the various distributors is mirrored in the 
considerable number of different tariff structures which are used. 
In the BTI investigation of municipal pricing in 1976, it was found that the most common 
tariff structures used by the municipalities were the same as the tariff structures used by 
Escom. Some municipalities also offered limited time-differentiated tariffs, whereby 
discounts were given if customers agreed not to consume electricity during the time of 
system maximum demand. However, this was noted to be the exception rather than the 
rule (Board of Trade and Industry Report No 1889, 1977:104) 
Regarding the cost allocations upon which municipal tariffs were based, the BTI 
investigation reported as follows: (Board of Trade and Industry Report No 1889, 
1977:108) 
"The majority of municipalities are vague and it appears that sophisticated methods are not 
applied. A number of these municipalities stated that they follow Escom's policy as nearly 
as possible without indicating what it means. In two cases, tariffs were restructured about 
thirty years ago and in one case it was not possible to determine how tariffs were 
structured. In two further cases where the methods of allocation were described it was 
stated in the first case that own costs are allocated according to a fixed rule and in the other 
case that demand related costs are allocated to consumer groups according to their kWh 
consumption." 
As a brief research into tariff structures for domestic consumers at present, the domestic 
tariffs offered by Port Elizabeth, Boksburg, Johannesburg, Pietermaritzburg, 
Bloemfontein, Benoni, Germiston, Vereeniging, Pretoria, Cape Town and Durban were 
examined. From this small list of distributors, the following differences should be noted: 












monthly c/kWh consumption rate. 







monthly consumption rate. In addition, Pietermaritzburg offers a flat rate tariff for 
customers whose demand exceeds 40 Amps per phase. Finally, there is an optional 
3-block declining rate tariff . 
Bloemfontein, Benoni, Germiston and Vereeniging have a fixed monthly 
charge irr~spective of the size of the supply, and a monthly c/kWh consumption 
rate. 
Cape Town City Council has a monthly fixed charge plus a declining block 
structure tariff, with the first block up to 1500 kWh per month and the second 
block in excess of 1500 kWh per month. 
These rates are in respect of a conventionally metered single phase supply of· 
60 amps. 
Different tariffs are generally offered to pre-payment customers where 
applicable. 
In many cases, different tariffs are offered to customers who are outside the 
area of jurisdiction of the distributor but are supplied by that distributor . 
There is considerable diversity regarding the practice of who funds the service 
connection, reticulation network and distribution network. 
Commercial Customers 
Unlike domestic customers who, in the tariff schedules of all distributors in this review are 
specifically defined as such •. most small power users who do not meet the criteria for 
classification as a domestic consumer, are placed on a general tariff intended for small 
power users. Customers on this tariff are, for the most part commercial customers but may 
also include small industrial customers or other such customers. Tariff structures to these 
customers generally mirror those of the domestic customers with the exception that the 
rates, in most cases, are considerably higher. In some cases, for example Boksburg, 
commercial customers are also obliged to go on a maximum demand tariff. 
Industrial Customers 
Like commercial customers, there is no specific tariff for customers who are classified as 
industrial customers. In Boksburg for example, all customers who are not domestic 
customers are offered the same tariff. Non-domestic customers are generally classified as 












applications. Large Power User tariffs vary widely. Most tariffs have a three-part structure 
i.e. demand charge [Rik.VA], energy charge [c/kWh] and a basic monthly charge. The 
structure and applicable rates are largely based on Eskom's Tariff A. 
Some municipalities also have time-differentiation in their Large Power User tariffs, in the 
form of off-peak tariffs, for example: Benoni, Genniston, Vereeniging, Bloemfontein and 
Cape Town City Councils. In almost all cases, this tariff has the same structure as Eskom's 
TariffE. 
4.4.4 Summary of the key issues in non-Eskorn distribution industry tariffing 
In terms of electricity pricing, the key attributes of the non-Eskom distribution industry can 





From a regulatory perspective, the considerable number of institutions that are 
able to regulate the industry leads to the conclusion that price regulation in this 
sector of the industry is best described as a "tangled mess". 
The industry made a surplus of Rl,27 billion in the 1992 Financial Year. Most 
of this was transferred to the municipal Rates Account to subsidise other services. 
The surplus is not evenly distributed throughout the country, but rather is 
concentrated in a few metropolitan areas, notably the PWV. 
The average price level to domestic customers, in comparison with industrial 
and commercial customers, indicates that there is considerable cross-subsidisation 












CHAPTERS INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN ELECTRICITY PRICING 
Tue purpose of this chapter is to investigate electricity pricing practices in other countries 
of the world. The approach is firstly to review the pricing structures in each country and 
then to develop some perspectives on the applicability of pricing strategies in these 
countries, to the electricity supply and distribution industry in South Africa. Three very 
different countries (from a pricing perspective) were chosen for this investigation. The first 
study is of the electricity industry in England and Wales which has recently been through a 
major restructuring which aimed to establish the force of fair competition as the prime 
determinant of electricity prices. The second study is of electricity pricing by Electricite de 
France, a state corporation, which has had a monopoly over all parts of the electricity 
supply and distribution industry since 1946. The third study is of pricing in Zimbabwe 













SA PRICING IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
Part 1: The restructuring of the ,electricity industry in the UK12 and 
electricity pricing in the restructured industry. 
5.1 Introduction 
In 1990 the UK electricity industry was radically restructured from a monopolist State 
industry to one in which there was extensive private ownership, competition in generation 
and limited but increasing competition in distribution. The mechanisms setting price in the 
industry are unique world-wide in the sense that they have developed as a consequence of 
the stated goal that pricing in the industry should be based on competition and as such 
should support absolutely no cross-subsidies whatsoever. This chapter examines the 
restructured industry and postulates possible applications to the South African industry. 
The chapter is split into two parts. Part 1 focuses on the restructuring of the industry and 
the price regulatory mechanisms that have been developed in various sectors of the 
industry. Part 2 focuses on possible applications of the UK system of electricity pricing to 
South Africa. 
The chapter starts with a discussion on the restructure and privatisation as principally a 
political development. The basic objectives of the privatisation and restructure are th.en 
established. The development of the new industry in the generation, transmission and 
distribution sectors is then discussed. This is followed by a discussion on the creation of a 
market-based electricity trading market, the development of generator/supplier/customer 
contracts, and the restructuring process in general. An explanation of the price regulatory 
mechanisms in the various sectors of the industry concludes Part 1. Part 2 begins with a 
discussion of private ownership versus competition. The positive principles arising from 
the UK restructuring are then discussed. This is followed by a discussion of a possible 
adaptation of the supply side pricing mechanisms in the UK industry to the South African 
ESL Part 2 concludes with an analysis of the application of the UK distribution pricing 
mechanisms to the South African Electricity Distribution Industry. 
12 While not technically correct, for the sake of simplicity, all reference to the UK in this chapter, 
should be taken to mean England and Wales only. The electricity industry restructuring in Scotland 












5.2 Political developments leading to the restructuring of the UK electricity 
industry 
The Conservative Party's manifesto for the May 1987 general election contained two 
pledges of relevance to the UK ESL The more important of these was to privatise the 
industry. This pledge came shortly before the fortieth anniversary of the nationalisation of 
the industry. 
During the years of its nationalisation the UK ESI had enjoyed a high degree of stability. 
What was, prior to the nationalisation in 1948, a fragmented and largely inefficient 
industry, had become a technologically advanced and stable industry. In addition, by 1990, 
the industry was enjoying spectacular financial success, financing all its own investment 
and paying back much of its earlier debt, so much so that at the time of privatisation it was 
close to debt-free (De Oliviera and MacKerron, 1992). 
However, despite this apparent success, the Conservative Government under the firm 
direction of Margaret Thatcher sought to radically restructure the industry in order to 
achieve the oft-cited objective of economic efficiency through competition. The idea that 
the electricity industry could achieve economic efficiency through competition was a 
radical departure from the commonly held notion that the electricity supply and distribution 
industry was a natural monopoly. 
The restructure was opposed in view of the apparent success of the existing nationalised 
industry and the fact that the idea of competition in facets of the electricity industry was so 
radically new and unproven. Indeed it is clear from published literature on the subject, that 
both during and after the restructure, considerable doubt existed as to whether the new 
competitive industry would achieve its stated goals any better than the previous 
nationalised industry had. 
However the fact that the momentous restructure did take place is largely accounted for by 
the political will of Thatcher's government who were as determined to "roll back the 
frontiers of the state" as the Labour Party had been to "secure for the worker by their hand 
and brain the fruits of their industry" when, under their government, the industry was 












5.3 The objectives of the restructuring of the Electricity Supply Industry. 
Two key principles quantify the basic objectives underlying the restructuring and 
privatisation of the UK ESL These have been expressed as: (Ruff, 1991:5) 
3.1. Economic efficiency, both long run and short run. 
3.2. Competition, rather than regulation, is the best way to accomplish 
efficiency. 
The White Paper of February 1988 on the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry 
stipulated these as the core around which a privately owned electricity i dustry should be · 
based. 
These were the principles that were established at the outset. However there was no grand 
plan which set out the process to be followed or even what the industry should look like at 
the end of the restructuring. 
5.4 The restructure 
To the electricity industry in England and Wales, April fool's day in 1990, ironically, was 
known as Vesting Day, the day on which the restructured industry came into existence. 
As explained earlier, two of the significant objections to the restructuring centred on the 
fact that the existing industry was apparently successful and also that competition in all 
parts of the electricity industry was a new and untested idea. In fact there were several 
other obstacles to the privatisation that only came to light as the restructuring progressed. 
One such problem was nudear generation which, due to disinterest from investors made it 
impossible to privatise. 
In this section, the restructuring of the UK ESI has been separated into two distinct 












trading system to facilitate market-based trading. Before the latter process is explained, it is 
necessary to describe the former. 
5.4.1 The unbundling of the electricity supply industry 
Since it was nationalised in 1948, generation and transmission was undertaken by the 
Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) while distribution was undertaken by the 
twelve Area Boards, who had a franchise over all customers in their respective areas. The 
industry was presided over by the Secretary of State for Energy and there was no 
competition in the supply, distribution or transmission of electricity. 
The crucial issue in the restructuring and privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry 
was to create competition in generation and distribution. This has meant unbundling 
generation and transmission from the CEGB and restructuring the Area Boards. This 
section focuses on the developments in generation, transmission and distribution in the 
course of the re-organisation of the industry. 
Generation 
On the generation side, the erstwhile Central Electricity Generating Board, was split into: 
1. Two independent power generators, National Power and PowerGen. 
2. Nuclear Electric, a commercial operation with 100% of its equity held by the 
state. 
3. A National Grid Company (NGC). 
In terms of the generating capacity in England and Wales, the capacity levels in 1991 were 
as follows: (Source: Power In Europe, Issue 106, 1991) 
National Power 29445MW 
PowerGen 18 711 MW 
Nuclear Electric 8333MW 
Others'!' 2500MW 
Table 1. 
*Includes small scale Independent Power Producers as well as pumped storage facilities 













For the May 1987 General Election, the second of the Conservative Party's pledges, 
relating to the UK ESI, focused on nuclear generation. In particular they pledged to 
continue to support the development of civil nuclear power in the private sector (Chesshire, 
1992). However, by November 1989, the government had discovered, much to its chagrin, 
that the decommissioning costs of some of the very old Magnox Reactors as well as 
exorbitant fuel cycle costs meant that private investors were not interested in the nuclear 
power stations, and as such it would have been impossible to effect a constructive 
privatisation of these assets. This was a source of great embarrassment to the Conservative 
Party and contributed to Cecil Parkinson's replacement by John Wakeham as Secretary of 
State for Energy. 
Conventional thermal generation 
As a result of the withdrawal of the nuclear power generators from the privatisation, 
National Power, which was originally intended to receive 70% of the nuclear plant held by 
the CEGB (PowerGen getting the other 30%), ended up with only the CEGB's fossil-fired 
plant in a split of 46% to National Power and 28% to PowerGen. With the creation of two 
generators with more than 74% of the generation capacity, the potential for duopolist 
behaviour was created. However, since the government only withdrew nuclear power 
generation from privatisation on 9 November 1989, there was not sufficient time to 
consider any alternatives before the flotation of the industry in April 1990. Had it been 
recognised at a much earlier stage that nuclear power was to be retained in the public 
sector, the division of the coal-fired generating assets into five or six companies might 
have been contemplated. The Secretary of State for Energy later admitted that were he 
starting again, he would have chosen a different structure for fossil fuel generators (Fourth 
Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Energy, 1989, in Chesshire 1992). 
Independent Power Producers 
The category labelled "Others" in Table 1, include Independent Power Producers (IPP's). In 
1992 there were no independent power producers, but generators in this category are 
forecast to increase to 7% of the total capacity by 1995. (Power in Europe, Issue 106, 












achieve a satisfactory return on their capital investments. The privately owned electricity 
distributors known as Regional Electricity Companies (RECs), among others, are investing 
in IPP's through long term contracts on the proviso that the investments in the IPP's will 
mean that the RECs will be able to access an economic source of power when the plant is 
commissioned. The majority .of these contracts are for Combined Cycle Gas 
Turbine(CCGT) plant (Power In Europe Issue 126, 1992). The largest Independent Power 
Producer project yet agreed to, is for a 1725 MW gas-fired plant. This contract is between 
four RECs, Enron and ICI and is scheduled for completion before 1995. 
It was known long before the privatisation of the power industry, that it was cheaper to 
generate electricity by using gas than by using coal. A lifting of the ban on the use of gas in 
power generation around the time of the privatisation, resulted in a new focus on gas-fired 
generating plant. py July 1992, the NGC had signed deals to connect 23 806 MW of gas-
fired plant (Power In Europe Issue 126, 1992). By late 1991, National Power and 
PowerGen were planning to build 4650 MW and 3730 MW of gas-fired plant respectively 
(Power In Europe Issue 106, 1991). 
Distribution 
At the time of the privatisation, the then .British Prime Minister expressed the conviction 
that "no-one in the (electricity) industry should regard customers as theirs by right" (Power 
In Europe Issue 58, 1989). This meant that in distribution it was necessary to create 
competition by allowing any customer the right to purchase electricity from any supplier 
that they may choose. This was perhaps the most radical development of the whole 
restructuring process. The idea that distribution was not a natural monopoly was an idea as 
yet unchallenged to any significant extent in the electricity industry world-wide. In order to 
effect competition in distribution it was necessary to ensure that potential suppliers should 
not be barred from gaining access to the distribution grid and reticulation "wires" to any 
particular customer. 
Although the intention of privatising distribution was to create competition, the process of 
introducing competition was intended to be evolutionary. The first step was to privatise the 
existing twelve Area Boards as public limited companies to be known as Regional 












The earnings of the newly privatised RECs come almost entirely from the charges that they 
are able to levy on customers for the use of their distribution assets. The initial licenses 
issued to the RECs by the Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) stipulated that each 
REC was allowed to price electricity in order to recover from electricity supply charges, the 
total costs of all electricity purchases plus a margin (limited to 10-20% of total supply 
costs) to cover administrative and working-capital costs. Hence the return on equity 
invested in the industry is a function of the expected growth of electricity consumption in 
each particular geographic area. The RECs in the South and East of England, with the 
highest flotation values, had the lowest return on equity and the highest price to earnings 
ratios, in view of the expected growth of electricity consumption in these areas. 
Conversely, the RECs in the North of England and Southern Wales had the highest returns 
but the lowest price/earnings ratios because of the expected industrial stagnation in these 
areas. 
The second stage in the restructuring of distribution was to create competition in the 
industry. Competition can be said to exist when any consumer anywhere in the UK has a 
voluntary choice as to which distributing company he or she chooses to purchase electricity 
from. In practice, creatmg this competition instantaneously was impossible for a number of 
reasons; The most significant reason was that at the time of privatisation the RECs entered 
into contract purchases from National Power and PowerGen at rates higher than the pool 
price since National Power and Powel'Gen had in tum been forced into three-year contracts 
to support expensive coal purchased from British Coal. (The pool price mechanism is 
explained in detail later). These contracts were scheduled to expire on 31 March 1993 by 
which time National Power and PowerGen would have been able to explore other avenues 
to obtain cheaper coal. As a quid pro quo the RECs had a franchise over all customers with 
maximum demands below 1 MW until April 1994. However there was open competition 
above this limit in which National Power and PowerGen had the right to supply electricity 
directly to large customers. After April 1994, the proposed franchise limit will be set at 0.1 
MW thereby opening up a much larger portion of the market to competition. After 1998 it 
is intended that the distributors have no franchise over customers inside their "area of 
supply". 
The changes undertaken thus far, and the changes proposed have meant a radically changed 
role for the distributors. The newly created RECs are responsible for acquiring and 












mean that they have an obligation to supply. Their role is to serve as an energy purchasing 
agent for any local customer - they must offer to sell electricity as long as any is available 
in the pool. Similarly, RECs are not under any obligation to extend their distribution 
network. Previously with the Area Boards a customer was connected to the system on 
request. In the privately owned industry however~ a customer will only be connected if he 
or she is able to pay the price that competitive suppliers are asking. 
Besides the fact that RECs will eventually have to operate in a completely competitive 
environment, there is also a regulated limit relating to the extent of vertical integration 
allowable in the RECs. In particular, they are prohibited from owning or controlling 
generating capacity exceeding 15% of their annual maximum demand. The intention with 
this is to stop the RECs from poaching customers previously supplied by the generators. In 
effect however, this is also a limit on the portion of the Independent Power production. 
Similarly, National Power and PowerGen are prohibited from contracting directly to supply 
more than 15% of the load in any REC territory. In fact this limit can be modified by the 
Director General of Electricity Supply at will. 
Transmission 
The National Grid Division was created within the CEGB, on the 1 January 1989, as a 
precursor to the formation of an independent grid company. On the 31 March 1990, the 
CEGB was split up into National Power Plc, PowerGen Plc, Nuclear Electric Plc and the 
National Grid Company (NGC) Plc. 
For the first two, 60% of the equity is privately owned and 40% is state owned, Nuclear 
Electric is 100% state owned while the NGC is jointly owned by the 12 RECs. 
Role ofNGC 
The NGC has been given responsibility for: (Source: NGC Annual Report 1989/90) 
II The operation, maintenance and development of the high-voltage transmission 
system in England and Wales. 












electricity in the new commercial market. 
Co-ordinating the operation of major power stations in accordance with a merit 
order based on bid prices submitted by generators. " 
The NGC should not be seen as a state or even para-statal organisation. It is a commercial 
organisation but closely regulated by the Electricity Act, the Draft Transmission Licence 
and Draft Articles of Association. 
It is a worthwhile endeavour to examine the modalities of the Draft Transmission Licence, 
the licence governing the responsibilities of the NOC, especially in terms of its relevance to 
the possible development of a Southern African Grid Company to co-ordinate exchanges in 
a Southern Africa Power Pool. The NOC Draft Transmission Licence can be defined in 
terms of the following codes: (Ruff, 1991:23) 
* Planning Code 
* Connection Code 
* Operating Code 
The Planning code considers the criteria to be applied by NOC in the development of a 
supergrid system. It stipulates the data requirements vis-a-vis demand profiles for actual 
and reactive demand including plant generating parameters and items such as excitation 
control, governor and protective arrangements. 
'The Connection code ensures a non-discriminatory approach for connection of users to the 
supergrid system. 
The Operating Code covers a wide range of issues: 
11 Demand forecasts: In the period up to eight weeks ahead, estimates of demand are 
undertaken by the NOC. Aggregated daily load profiles will be assessed and 













Operational planning: The objective of operational planning is to co-ordinate 
generation and transmission maintenance outage patterns over a 3-5 year time scale 
in order to ensure adequate generation levels throughout the year. 
Operating Margin: Here the idea is to determine the necessary operating plant 
needed as standby to cover demand estimating errors or unexpected failure of plant. 
Demand Control: Load management techniques are centrally co-ordinated to ensure 
stable operating conditions. 
Operational liaison: This code relates to the necessary control room interface 
arrangements of distributors and generators and grid control. 
Safety co-ordination: The need to ensure safety across boundary interfaces at power 
stations and transmission and distribution locations is of paramount importance. 
Contingency Planning: This covers emergency arrangements in the event of major 
system difficulties. It details the black-start procedures. 
National Control: In the event of a defined national emergency following a 
government notification, NGC has the authority to assume control of the system. " 
NGC influence on capacity 
With the old CEGB system, the type and level of capacity was determined by system 
planners who would forecast the system demand and then decide on the type of plant 
necessary to meet the system demand. The political process also determined to a large 
degree the type of plant to be used. For example, political influence determined that 
nuclear energy would be used as a means of generation. The Magnox Reactors, dating back 
to the 1950's were among the first nuclear power plants. The nuclear stations have never 
been a commercial success, but have kept generating through political persuasion and 
through a roughly 9% Fossil Fuel levy. Similarly, the State subsidisation of British Coal 
and the ban on the use of gas, meant that in the old CEGB, coal-fired thermal power 
stations were the predominant type of generating station. 
With the new regime, the intention is that the end market will dictate the type of generation 
plant which would be the most economical. It is not intended that the NGC have any 
influence over what the market would have determined as the optimum type and amount of 
capacity. Rather, the NGC is responsible for forecasting demand, planning the production 












Transmission Access and Pricing 
Since the NGC is responsible for co-ordinating the power pool, they have to be paid for the 
services they provide and also for the use of their transmission grid assets. To this end they 
have devised certain charges: (Source: Ruff, 1991:23) 
1. Customer Specific Charges 
Any new generator or supplier wanting to use the grid must pay for the necessary 
connection equipment, plus a share of any system reinforcement costs made necessary by 
its connection. 
2. Site-Specific Entry and Exit Charges 
Each grid user pays an annual capacity charge related to the cost of grid equipment that is 
required to serve that customer at its specific site. (NGC estimates these costs as £ 
1.25/k.W for generators and£ 4/k.W for off-takers.) 
3. System Service Charges 
Each supplier pays an annual charge (in 1991 it was £3.37/k.W ) to cover the cost of a 
hypothetical "skeletal" grid that would provide the stability and voltage control that all 
suppliers would need even if they did not use the grid to transport energy from distant 
generators. 
4. 'Zonal Infrastructure Charges 
Each grid user pays an annual capacity and an annual energy charge. These charges are 
zone dependent but are unrelated to any generator/supplier contracts. There are 11 zones in 
total. In the South where there is a deficit of generation relative to load, there is no 
infrastructure charge payable by the generators. This is not the case in the North and 













5. Transmission Losses and Out-of-Merit Running Costs 
The costs of electrical losses and of running plants "out-of-merit" because of transmission 
constraints are recovered through the "uplift" charges in the half-hour in which they occur. 
These charges will be explained in more detail later in this chapter. 
5.4.2 The creation of market-based electricity trade 
Having discussed some of the details pertaining to the restructuring of the generation, 
transmission and distribution sectors, it is necessary to focus on the creation of market-
based electricity trade. As the restructuring progressed, the ideas on the electricity trading 
market evolved from the initial idea of separate Distributor and Generator Pools, to the 
idea of a unified single distribution and generation pool. This section explains the 
operation of the Unified Pool as it is currently used. 
The "U-Pool" consists of three parts: (Source: Power in Europe Issue No 58, 1989) 
1. An "energy pool" in which power will be bought and sold at a market clearing 
price, based on offers made half-hourly by the generators. 
2. A "Capacity market" allowing for: 
2.1 Long-term contracts for power. 
2.2 A regulated insurance market enabling small independent generators to 
buy back-up at reasonable prices. 
2.3 Regulated spot-trading of capacity. 
3. A registry which will administer and record all transactions. 
On 1 April 1990, after having debated and resolved counter proposals from the generators 
and Area Boards, NOC began to release daily prices for its pooling and settlements system. 
The prices were published in the Daily Telegraph (they are now published in the Financial 
Times) and contain a table of pool prices on the day of publication and final prices for 
trading on days previously. The value of these pool prices is calculated ex ante based on 












Notional Ex Ante Pool Prices 
Each day the NOC determines the pool prices for the following day, on the basis of 
generator offer prices and a notional unconstrained schedule of generator operation13. The 
half-hourly pool price depends on the system marginal price (SMP), a calculated loss-of-
load probability (LOLP) and an administratively set, value of lost load (VLL) 
13 
1. Generator Offer Prices 
Each day, each generating unit notifies NOC of the capacity it expects to have 
available for each half-hour of the following day and the energy prices (p/kWh) at 
which that station will generate. The generators also notify NOC of the prices at 
which they will provide various ancillary services such as spinning reserve and 
reactive power. 
2. Unconstrained or Notional Dispatch 
NOC determines an "unconstrained" schedule and dispatch, indicating which units 
would, in the absence of any transmission constraints, be scheduled to run in order 
to minimise system costs. The offer prices and the unconstrained schedule have no 
purpose other than to compute pool prices for each half-hour. 
3. Energy Price 
The system marginal price (SMP) for each half-hour is conceptually the energy 
offer price of the highest-running-cost plant operating in that half-hour. In practice 
calculating the system marginal price is much more complex because of plant start-
up costs and plant dynamics. Each generator, whatever its offer price, is paid SMP 
for the energy it is scheduled to generate in the unconstrained dispatch. 
In this context a "notional unconstrained schedule of generator operation" describes a 
hypothetically calculated generation operation schedule in which system constraints on the operation 
of different power stations have been ignored. The purpose of the "notional unconstrained schedule" 
is to calculate an operational merit order of the different power stations, based purely on the 












4. Loss-of-Load Probability 
Generator declarations of plant availability and NGC's forecast of load are used in a 
probabilistic model to compute a LOLP for each half-hour of the following day. In 
the context used by NOC, LOLP is defined as a conditional probability, given 
today's forecasts, that voltage will have to be reduced in a specific half-hour 
tomorrow because of insufficient generating capacity. Since there is currently an 
excess of generating capacity in the UK system the day-ahead LOLP is essentially 
zero. 
5. Value of Lost Load 
Failure to meet load because of a capacity-related voltage reduction is deemed to 
impose on customers a gross cost-per-kWh-lost called the Value of Lost Load 
(VLL). The concept of this cost is clear, however the calculation of a value is highly 
debatable since the value of lost load will vary widely depending on the particular 
industry that has lost its supply. The NGC has adopted a value of £2/k.Wh, a figure 
which had previously been used by the CEGB and which they advance as being 
broadly in agreement with various studies of consumer attitudes. 
6. Ex Ante Half-Hourly Capacity Value 
Each kW of generating capacity that is declared available for a specific half-hour of 
the following day, and then is available for that half-hour, is paid an amount 
representing the ex ante value of that capacity. This is over and above the value of 
any energy it may produce. The value of the capacity payment is: 
LOLP*(VLL - SMP) for plant that is notionally dispatched 
LOLP*(VLL - Bid Price) for plant that is not notionally dispatched 
7. Pool Input Price (PIP) 
The half-hourly SMP's and capacity payments to dispatched plants are combined 












PIP= SMP + LOLP(VLL · SMP) 
PIP is the amount paid by the pool for each kWh actually generated, whatever the 
generators bid price. However, capacity available but not run in the unconstrained 
dispatch is also paid a capacity value equal to LOLP*(VLL - Bid Price). The PIP 
can then be defined in terms of SMP for all energy produced and a capacity price 
related to system LOLP, the value of lost load and the SMP. 
Final Ex Post Pool Prices 
The discussion thus far has explained the determination of the pool prices. In fact the 
circumstances forecast in the ex-ante approach might not eventuate and hence adjustments 
have to be made ex-post to compensate generators for any costs or lost profits resulting 
from divergence between the forecast and the reality. The steps in this process are 
explained as follows: 
1. Actual Dispatch 
NGC determines an actual dispatch reflecting transmission constraints and using the same 
generator bids used in the notional unconstrained dispatch. 
2. Out-of-Merit Running 
In the actual dispatch, NGC instructs plants to operate differently from the day-ahead, ex-
ante, unconstrained dispatch, b~cause of either transmission constraints or last-minute 
changes in system conditions. Generators are required by the pool to take instructions 
without further negotiation, but are compensated at their individual offer prices for 
divergences from the unconstrained dispatch. An example of out-of-merit running is the · 
use of PowerGen's Fawley oil-fired plant. Fawley, is a 2000 MW oil-fired plant which does 
not get onto the notional unconstrained schedule on ·the basis that it is not competitive, 
economically, with other available plant. However, Fawley is needed to stabilise the 












effective plant is available. Since Fawley runs "out-of-merit" PowerGen receive the full 
offer price for power generated by Fawley. 
3. Ancilliary Service 
During the actual dispatch, NGC calls upon generators to provide certain ancilliary services 
such as spinning reserve or reactive power. Because the market in these ancilliary services 
may be quite uncompetitive, NGC pays each generator what it bids, but generators have a 
licence obligation to bid prices for these services at a "reasonable" level. 
4. Pool Output Price (POP) 
A Pool Output Price is calculated for each half-hour as the Pool Input Price (PIP) plus an 
uplift. The uplift is the sum, for that half-hour, of all payments NGC makes for available 
but undispatched capacity, ancillary sen1ices, out of merit running and transmission 
losses, all divided by the total kWh sold in that half-hour. All energy taken from the pool at 
bulk supply points is paid for at the pool output price. 
5. Ex Post correction of the Ex Ante Pool Prices 
For the reasons explained earlier the ex-ante calculations of the pool prices may not be 
accurate. Ex post adjustments are made and final payments are made on the basis of the 
adjusted prices. 
This section has attempted to explain the various mechanisms which have been created to 
stimulate market-based trade of electricity in the supply-side of the industry. In practice 
however, the heated debate surrounding the alleged collusion of National Power and 
PowerGen to control the market is evidence that the proposed structure has not exactly 
worked as intended. This debate is not entered into here, but is instead covered in later in 
this chapter. 
5.5 The development of Generator/Supplier/Customer Contracts 
One of the principal strengths of the U.K system is the apparent extent of contractual 












merchants and brokers, even entities with no connection to the pool and totally outside the 
industry have freedom to enter into any kind of short or long term contract they desire. The 
secondary contracts market acts as a market for these participants to insure against Pool 
transactions. During the first year of pool operation, some 95% of all electricity sold was 
covered by some form of contract (Littlechild, 1991). 
In theory, the pool price is directly related to the balance between supply and demand. In 
practice, barriers to entry and duopolistic collusion will conspire against the absolute 
·functioning of an absolutely free market. Nevertheless it can be asserted that the pool price 
comes close to a free-market determined balance between the bids of a group of buyers and 
the offers of a group of sellers. By virtue of the stochastic nature of electricity supply and 
demand, this price will be volatile. It is thus natural for the pool to develop a financial tool 
whereby participants can minimise their exposure to risk. The risk is the considerable 
uncertainty as to how the pool will perform and what the average pool price will be. The 
solution to insure against this risk is a series of contracts which w uld have the effect of 
fixing the price of electricity independently of the prevailing pool price. These contracts are 
known as "contracts for differences". 
All energy contracts are concluded with the Pool in the first instance. Contracts for 
differences and other insurance tools are not part of the power pool managed by the NGC. 
In the Pool, Generators are credited at Pool Input Price for energy delivered to the Pool. 
Suppliers (distributors) and direct customers are debited at Pool Output Price for energy 
taken from the Pool. Contracts for differences based on the Pool Price are then written to 
insure the initial Pool contracts. These contracts can work in two ways: 
1. Before the electricity is purchased, a consumer, C, contracts to buy firm 
energy from a generator, G, at a specified, predetermined price, P. After the 
contracted-for electricity has been delivered, G is paid by the pool at the 
agreed pool price and hence the only payment between C and G directly is 
the difference between the actual Pool Price and the price, P, the agreed 
contract price. 












option of buying energy from G at price P. C will only call the contract 
when the Pool Price exceeds P. G will then meet the call by paying the 
difference between the Pool Price and P. 
Eighty-five percent of National Power and PowerGen's output - which is sold to the RECs 
is covered by contracts for differences. In 1992, the contracts were negotiated at a pool 
price of over 3 p/k.Wh. For the time that these contracts existed, National Power and 
PowerGen were therefore secure against pool prices being less than this. It is interesting to 
note that in the second year of the pool's existence there was a reduced number of contracts 
for differences and coincidentally the pool price began to rise. 
A further development in the financial derivatives market is pool price futures, scheduled 
to be run on the London Futures and Options Exchange(FOX). In this market, investors 
and speculators can take any positions that they choose. In essence, it should not be any 
different to a Gold Futures market. The launch of an Electricity Futures market has been 
scheduled for mid 1993, not long before the three-year contracts for differences between 
generators and RECs will expire. 
5.6 A Discussion on the restructure and the development of the Power Pool 
Roughly 18 months after the White Paper was tabled in the House of Commons, electricity 
supply and distribution in England and Wales had largely been transformed from a public 
service industry to a commodity industry. The process had been achieved through 
privatising much of the industry and then creating a framework within which competition 
between the privatised participants in the industry could be achieved. The resulting system 
is far from being a definitive competitive industry. However, it is much closer to a system 
in which the utilisation of resources is determined by competitive forces in a free market, 
than it is to a system in which the allocation of resources is determined through centralist 
technocratic planning. 
Politics as the driving force 
Much of the zeal in creating a liberated ESI in the UK was the result of Thatcher's penchant 












to releasing the ESI to the private sector since it was a Labour government which had 
detennined the structure of the CEGB and the Area Boards 40 years earlier. It is interesting 
to note that, at the time, the Labour Party expressed the intention to re-nationalise the 
industry should they win the 1992 General Election. The privatisation and resultant power 
pool should thus be seen in the context of the political developments in England at this 
time. 
The Pool Model 
It is not the intention of this chapter to enter into a discourse on general pool theory, 
however it is necessary to provide some insight into the reasons for a central pool. 
The motivation for a central electricity pool is not immediately obvious. If the intention 
with the UK restructuring was to create competition, it is not immediately obvious why the 
industry could not simply have been deregulated altogether, and hence bilateral power 
exchanges between the generators and the distributors would have been the modus 
operandi of the ESI? 
To illustrate why a central market is required consider the following example: A generator, 
G, enters into an agreement with a customer, C. C pays G a fixed annual payment to take 
all of G's power. G and C are both getting what they are contracted for, but the system will 
not be operating efficiently because the nature of electricity supply and demand means that 
there will be times when other generators could generate more cheaply than G. Economic 
efficiency would require G to shut down during these times and purchase power from the 
other (more economical) generators in order to satisfy its contract with C. This reality 
points to the need for some kind of central market where buyers and sellers can meet to 
trade and in so doing, determine a price which will balance system supply and aggregate 
customer demand. Hence the development of a Power Pool which collects decentralised 
offers to buy and sell and determines market clearing prices and quantities. 
Compromise 
The 1988 White Paper explained that the fundamental objective of the restructuring of the 












this process should be achieved, these modalities were left largely to the specialists in the 
ESI. Hence the privatisation has been described as a process "whereby the ESI was thrown 
in the air and told to sort itself out before it reached the ground" (Ruff, 1991:2). In fact for 
the 18 months the ESI spent in the air, it became clear that it would not reach the ground in 
satisfactory condition without a significant amount of compromise. 
One of the first areas to be compromised was the Nuclear power sector. Prime Minister 
Thatcher and Secretary of State for Energy, Cecil Parkinson, had been strong proponents of 
nuclear generation and were convinced that the private sector would be able to manage 
these resources more industriously than the public sector. The intention was therefore to 
split the CEGB into two separate companies, the larger of which would be responsible for 
all nuclear plant. As explained in detail earlier, it became clear that it would be impossible 
to privatise the nuclear plant. Hence the decision was that the nuclear plant would not be 
incorporated into the private sector, but that it should rather be controlled by a public 
limited company of which the State was the sole shareholder. Nuclear plant was to be 
dispatched as base-load plant with the highest priority in the generation schedule. Since the 
privatisation the nuclear sector has in fact recorded its highest output yet. It is clear 
therefore that the failure to privatise the nuclear sector ensured its survival but at the 
expense of true competition in generation. 
Another area in which there has been compromise is the limitation of the non-franchise 
sector (the franchise sector being those customers who are forced to buy electricity from 
their local REC). Part of the reason for this compromise is explained by fixed coal 
contracts between British Coal and National Power and PowerGen from 1990 and 
terminating in 1993. Largely because British Coal prices are uncompetitive with 
international coal prices, the fixed contracts have placed National Power and PowerGen at 
a competitive disadvantage compared with other generators who would be free to buy coal 
on the world market. Hence the contract price of electricity to the RECs was set at a level 
above the forecast pool price in order to recover the necessary funds to subsidise British 
Coal. The RECs were allowed to pass this cost on to their customers but, as a quid pro quo, 
the RECs were given a monopoly on sites with maximum demands of less that 1 MW, at 
least until the· termination of the coal contracts. In addition RECs are prohibited from 
owning generation with capacity exceeding 15% of their 1989 maximum demands, and 
National Power and PowerGen jointly are prohibited from contracting to supply more than 












is proposed that the monopoly will be limited to customers with maximum demands below 
0.1 MW, in April 1998, it is proposed that the franchise market should dissolve altogether. 
The current compromises are seen as necessary steps in the evolution to a truly competitive 
industry. 
5.7 Price regulation in the generation industry 
The focus of the chapter thus far has been on describing the restructuring process and some 
of the mechanisms which were developed in the restructured industry. The focus is now 
turns to analysing the mechanisms, equations and structures used to regulate the price of 
electricity produced by the generating companies. 
Price regulation in generation 
Thus far, the analysis of the unbundling of the generation sector and the creation of a 
competitive market in generation has detailed the mechanisms used to price electricity in 
the "competitive" industry. At the least the pool pricing mechanism can be described as 
complex. The principal source of the complexity is that the pricing mechanism attempts to 
set the laws of supply and demand as the basis to the quantity and price of generated 
electricity. In practice this objective is complicated by the fact that electricity generation, 
has a whole set of technical dynamics such as voltage, frequency, load flows and power 
flows which at times act counter to the requirements for least cost production. In the UK 
the problem is complicated further by the fact that electricity generated from nuclear plant 
is not subject to the same rules as electricity generated from other plant. 
In this section, the issue of the regulation of the price of electricity purchased from 
generators, by the Pool, will be analysed in more detail. The section begins with an analysis 
of the problem of having two dominant generators who together share control of most of 
the market. The analysis then moves to a discussion of the basis of pool price regulation by 
the Office of the Electricity Regulator (OFFER). Then the components of the Pool Selling 












National Power and PowerGen: Allegations of collusion 
Earlier in this chapter the developments leading to the creation of only two generating 
companies to assume the non-nuclear power stations of the CEGB, was discussed. National 
Power and PowerGen together currently control about 70% of the generating capacity in 
the UK. They have been accused by different parties at different times of colluding to drive 
the pool prices too low and also of colluding to drive the pool prices too high. 
In the first case - pool prices too low - PowerGen and National Power have been accused of 
exploiting contracts for differences to keep the pool price low and in so doing excluding 
Independent Power Producers. Since more than 95% of pool trade in the first year was 
covered by Contracts for Differences, it was argued14 that it was possible for National 
Power and PowerGen to offer plant at below operating cost and still recover the required 
revenue through Contracts for Differences. Substantiating this view is the fact that the 
average Pool Price during the first year was 1.7 p/kWh when Contracts for Differences had 
pitched the Pool Price at around 3 p/kWh. By keeping the Pool Price low, Independent 
Power Producers WOl1ld be faced with a significant barrier in trying to secure investment 
capital for new plant and hence further entrenching the position of the two dominant 
generators. However, Professor Littlechild, the Director General of Electricity Supply, 
dismissed these arguments and expressed the opinion that the low pool prices were to be 
expected during the settling-down period (Power in Europe Issue No 79, 1990). 
In the second case, National Power and PowerGen have been accused of driving the pool 
prices too high - the average pool prices in April-September 1991 were 29% higher than in 
the same period in 1990 (Power in Europe Issue No 115, 1992). In total, the Pool Selling 
Price (PSP) rose from 1.84 p/kWh in the 1991 financial year to 2.42 p/kWh in the 1993 
financial year. The potential for National Power and PowerGen to collude in anti-
competitive behaviour has always been recognised and for this reason Professor Littlechild 
recommended at the start of 1992 that new licence conditions be placed on National Power 
and PowerGen to oblige them to publish information on plant availability and to establish 
arrangements for ascertaining whether others would be willing to buy stations which they 
were planning to close. 
14 This argument was put forward in July 1990, four months after the pool· was in operation, by 












In July 1993, at the time of the fourth OFFER inquiry into significant price increases in the 
pool, Professor Littlechild, the Director General of Electricity Supply in OFFER released a 
press statement saying that: 
"In a competitive market, customers' interests are paramount. This is not the case in the 
electricity market. Further steps need to be taken to ensure that customers do come first" 
(Littlechild, 1993(a)). 
The increases in the pool price were mainly attributable to increases in the bid prices of 
National Power. However, PowerGen's bidding policy also influenced the process. This 
evidence has lead to concern at the perceived ability of the major generators to raise the 
prices at will, on account of their market power. Should the pricing developments of the 
major generators prove to be a case of duopolistic collusion, OFFER may refer the major 
generators or the structure of the generation market to the Monopolies and Merger 
Commission. However, there is another twist to this whole debate contained in the fact that 
40% of the equity in National Power and PowerGen is still owned by the government, who 
are eager to realise their investment at the earliest opportunity. A referral to the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission will significantly harm the government's ability to realise an 
acceptable return on their investment and hence there is obviously a certain amount of 
government pressure on OFFER not to institute a referral. To what extent this pressure will 
force OFFER's hand is yet to be seen. Evidence so far would seem to indicate that OFFER 
has maintained its independence. 
Pool Price regulation by OFFER 
If there was a single yard-stick against which OFFER judged the revenues which 
generating companies obtained from the Pool, it would be the generator's avoided costs. 15 
In the 1992 Review of Pool Prices, Professor Littlechild concluded that the average 
avoidable costs of the two major generators were above their average revenues from the 
pool in 1991/1992. On that basis he concluded that it was difficult to object to an increase 
in bid prices from the level obtaining in 1991/1992. However, in 1992/1993 the revenues 
from the pool exceeded the avoidable costs of the two major generators. (Littlechild, 














I993(a)) For this reason, Professor Littlechild argued that any further price increase was 
not justified. 
However, explaining OFFER's method of price regulation as a matter of controlling 
generation costs through control over avoidable costs, does not do justice to the complexity 
of the price regulation process. To analyse the process it is necessary to analyse the various 
components of the Pool Selling Price i.e. System Marginal Price, Capacity and Uplift. 
Pool Selling Price 
Earlier in this chapter, the Pool Selling Price (PSP) or Pool Output Price (POP) was 
described as the sum of the Pool Input Price (PIP) plus Uplift. PIP was further described as 
the sum of System Marginal Price (SMP) plus Capacity payments. Hence increases in POP 
may be due to increases in SMP, Capacity or Uplift. Table 2 below, describes the trend in 
these pool price components over the last three years: (Source: Littlechild, 1993(a):8) 
Pool price components 1990- 1991- 1992- Apr to Jan to Apr to 
1991 1992 1993 Jun92 Mar93 Jun93 
S:MP 1.74 1.95 2.26 2.14 2.26 2.61 
CAPACITY 0.01 0.13 0.02 0 0.01 0.01 
UPLIFf 0.09 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.27 
PSP 1.84 2.24 2.42 2.26 2.4 2.89 
Table 2. Pool Selling Price 
SMP 
According to OFFER, SMP was lower than the avoidable costs of the generators for 1990-
1992, but since the start of 1993, the converse was true. The increase in SMP in April 1993 
compared to March 1993, coincided with a 10% fall in average demand. All of this 
increase has come from increased bids by National Power and PowerGen. To understand 













National Power says that the objective of their bidding strategy is to ensure that the prices it 
achieves for its products cover at least the cash costs of each of its generating assets and 
also provide a reasonable return to shareholders (Littlechild, 1993(a):77). Bids are based on 
a supply curve and as such there is a trade-off between price and volume. 
A System Marginal Price lower than avoidable cost for 1990-1992 was, in National 
Power's view, a consequence of the coal contracts put in place at Vesting. These contracts 
stipulated that National Power and PowerGen consume a specified amount of British Coal. 
However, as a consequence of low market demand and high nuclear output, bid prices 
during this period were forced down in order not to risk market share and a consequential 
increase in coal stocks. Furthermore, in parallel with· the over-contracting of British Coal, 
National Power found itself fully contracted in their contracts with RECs and direct 
customers. This meant that in the short term the net effect of higher pool prices on 
operating profit was small. This in tum reinforced their reluctance to risk market share in 
pursuit of higher prices. 
In the period following 1 April 1993, at the termination of the coal contracts, National 
Power considerably increased their bids from between 0.25 p/kWh and 0.5 p/kWh. It is 
interesting to note that this lead to a loss of market share of 7.3%. This was a strategic 
decision - now that they had freedom to choose how much coal they wanted to buy and 
whom they wanted to buy it from, they were able to sell less power, obviously (as the 
figures indicate) with the goal of producing higher profits on lower volume. · 
PowerGen's pricing policy is different to that of National Power. PowerGen aim to 
compete in the contract market with the aim of fully contracting it's (PowerGen's) forecast 
output. In the short-term however, PowerGen aim to maximise uncontracted sales through 
the pool when Pool prices allow. In the longer term National Power seek Pool prices which 
result in an effective realised price sufficient to remunerate capital and sustain required 
investment. PowerGen base their bidding strategy on their average avoidable ·costs. 
Accordingly, PowerGen based their bids on an annual average SMP of 2.4 p/kWh for 
1993. For April 1993, the average SMP corresponding to this price parameter was about 
2.45 p/kWh and hence PowerGen increased the prices of its base-load and mid-merit plant 
in the first quarter of 1993 by 0.05 and 0.15 p/kWh respectively. It is interesting to 
compare these increases with the increases in National Power of 0.25 p/kWh and 0.5 












prices compared to National Power's prices for the period April 1993 to June 1993, resulted 
in PowerGen marginally gaining market share during this period. 
Capacity 
Payments for capacity are defined as payments for generating capacity [MWs] that are 
declared available on a day-ahead production schedule, and then which actually are used. 
This payment is described by the following formula: 
Loss of Load Probability*(V alue of lost load - System Marginal Price). 
As indicated in Table 1, these payments have not increased and furthermore they are really 
insignificantly small. 
Uplift 
As explained earlier, Uplift is made up of payments for undispatched capacity, ancilliary 
services, out-of-merit running and transmission losses. Of these, the most significant are 
the payments in respect of undispatched capacity. Under the present Pool rules, generators 
are compensated if plant which would otherwise have been chosen to run is "constrained 
off' the system. They are paid the difference between SMP and their bid price. PowerGen 
have said that "constraining off' has had only a limited effect on the output of its plant and 
on its pool revenues. It did not apply any separate policy when determining the offer prices 
of plant which might be constrained off. National Power said that it did not seek to gain or 
lose from constraining off, but that it typically reduced its bid price for any constrained-off 
plant to the short run avoidable cost of that plant, in order not to benefit or suffer from 
being constrained off (Littlechild, 1993(a)). 
However despite these policies, constrained-off payments reached £40 million in the 
quarter from April to June 1993. Professor Littlechild expressed the opinion that in view of 
the high and increasing cost of constrained-off payments, the Pool should consider 
whether, or under what circumstances and to what extent, it is appropriate to continue 












5.8 Price regulation in the distribution industry . 
Having examined the method of price regulation on the generation side of the industry, it is 
appropriate to examine the price regulatory structure on the distribution side of the 
industry. The focus of this section is on the regulatory practices in respect of price control 
in the distribution side of the industry. The section begins with a discussion of a price 
setting paradigm to explain the difference in price making in a monopolistic industry and 
price taking in a competitive industry. The focus then narrows to a breakdown of the costs 
of serving different types of customers. Finally, the actual price control practices in the 
distribution and supply businesses will be discussed. 
5.8.1 Competition: From regulation of profits to regulation of prices 
In the UK, if there is one central theme of pricing in the distribution sector, consistent with 
the restructuring of the generation and transmission sides of the business, it is the 
conviction that competition should be the prime determinant of the allocation of resources. 
In the regulation of pricing in the distribution industry, this belief has resulted in a shift in 
the focus from regulation of profits to regulation of prices. In the UK industry it is believed 
that in the case of true competition there is no need to regulate the price, since the market 
determines the quantity and price of goods to be delivered in terms of the balance between 
supply and demand. Where true competition does not exist, but where the benefits of 
competition are still sought, it is necessary to set a price as if the market had determined 
that price. 
Diagram 1 below illustrates a paradigm to explain the difference between price making in a 

















Diagram 1. A price setting paradigm 
Return on 
Assets 
In a monopoly industry, the starting point in determining the price level is the valuation of 
fixed assets which are used to produce the product which is then sold and generates 
income. The assets may be valued in a number of ways for example, at historic cost, at 
historic cost less accumulated depreciation, at current cost or at replacement value. The 
next step in determining prices in a monopolist industry is to specify the rate of return 
which must be earned on the assets. A specified Return on Assets is then calculated, and 
this results in a required price level. In restructuring the UK distribution industry the aim 
was to reverse this process through allowing the market to determine the price level and the 
market value of a particular distributor would then be established as the value of future 
profits discounted to the present by an appropriate rate of return required to cover risk and 
opportunity costs. 
Essentially the method of price regulation in the franchise market of the distribution 
industry, until 1998, is an attempt to fabricate this process by setting maximum prices 
which RECs may charge for the "supply" and "distribution" services which they provide. 
The profit which individual distributors may earn is the difference between the revenue 
derived through their regulated prices, and their total distribution costs. There is thus an 













It is a combination of the price regulatory structure and the force of private capital seeking 
to maximise its returns, which has lead to tremendous cost consciousness amongst the 
Regional Electricity Companies. 
5.S-.2 Cost of supply analysis 
Most of the 22 million electricity customers in England and Wales buy electricity from the 
REC in whose area they live (Littlechild, 1993(b):3). Only customers taking above 1 MW 
are presently free to choose their supplier. In a press release in October 1993, OFFER 
disclosed that one third of customers in the present competitive market (above 1 MW) now 
use a second tier supplier. This accounts for more than half the electricity supplied in the 
market. (Littlechild 1993(c)) This clearly indicates that some RECs have been able to 
control costs better than others and hence out-compete their fellow RECs for non-franchise 
customers. To introduce the subject of cost analysis, the following pie charts indicate the 
respective amounts of the different costs involved in selling electricity to customers of 
varying sizes (Source: Littlechild, 1993(d):4) 
Electricity costs for a below 100 kW customer. 
Supply business (6.1 %) 
Distribution charges (25.3%) Generation Costs (54.1 % ) 












Cost breakdown for a 100 kW to 1 MW customer 
Distribution charges (19.2%) 
Transmission and other cost (5.7%) 
Generation Costs (64.1 %) 
Cost Breakdown for an above 1 MW customer 
Fossil Fuel Levy (9.9% 
Supply business (0.6% 
Distribution charges (15.0% 
Transmission and other cost (5.7% 












As indicated in the above charts, the final price of electricity to customers comprises the 
cost of electricity purchased from generators, transmission charges, distribution charges, 
the supply business margin, and a Fossil Fuel Levy (plus VAT). The price regulatory 
structure in respect of generation and transmission, has already been discussed. The 
discussion will now focus on price regulation in the supply and distribution businesses. 
The supply business, in particular, includes the following activities: 
arranging for the purchase of generation capacity and use of system facilities; 
sending out bills and collecting payment; 
providing service to customers (for example, advice on tariffs, on how to use 
electricity efficiently and on special services); and 
advertising & marketing 
To facilitate competition in supply, each of the RECs is required under its licence to allow 
other suppliers to use the wires taking electricity from the Grid to its customers' premises. 
The RECs charge other distributors for the use of the "wires" (distribution and reticulation 
· network) which they own, and they have to charge their own customers the same amount 
(the "use of system" charge). This part of the companies business is known as the "wires" 
business or "distribution" business. The next section is concerned with the method of 












5.8.3 Price regulation in the supply business 
The objective of the supply price control is to limit the price which a REC may charge in 
respect of providing the "supply business" services as defined in the previous paragraph. 
The essence of the regulation is the RPI-X formula. At present (1993) the RECs are 
allowed to earn revenue for these services based on the number of kilowatt hours supplied. 
In the price control proposed for 1994, the revenue that RECs may derive for supply 
services is made up of a fixed allowance (different RECs have different fixed allowances), 
plus a pence per kWh charge, plus charges in relation to the number of customers 
connected. 
The present (1993) price control governs the prices charged to customers in the competitive 
market as well as customers in the monopoly "franchise" market. The supply revenue 
control proposed for April 1994 until April 1998 is that the RP~-X price regulation is only 
valid for the franchise customers. The non-franchise customers, it is argued, are protected 
by competition. This has been supported by most of the RECs who have argued that the 
present all-embracing scope of the price control limits their participation in the competitive 
market and puts them at a disadvantage compared to their competitors (such as the major 
generators) who do not have such controls (Littlechild, 1993(b):10). Their argument is that 
if the costs of purchasing electricity for the competitive market tum out to be higher than 
expected when signing contracts with customers, they are unable to pass on these higher 
costs in the competitive market. In contrast, if the costs tum out to be lower, they are 
unable to keep the difference because the price control requires cost reductions to be 
passed on to customers. 
Professor Littlechild further argues that lifting the price control will also improve the 
protection for the remaining franchise customers. It will do so by reducing the scope for 
RECs to cut prices to non-franchise customers at the expense of franchise customers. It 
will thereby facilitate enforcement of the licence conditions which prohibit price 
discrimination and cross-subsidy (Littlechild, 1993(c): ii). 
The proposed supply regulation is a price control on total revenue in which there is a basic 
constant term plus an allowance per customer served, plus an allowance per kilowatt hour 
sold. The last two allowances will be uniform across all RECs. The constant term will vary 












particular customer base, or operating in certain areas. An example of this is London 
Electricity who put the case to OFFER that certain additional costs of operating in London 
should be recognised. 
The allowance per customer served reflects the differing economies of scale among the 
different sized RECs. The size of the economies of scale achievable by any REC are 
obviously dependent on the size of that REC. Since this was determined at Vesting day and 
since competition will not exist in the franchise market until 1998 it is necessary that the 
regulatory mechanism take account of these unavoidable differences. Finally, the 
allowance per kilowatt hour sold is in respect of all costs that are directly proportional to 
the unit sales. 
5.8.4 Price regulation in the distribution business 
The 12 RECs in England and Wales, own and operate the lower voltage distribution 
systems for taking electricity from transmission systems to customers' premises. The 
distribution price controls are set out in the companies' licenses as public electricity 
suppliers (PESs). The controls vary from one company to another, ranging from Retail 
Price Index (RPI) -0.5 to RPI+ 2.5. The controls last for five years, until March 1995. 
The distribution business has so far proved to be the most lucrative part of the whole 
industry as Table 3 below shows: (Littlechild, 1993d:6) 
I 
Activity Turnover(£) CCA Operating profit (£) 
Distribution 3209 1042 
Supply 12472 154 
Generation 7 (8) 
Other & Intra-2roup transactions (2017) (53) 
Group 13626 1135 
Table 3. Aggregate company accounts for 1992/1993 
There has been some public criticism of the level of profits reported by the RECs. The 
criticism is levelled at the method of regulation i.e. through the price and not directly 
through the profits. In this regard it is interesting to note that the controls operating in the 












to profit control because it gives an incentive to cut costs and achieve efficiency savings 
during the course of the control, since any extra profit made by so doing will be retained by 
the company at least until the next price control review. OFFER have expressed the 
opinion that distribution prices would probably not have been significantly lower had a 
profits control been used in place of a price control (Littlechild, 1993(d):35). 
Present distribution price controls 
Ninety percent of distribution business revenues are accounted for by "use of system" 
charges and are included in the price controls. Just over 10 per cent of the revenue is 
accounted for by "excluded services", so called because they are excluded from RPI-X 
price controls. Companies calculate distribution use of system charges using an approach 
which allocates system costs between major customer groups on the basis of assessments 
of the long-run marginal costs of meeting each group's demand for use of the system. This 
means that users connected at a particular voltage level normally only pay for the use of the 
system at and above that voltage level. 
The distribution price control limits the amount of revenue that the RECs are allowed to 
earn from the distribution business. The control applies an RPI+/- X limit to income per 
kilowatt hour distributed to all customers, including those outside of the franchise market, 
connected to HV and L V sections of the distribution network. 
The price control formula is expressed as: 
Mdt = (l+(RPI+Xd))/IOO*Pdt-l*At 
Where Mat is the maximum allowed charge per unit in any one year, 
RPI is the Retail Price Index 
Xa is the X factor applying to the company's distribution business 
P dt-1 is a base price, and 
At is a term related to losses. 













The Xd term· was set by the government when the RECs were formed. Table 4 below 
shows the Xd factors for each company (Littlechild 1993(d):l2). 
Companv Xd Company Xd 
Eastern 0.25 East 1.25 
Midlands 
London 0 Man web 2.5 
Midlands 1.15 Northern 1.55 
Norweb 1.4 See board 0.75 
Southern 0.65 Swalec 2.5 
South Western 2.25 Yorkshire 1.3 . 
Table 4. Xd values 
At the time it was proposed that positive Xd factors be used to allow the companies to 
finance major investment programmes to refurbish their distribution systems. It is clear 
from reference to Table 3, that the RECs have made very substantial profits with the price 
regulation established af the time of privatisation. 
The base price term P dt-1 is made up of a weighted basket of four component prices. The 
weights and the component prices differ between the companies depending on their mix of 
customers connected to the distribution system. The four component elements are: 
LVl, units sold to customers connected ·at L Vat a higher day or peak time 
price; 
LV2, units sold to customers· connected at LV at a lower night or off-peak 
price; 
L V3, all other uni ts sold to customers connected at L V; . 












Part 2: The applicability of a UK-style restructuring to the South African 
electricity supply and distribution industry. 
5.9 Introduction 
Tue object of this thesis is to produce some ideas on a pricing strategy for the electricity 
industry in South Africa. The study of the restructuring of the UK ESI is essentially a study 
of pricing. However, of necessity, the work has covered a somewhat wider area. The major 
socio-political and economic differences between the UK and South Africa means that 
blindly attempting to translate the intricate and highly sophisticated UK system to the 
South African industry is certainly destined to fail. The focus of this section is rather to 
draw out some of the key positive attributes of the UK restructure and from there to discuss 
the application of some of these attributes to the South African industry. 
5.10 Private ownership versus competition 
It is important to distinguish the principle of private ownership from the principle of 
competition. The essence of the re-organisation of the UK industry was that it aimed at 
restructuring the industry in order to create competition. Privatisation was seen as a means 
of lessening the State's investment in the industry while at the same time aiding the process 
of creating competition. In the White Paper introducing the restructuring, the then Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher was at pains to point out that the focus of the restructure was to 
create competition in the industry. Private ownership was never seen as an end in itself, but 
rather as a factor which would enhance competition. 
In South Africa at present, the most commonly held view is against private ownership of 
the electricity industry. It would seem clear that the majority opinion is that there should be 
a decrease of private ownership. Judgement on whether this is right or wrong will not be 
passed here. It is clear though, that certainly in terms of ownership it is simply not realistic 
to expect that any of the UK ideas can find application in South Africa at present. 
However, it is entirely realistic to argue that it is possible to create competition inside an 












in applying the lessons of the UK restructuring to South Africa, is that there is only one 
"owner" of the industry. 
5.11 Positive principles arising out of the UK electricity industry restructure 
In this thesis it is asserted that competition is a most important ingredient in the operation 
of an electricity industry. Competition should be enshrined in the structure and expressed 
in the pricing mechanisms. In this section, some of the positive characteristics arising from 
competition will be discussed. Later in this section, possible ways of restructuring the 
South African electricity industry to achieve some of these positive attributes will be 
discussed. 
The study of the UK restructure reveals that some of the positive attributes, particularly 
from the perspective of pricing, which the UK industry now displays are as follows: 
Transparency 
To ensure equitable and fair competition, a necessary precondition is the availability of 
information detailing the operations of the various players in the .industry. In the UK, this 
precondition is enforced through the creation of the Office of the Electricity Regulator 
(OFFER) to which every generator or distributor as well as the National Grid Company is 
required to submit results. Furthermore, should OFFER require additional information, this 
must be supplied on request. 
Accountability 
By splitting the industry into a number of competing enterprises, each of these 
organisations are directly accountable to their customers. This is further reinforced through 
the regulatory structure managed by OFFER. Throughout the industry there is a clear 
customer/supplier link: generators compete to sell electricity to RECs and also to their own 
large customers, the National Grid Companyis responsible to their owners, the RECs - and 
the RECs are accountable to their customers. A consequence of this accountability is the 
positive impact on the administration of the pricing mechanisms, from the generator bid 
prices, to the administration of the Pool, and the price regulation in respect of the supply 













Another major impact of the restructuring is the considerable cost consciousness 
throughout the industry. This is an obvious consequence of competition as well as the 
method of regulation - which imposes a direct relationship between profitability and the 
ability to control costs. The earlier analysis of the. various cost components in the 
generation, transmission and distribution sides of the industry clearly indicate the 
considerable focus on costing. Perhaps one of the most significant aspects here, is the line 
drawn between "supply" costs and "use of system" costs in the distribution sector. The 
focus on costing is once again supported by OFFER who stipulate that there shall be no 
cross-subsidisation in the industry whatsoever. Enforcing this rule in the various parts of 
the industry has necessitated an accurate and thorough analysis of costs. 
5.12 The supply-side: Applying a UK-style restructuring to the SA ESI. 
As explained in detail earlier, the transformation of the supply-side lead to the generating 
capacity of the Central Electricity Generating Board being split between National Power, 
PowerGen and the fully State owned Nuclear Electric. The purpose of the transformation 
was two-fold, firstly to privatise previously state-held assets and secondly to create 
competition in the generation industry. Privatising the South African generation industry 
will not be explored here since the political will for privatisation does not exist. However, 
creating competition inside the parastatal ownership structure that exists at the moment is 
definitely feasible. Before this possibility is explored, it is important to note one 
significant difference between the supply side of the SA ESI and that in the UK: In the UK, 
their generating capacity is made up of more than 70 stations the biggest of which has a 
capacity of just over 2000 MW. In South Africa, as indicated in Table 1, there are no more 
than 23 stations of which, during 1992, only 11 were used. Furthermore, 6 of these 11 
stations are greater than 3000 MW. This difference in the size and number of power 
stations between the UK and South Africa, has an impact on the nature of the re-
organisation that will be necessary in order to create fair competition in generation. 
To create fair competition in generation it will be necessary to create similarly matched (in 
terms of size and costs) "generating companies". Table 1 below lists Eskom's current stock 
of power stations, classified as base-load, mid-merit or peaking/other with their applicable 












Base Load Mid-Merit Peakine & other 
Arnot 2100 MW Camden 1600 MW Wilge240MW 
Duvha 3600 MW Grootvlei 1200 MW Pumved storaJ?e 
Kendal 4116 MW Hicllveld 480 MW - Drakensberg 1000 MW 
Kriel 3000 MW lngru?ane 500 MW - Palmiet 400 MW 
Lethabo 3708 MW Komati 1000 MW Hvdro-electric 
Matimba 3990 MW -Hendrik Verwoerd 320 MW 
Matla 3600 MW - V anderkloof 220 MW 
Tutuka 3654 MW Gas turbine 
Koeberg 1930 MW -Acacia 171 MW 
Hendrina 2000 MW - Port Rex 171 MW 
Table 1 Eskom Generating Capacity 
The different technologies used in these different stations determines the length of 
utilisation at which these stations are most economically used. In terms of the production 
plan currently used, the stations are placed in a merit-order in which the most economical 
stations are used to generate first. In practice, however, there are some special cases where, 
due to system constraints, it is necessary to interrupt the merit order. ·nuring 1992, due to 
the capacity surplus, all the stations classified as mid-merit were actually in reserve 
storage. 
In creating competition, the station which generates electricity during any hour is the one 
which bids to sell electricity at the cheapest price. Hence to ensure fair competition it is 
necessary to ensure that the stations, or group of stations that compete, are able to compete 
fairly. Using this criteria it is necessary to create a number of competing generating 
companies who will all have a similar mix of power stations. A proposed means of 
achieving this is to split Eskom's generating capacity into, say, three "generating 
companies" each having a mix of base-load and mid-merit station. The hydro, pumped 
storage and emergency plant could be controlled by a National Grid Company and as such 
would not be part of the competitive network. One possible split of the power stations 
currently operational on the grid into three competing generating companies and one 












Generator A Generator B Generator C National Grid Company 
Arnot Matimba Tutuka Wilge 
Duvha Lethabo Hendrina Drakensber.g 
Kendal Matla High veld Palmiet 




Table 2. Possible generating companies 
Each of these generating companies would bid to sell electricity to a power pool. The bids 
would be based on a c/kWh price for the amount of energy offered during that hour. The 
same structure of payments in respect of constrained-on or constrained-off payments as in 
the UK, could quite simply be applied here. The hydro, pumped storage and emergency 
plant, managed by the National Grid Company, would be used to meet sudden changes in 
load or to maintain the system frequency/voltage and as such would be excluded from the 
competitive market. 
Non-Eskom generating plant such as exists in some of the municipalities, as well as some 
of the significant co-generators could be considered as Independent Power Producers 
(IPPs) and would have to bid their energy for sale to the pool in the same way as all other 
generators. 
On the other side of the Pool, a number (say 10) of Regional Electricity Distributors 
(REDs) would bid to purchase a specific amount of electricity during each hour of the 
following day. All the mechanisms of calculating the Pool Input Price and the Pool Output 
Price, as described earlier, can be applied without alteration here. 
Another vital aspect of the supply side of the UK industry is the Contract for Differences 
market where buyers (in the South Africa, the REDs) insure their purchases through the 
Pool by forward contracting with one of the generating companies or the IPPs for 
electricity at a certain price. This would insure against the uncertainty in the pool price. 












in that it provides an incentive to the RECs to monitor and forecast their load as accurately 
as possible so as to minimise expenditure on insurance "contracts for differences". This 
leads to further efficiency in the forecasting and management of load in the RECs. On 
account of these positive benefits, it is argued here that a similar insurance contracts 
market should be available to the competitive generators. 
As in the UK, the power pool could be managed by a National Grid Company (NGC). The 
NGC would also be responsible for undertaking to operate the transmission network. The 
NGC would be "owned" by the Regional Electricity Distributors and as such be answerable 
to them for their service. Part of its responsibility would be to operate the transmission 
network efficiently. To achieve this, the NGC would have to develop a transfer pricing 
mechanism in order to cost for the use of the transmission network. To a very limited 
extent, Eskom has attempted this already, through the Transmission Tariff, thus far without 
much success. Since the Pool would use hourly prices, it would be necessary that an hourly 
costing model for transmission tariffing be developed. 
5.13 The demand-side: Applying a UK style restructuring to the SA EDI 
Differences in the demand-side between the UK and SA 
Considerable differences exist between the nature of the demand side in South Africa and 
in the UK. For a start the distribution industry in the UK is funded almost entirely by 
privately held equity. In South Africa, in the currently highly fragmented distribution 
industry all the equity is ultimately state-owned, though through a number of different 
parastatal and Local Authority organisations. In South Africa, there are approximately 3 
million customers. A much higher proportion of these customers are very large customers 
than is the case in the UK. In the UK there are 22 million customers (Littlechild, 
1993(b):iv). It has been estimated that more than 70% of these customers have a site 
specific load of less than 1 MW (Power in Europe Issue No 58 1989). London Electricity 
alone has more than 1.9 million customers, which is about 60% of the total number of 
domestic customers that exist in South Africa. Table 4 below reflects the differences in the 












Market Sector UK-1990 SA-1991 
Percent of total Percent of total * 
Domestic 34 16 
Commercial 25 12 
Industrial 37 41 
Agricultural I I 
Traction I 4 
Other 1.7 (Mining) 26 
Table 4: Customer profile in the UK and RSA. 
*Source: Lane, 1990. 
Furthelillore, in South Africa there is a considerable distortion in the wealth distribution 
with the vast proportion of the country's economic activity and people concentrated in a 
few centres. Finally, in South Africa approximately 70% of the population do not have 
electricity supplied to their homes. This contrasts wi.th the situation in the UK where the 
electricity market is fully developed and the wealth distribution is fairly uniform 
throughout the country. Given such considerable differences it is reasonable to question the 
relevance of attempting to apply aspects of the UK restructuring to South Africa. 
Applicability of UK distribution price regulation to SA 
It is argued here that despite the fact that there are considerable differences in the 
respective industries, the method of price regulation used in the restructured UK industry, 
as explained earlier, provides clear insights as to how to calculate and control the costs of 
distributing and supplying electricity to the end-users. In particular, distinguishing the 
supply business from the distribution business has resulted in a clear focus and consequent 
control over the costs in each of these businesses. This is further reinforced through the two 
separate price regulatory mechanisms in each of the businesses. The price regulation of the 
distribution business demands a consistent and reasonable calculation of the costs of using 
the distribution and reticulation networks. The price regulation of the supply business also 












As discussed earlier, the supply price control contains three different components i.e. the 
fixed allowance, the allowance dependent on the number of customers and the allowance 
dependent on the number of units sold. These components are used to distinguish 
differences in the supply costs between RECs in different areas. In the case of London 
Electricity, the fixed allowance was increased to take cognisance of the higher operating 
costs inside London. Similarly this structure of supply price regulation could be relatively 
easily applied in South Africa given a structure in which there are say 10 autonomously 
independent Regional Electricity Distributors (REDs). Because of the aforementioned 
structural defects in the South African electricity distribution industry, there will be large 
disparities between the supply costs between the various regionally differentiated 
distributors. These disparities can be catered for with the fixed allowance of the supply 
price control mechanism. The allowance per number of customers and number of units sold 
may also need to have some regional differentiation. 
Transparent Cross-subsidies 
Another admirable feature of the price control in the supply and distribution industry that 
developed in the UK, is that it developed out of a mandate that there should be no cross-
subsidy in the industry whatsoever. Applying this to the South African industry, it will be 
possible to reflect the actual costs of distributing electricity to the customer. Any cross-
subsidy, for whatever reason, between customer types or between urban customers and 
rural customers, is then immediately transparent. 
The final benefit of applying the UK-style price regulation of the supply and distribution 
business to SA is that it will allow competition in the supply of the very largest customers. 
In the UK, competition is o ly being introduced gradually from the largest customers to the 
smallest customers. There is no reason why similar competition, though for the sake of 
simplicity initially limited only to the largest customers, can not be put in place in SA. 
Over time, as the principle of competition becomes accepted and as the industry becomes 












SB PRICING IN FRANCE 
Part 1: Electricity tariffing in France 
5.1 Introduction 
A study of electricity pricing in France is a study of electricity pricing in a centralised, 
mature and stable industry. Following Marcel Boiteaux's design of marginal cost based 
tariffs in 1949, EdF has had over four decades to evolve its expertise in marginal cost 
pricing. This has lead to the development of highly sophisticated and analytically rigorous 
pricing applications. The purpose of this study is to review electricity tariffing in France, in 
principle and in practice. The section begins by focusing on the history of tariffing in 
France. This is followed by a brief description of EdF's role in the French energy economy. 
The next section considers the regulatory and financial constraints on EdF pricing. The 
tariff derivation methodology section then runs through a series of steps that EdF uses in 
the derivation of their various tariffs. The following section, "from theory to practice" then 
seeks to analyse how the theoretically derived tariffs are shaped by political considerations. 
This leads to a review of EdF tariffs, taxation on French electricity and fmally a discussion 
on practical aspects of EdF tariffs. ·Part 2 focuses on the lessons of EdF tariffing which may 
be of relevance to pricing in the South African electricity industry. The sections begins 
with a review of the industry structure and price regulatory framework and then it discusses 
lessons of principle and practice. 
5.2 A brief history of electricity tariffing in France 
In 1946, the electricity industry in France was nationalised. The purpose of the 
nationalisation was, "to endow the country with an efficient electrical power supply system 
in the post-war reconstruction era" (Roux, 1982). 
The new industry took over from more than 1200 private power supply companies, whose 
policies and methods were extremely diverse. In particular, prior to nationalisation, there 
were about 15000 separate operating concessions and the new undertaking had to respect 












Beyond this constraint, tariffs were also distorted by the application of rigid indexation 
formulae. For example, the standing charge in the high-voitage tariff had been set at 165 
F/k.W in 1936, but had remained unchanged until 1957 whereas it should have been raised 
to between 5000 and 6000 F/k.W to stay abreast of inflation. 
Tariffs were thus "giving an inaccurate reflection of production costs and were also wholly 
inconsistent with commercial considerations" (Forster and Fauconnier, 1988). EdF was 
concerned about eliminating the inconsistencies of the outdated tariffs. 
Progress in reforming the tariffs was relatively slow however. In 1957, the first major tariff 
reform to high voltage and medium voltage users was undertaken. This resulted in the 
promulgation of the time of use "Green Tariff." 
The second major reform began in 1965 but was not completed until 1972, following the 
introduction of the Universal Tariff to domestic customers. The initial option proposed two 
distinct energy rates, in peak hours and in off-peak hours. The universal tariff experienced 
rapid development and its later replacement, the "Blue Tariff' had nearly 8 million 
customers (1/3 of EdF's total clientele) (EdF, 1991). 
1973: The Oil Crisis and the departure from Long Run Marginal Costing 
By 1973, long run marginal costing had been successfully applied by EdF as the basis to 
their tariffs for more than 15 years. The industry had reached a relatively stable position. 
Contractual agreements had been entered into with the regulating authorities, whereby EdF 
was given broader autonomy - including freedom to set tariff levels. As a result, overall 
revenues and internal cash generation were at satisfactory levels. However, the year 1973 
marked the beginning of a world energy crisis, following the first oil price shock. With the 
oil price trebling between 1973 and 1974, a serious threat had been posed to the existing 
marginal cost structure: Almost overnight, the production costs of nuclear plant were 
halved compared with those of oil-fired power stations. As a consequence, EdF halted the 
development of further conventional thermal stations and accelerated the nuclear program. 
However, in 1973 this placed EdF in an invidious position: on the one hand EdF had to 
bear the burden of a costly capital investment program to change the nature of generation 












still had to purchase the now expensive fossil fuels needed to keep the conventional 
thelillal stations running. 
It was at this point that EdF departed from Long Run Marginal Costs (LRMC) as· the basis 
to their tariffs. The mix of power stations which EdF had at the time of the oil crisis, was 
such that when oil prices trebled, the marginal cost of generation (for the oil-fired plant) 
increased from 2.5 centimes/kWh to 7.5 centimes/kWh representing an increase of 5 
centimes/kWh. However at this time only two-thirds of total electricity generation was 
based on fossil fired power stations and one-third on hydraulic and nuclear sources. Hence 
the average price of fuel only increased by 3.3 centimes/kWh. While, resulting from the 
increase in the oil price, the short run marginal cost rose dramatically, the long run 
marginal cost (the cost of nuclear generation - since this was the type of generation which 
would replace oil-fired generation in the long run) increased to a much lesser degree than 
the increase in short run marginal costs. This posed a dilemma: basing tariffs on short term 
marginal costs would have meant that the prices would have had to be increased by 5 
centimes/kWh reflecting the increase in the cost of marginal generation. On the other hand, 
basing tariffs on long run marginal costs would have meant that the tariffs would have had 
to reflect the increase of nuclear generation, whose marginal costs were considerably lower 
than that of oil-fired plant. 
If at that time, EdF were to have implemented tariffs reflecting the long run marginal cost 
corresponding to the restructured generation mix caused by the increase in the price of oil, 
correct investment decisions would have been made but in contravention of operating 
budget constraints. On the other hand, basing tariffs on short telill marginal costs would 
engender incorrect investment decisions but correct operating budget conditions. The 
outcome was that EdF opted for a structure derived from short run marginal costs. This is a 
significant point in the history of EdF tariffing since it represented a departure from the oft-
cited LRMC tariffing principles. 
Changing production systems 
If the tariffs of the seventies were influenced primarily by the oil crisis, the tariffs of the 
eighties were influenced primarily by changes in the production systems. The trend of 













Production type 1980 1990 
Hydro 23% 14% 
Nuclear 7% 79% 
Coal & Oil 70% 7% 
Table 1. Trend in production resources: 1980-1990 
Such major changes in the production system led EdF to carry out a complete overhaul of 
the tariff system from the smallest to the largest customers (EdF 1991). The nature and 
extent of the changes made to the tariff structures differed according to the category of 






Substitution of voltage for demand as a basis for the differentiation of 
tariffs. 
Regionalisation (regional tariff differentials) limited to very large 
industrial customers. 
Reform of tariff structures including new definitions of time-of-day 
and seasonal headings. 
Reclassification of customers within new categories of tariffs, based on 
subscribed demand. 
The development of a wide range of tariff options. 11 
These changes however, did not alter the fundamental basis to the tariffing philosophy i.e. 
that tariffs should be efficient, neutral and cost reflective. All the literature reviewed for 
this study echoed the same underlying principle for electricity pricing in EdF, that is, 
equality of treatment and economic efficiency. Equality of treatment means that all 
customers with the same consumption characteristics are offered the same rates. Economic 
efficiency implies passing on to the consumer the costs that he or she incurs to the power 
system. Through the realisation of the tariff philosophy, it is intended that each customer is 
thus encouraged to consume only the kilowatt hours the value of which to the customer is 














Since the creation of EdF as a nationalised, vertically integrated industry in 1946, 
considerable changes have been made to the electricity tariffs within a consistent tariffing 
philosophy. The basic principles of equality of customer treatment and economic efficiency 
have not changed. The only change has been in respect of the application of these 
principles from the relatively rigid Green Tariff and Universal Tariff of the 1950's and 
1960's to the highly diverse tariff structure which exists today. The evolution has been 
driven primarily by the need to realise the fundamental principles of equality of treatment 
(llld economic efficiency. Customer reaction to tariffs proposed or implemented over the 
last 40 years, have had a large bearing on the determination of future tariffs. However it is 
also important to note the role that factors extrinsic to the industry, such the Oil Crisis of 
the 1970's, have played in shaping EdF tariffs. 
5.3 Electricite De France in the French energy economy 
In 1983 EdF employed 0.5% of the French working population, it contributed 1.8% to the 
French GDP and it accounted for 5.5% of national investment (Fremaux and Lederer, 
1986). 
In 1992 EdF's own production of 417 TWh accounted for 95% of electricity produced in 
France, whereas its sales accounted for 97% of French electricity consumption (EdF 1992 
Annual Report). It exported a total of 58.3 TWh, mainly to Great Britain, Switzerland and 
Italy and had 118 551 staff in full time employment. 
Also in 1992, EdF had its anniversary after it was created following the nationalisation of 
the vast majority of privately owned utilities that then made up the French electricity 
industry. The law creating EdF as a State Company also granted EdF a monopoly over the 
transmission, distribution, import and export of electricity. However the law also allowed 
other companies to own and exploit one or several production units to cover their own 
electricity needs, provided they sold exclusively to EdF any of their production exceeding 
their own requirements. However, these companies together only account for 2% of total 












5.4 Regulatory and financial constraints in EdF pricing 
EdF's relationship with the government is governed by two requirements. Firstly EdF's 
activities must be consistent with official Public Authority energy policy. Secondly, as a 
large State body, EdF is inevitably called on by the sponsoring governmental ministries as 
an instrument to help regulate the country's overall economic equilibrium. 
Despite the fact that EdF is a State Company, actual state interference in EdF's operations 
is very limited. To avoid confusion between the ministries' and EdF's responsibilities, it 
was agreed that EdF could not perform its task with full efficiency unless it enjoyed a 
degree of autonomy within a framework of objectives and constraints which were clearly 
set out and covered a period of several years. It is from this agreement that a "Plan 
Contract" came into being as the mechanism through which EdF could "buy" freedom from 
State interference in its operations. In terms of the 1984-1988 contract for example, EdF 
committed itself to a relative decline in electricity prices by comparison with the general 
consumer price index, while balancing the utility's accounts and achieving a rate of self-
financing of the order of 50%. 
The excerpt from the same contract relating to tariff structure reads as follows: (Forster and 
Fauconnier, 1988: 1-32) 
II The tariff structure needs to be in conformity with the following principles: 
The tariff scales will be uniform throughout metropolitan France. 
Subject to the above, the tariffs should guide customer's consumption choices by 
reference to the true cost of the energy supplied to them. 
The tariffs shall respect the principle of equality of treatment between customers 
with the same characteristics, each customer being allowed to choose between the 
different options available under the tariffs in force. 
Within the framework of the general tariff, the tariff structures applicable in 
off shore and overseas territories will be adapted to suit the special conditions 
obtaining there. 












comprising price guarantees in return for consumption commitments. II 
With regard to tariff level, 
"The level of tariffs must as a rule be such as to cover the Utility's overall expenditure, 
allowing for the commercial objectives (described earlier) and for the productivity gains to 
be made each year. From this standpoint, an increase may take place on the 15th February 
each year, (a) equal to the increase during the previous year in the general consumer price 
index less 1 % and (b) sufficient to maintain an evenly balanced budget, providing no new 
charges are imposed· on the utility affecting its operating accounts." 
It is interesting to observe the parallels between the regulation of EdF through the Plan . 
Contracts with the State, and Eskom's current Pricing Compact providing for a decrease in 
the real price of electricity. This "Plan Contract" regulatory mechanism has allowed arms 
length regulation in the French industry and is regarded as having achieved the desired 
objectives. 
Financial Constraints 
A dominant financial constraint arising from the nationalisation of the industry in the 
1940's is that it is illegitimate for EdF to make profits (in the sense of distributable 
surpluses). In this respect, the tariff level is set so that the average price is sufficient to 
cover costs. 
5.5 Tariff derivation methodology 
The sections covered thus far, have focused on creating a regulatory and historical 
background to electricity pricing in France. It is appropriate that the focus now turns to an 
. analysis of the processes used in EdF tariff development. 
In the introduction to this section, EdF pricing applications were described as highly 
sophisticated and analytically rigorous. To support this claim, evidence is available in a 
number of areas such as the application, in the early 1950's, of the Boiteaux forward-












Rules to determine marginal cost prices which reconcile with historical cost-based revenue 
requirements. In this section, the tariff derivation methodology will be developed by 
explaining the overall phases of tariff development and also by analysing the calculation of 
long range marginal costs and the application of the Ramsey-Boiteaux Rules in the 
calculation of tolls to balance forward looking marginal costs with historical cost revenue 
requirements. 
Forster and Fauconnier (1988: 1-21) explain the tariff design process as follows: 
ANALYSIS OF DEMAND 
CHARACTfRISTICS OF FORECAST DEMAND IN 
TYPICAL CONSU~1PTIO~ TER.c\1S OF POWER M'D EBERGY 
ANALYSIS OF SUPPLY 
!li"'E'n''ORK DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR THE 
PLA.N" DEVELOPMENT OF 
GENERATION FACILITIES 
DETERMINATION OF THE ECONOMIC COMPONENT OF THE 
TARIFF 
DETERMINATION OF THE FINANCIAL 
COMPONENT OF THE TARIFF 
DEVELOPMENT COSTS 
OF 1'"ETWORKS 
MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION 
DR.~G OF A TARIFF STRUCTURE 
BASED O~ MARGL'\AL COSTS 
SOCllAL AND POLITlCAL COMPONENT OF THE TARIFF 
SOCl.\L A,""'D POLffiCAL CONSTRAINTS 
ANALYSIS OF EXISTING TARIFF 
STRUCTURE A. '-"'D LEVEL 
MEDIIJM-TERMFINANCIAL FORECASTS 
DEfERMINATION OF A BALANCED 
TARIFF LEVEL 
DRAFTING OF THE TARGET TARIFF 
FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENT 
INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL AND 
POLIDCAL CONSTRAINTS 
DETERMINATION OF TRANSITlONAL TARIFFS 
Step 1. Analysis of demand 
The basis of French electricity tariffs is long run marginal costs. This principle was 
explained in theory in the first chapter and will be explained in practice later in this section. 
At this stage it is important to notice how the principle of using long run costing places an 
emphasis on the accurate forecasts of future power and energy needs. The forecasts are 












Population and socio-economic data; 
National economic planning with probable development of electricity 
applications; 
Change in the relative price of other energy sources; 
Sectoral analyses of customers by reference to voltage levels, volume of 
consumption, etc.; 
Trends observed in previous years. 
With regard to trends observed in previous years, an examination of the daily load curves 
over the weekdays, weekends and public holidays of a year, allows an analysis of capacity 
needed for the 8760 hours of the year. This analysis ordered on the basis of the duration of 
a specific level of demanded for a specific period of time, produces a curve known as a 
Load Duration Curve. 
Step 2. Analysis of supply 
Having completed the analysis of demand, it is necessary to use these results in an analysis 
·of supply. As explained earlier, EdF is committed to meeting the power and energy 
demands of its customers and hence developments on the supply side must ensure that 
forecasted demand levels will be met. 
The supply analysis focuses on the development plan for the transmission and distribution 
network and the development plan for the generation network. The development plan for 
the transmission and distribution network requires reliable forecasts of the expected 
demand at the various points on the network. A similar analysis of the generation capacity 
will result in a generation expansion plan necessary to meet the forecasted demand levels. 
The supply-side development plan can then be defined in terms of a schedule of investment 
outlays over the target time period. This is a vital input in the determination of the capital 
component of the tariff. 
Step 3. Determination of the economic component of the tariff. 












The most crucial aspect of this step is the determination of the marginal cost of production 
and transmission and the subsequent determination of a tariff structure based on marginal 
costs. An illustration of how EdF derives these marginal costs, based on the Long Range 
Marginal Cost theory, is instructive: 
Marginal generation costs are calculated as the sum of marginal energy costs and marginal 
capacity costs. The basis of the calculation of the marginal generating costs are the 
marginal conditions for least cost operation of the plant mix that is expected to exist during 
the planning period. The marginal running cost calculation is theoretically made for every 
level of expected demand on the generating system. The calculation is made as follows: At 
a particular point in time, the expected generating cost of the least efficient plant that 
would be loaded onto the system to meet the expected load is calculated. This figure 
represents the marginal running costs per kilowatt-hour at this time. It is possible to derive 
these figures for every hour or even-half hour during every day. It is important to note that 
these marginal running costs will always be greater than the average costs except when 
only the most efficient plant is running, in which case the marginal running cost equals the 
average running cost. 
The marginal capacity cost for each period of time is calculated by balancing the marginal · 
opportunity cost of capacity (for an optimal system) during that time period, with the 
marginal cost of shortages, i.e. the costs incurred should the level of capacity not be 
sufficient to meet the required level of demand. The marginal cost of capacity is based on 
the cost-minimising conditions that yield an optimal plant mix for meeting an expected 
load. The optimal plant mix depends not only on the expected peak load but also on the 
expected load duration curve. Determining the optimal plant mix is a process of 
determining whether usage levels will be high enough to use high-capital-cost-but-low-
running-cost base load plant instead of low-capital-cost-but-high-running-cost peak load 
plant. The marginal opportunity cost of additional capacity is therefore given by the per-
kilowatt cost of capacity, less the fuel savings from displacing plant which has higher fuel 
costs. 
The marginal cost of shortages are simply described as the costs imposed on customers 
when demand exceeds supply. In EdF tariff practice, the level of capacity that will be 












marginal shortage costs at any particular level of capacity. Consider the probabilities P1, 
Pz ... Pn that demand will exceed capacity in each of n specified rating periods where each 
period has a particular number of hours in it (Hi, Hz, ... Hn; Hi +Hz + ... + Hn = 8760). 
Assume that the marginal cost of an outage is given by the value of a constant, d, in any 
period. Optimality requires that capacity be expanded up to the point at which the marginal 
opportunity cost of additional capacity is equal to the expected marginal shortage cost. This 
is expressed as follows: 
This expression can be solved for the expected marginal shortage cost in each period. 
Period 1: P1H1.d = (P1H1.Cg)/(P1H1 + P2H2 + ... + PnHn) 
Period 2: P2H2.d = (P2H2.Cg)/(P1H1 + P2H2 + ... + PnHn) 
Period n: PnHn.d = (PnHn.Cg)/(P1H1 + P2H2 + ... + PnHn) 
The expected marginal shortage cost for each kilowatt-hour in each period can be obtained 
by dividing each of the above expressions by the number of kilowatt-hours in each period. 
This complex, and at times confusing, approach to the calculation of marginal capacity 
costs, has two significant advantages: 
Firstly, it explicitly recognises and provides for uncertainty and shortage costs in the 
electrical system. Secondly, it provides a logical means for assigning some proportion of 
the capacity costs to several periods according to their relative probabilities of outage and 
the expected costs of shortage in each period. 
3.2 Marginal cost of transmission. 
The transmission cost component of long run marginal costs is necessarily related to the 
location and capacity of the generating facilities. The optimal plant mix and plant location 
is affected by transmission costs. Unfortunately the problem of solving for the optimal 
plant mix, optimal plant locations and optimal transmission network simultaneously is 












relatively simple formula Firstly, marginal transmission losses should be factored into the 
costs. To the extent that there are significant variations in transmission losses at different 
times of day and in different seasons, this should be reflected in charges differentiated by 
time of day or season. Incremental transmission capacity charges can be calculated at each 
voltage level as the ratio of the discounted annual investment and operating expenditure to 
the discounted value of annual peak capacity increases. This results in a measure of the 
incremental transmission cost per kilowatt. 
3.3 Marginal cost of distribution 
Calculating the differential distribution cost components is a complex problem which, like 
the marginal transmission cost calculation, is highly simplified in the interests of obtaining 
some conclusion. The French methodology is based on the principle that some costs, 
specifically generation and transmission cost are collective costs while distribution costs 
are more directly correlated with the individual customer's load characteristics rather than 
the system load characteristics. Consider a simplified distribution system as depicted in 
Figure 1. 
C1 
Figure 1. Simplified distribution system 
Cl..C3 are the final distribution points and AB is a line segment serving all of them. The 
capacity required for each Ci is determined by that customer's demand and the cost of that 
capacity should be charged as a demand charge based on that customer's demand. The 
capacity required for AB will not, in general, be the sum of the capacities required for each 
of the Ci's unless their behaviour is perfectly correlated with one another. While the logic 
would seem to be intuitively correct it is unclear exactly how EdF incorporates the 












3.4 Development of the tariff structure based on marginal costs 
Having studied the determination of the marginal generation, transmission and distribution 
costs separately, it is possible to examine how these are incorporated to determine the 
actual tariff structure. 
The tariff structure is determined by attributing marginal costs to the capacity and energy 
components: 
The marginal operating costs for generation, as well as the marginal cost of line 
and transformer losses is fully integrated in the prices per kWh. 
The long run marginal capacity costs as determined in 3.1 are divided between the 
maximum demand charge and the energy charge as explained below. 
The long run marginal capacity costs mentioned above are made up of the capacity costs of 
generation, transmission and distribution. The distribution of these costs between the 
maximum demand charge and the energy charge is dependent upon the impact of the 
consumer's requirements on the specific capacity requirements. To analyse this impact, 
Boiteaux distinguished three zones of a power system, upstream from a consumer: (EPRI, 
1977(b):81) 
" 1. The collective network, or the most remote part, where capacity depends above all 
on the average consumption of customers at the time of the collective peak. 
Collective system costs are thus assigned to the peak period kilowatt-hours; 
2. The "semi-individual network" whose capacity depends particularly on the 
random conditions of each customers consumption pattern and hence these costs 
are apportioned in proportion to the subscribed demand of every subscriber 
supplied; 
3. The individual connection which is directly determined by the personal peak of 
the customer, who is normally expected to bear the cost of his own connection. " 
The explanation for costing in zone 1 as described above, is that at the level of his own 
insertion into the system, the consumer is entirely responsible for the size of the system 
serving him. A short way upstream, despite diversity, the consumer's own maximum 












to be more like their immediate neighbours than like the system in general. As more and 
more customers join the system, the consumer's own maximum demand becomes less and 
less related to the size of the system required to serve him. It thus becomes the customers' 
average demand at peak period which determines system size and hence the assignment of 
collective system costs to all the peak-period kilowatt-hours. 
Another major feature of the determination of the tariff structure in EdF tariffing is the 
differentiation of tariff structure according to load factor. The reason for this differentiation 
a 
is that, because of diversity, two customers which register identical peak loads may impose 
very different capacity costs on the system. Hence the expected system cost of an 
additional kilowatt of demand varies directly but not linearly with the customer's load 
duration. In Figure 2 below, C(S) represents the expected "collective" costs imposed on the 
system per kilowatt of recorded peak demand for customers with different durations of 
peak demand (8). Cp in the figure is the marginal cost of capacity and the slope of the line 
extending from it is the marginal energy cost (Ce) per kilowatt-hour. Only customers with 
very high load factors impose the full marginal costs of one kilowatt of capacity per 
kilowatt of recorded individual peak demand. Because of diversity, one kilowatt of 
additional peak demand recorded on a customer's meter during a broad peak period will 
cause the system to require less than one kilowatt of additional capacity. C(S) therefore lies 
below the line extending from Cp for load durations less than the entire rating period. This 












Marginal cost per KW peak demand 
C(9) 
a b 8760 
Hours of the Year 
Figure 2. Cumulative marginal cost curve 
EdF then try to make a linear approximation to the actual cost function C(~) at several 
different load duration levels to allow them to construct a set of two-part, or other, tariffs 
which more closely matches the rate schedule with cost causality of different types of 
customers. This is done by drawing lines tangential to the cost function at various load 
duration levels. The intercept of each line is the demand charge in the rate schedule, and 
the slope is the energy charge which is always greater than or equal to, the pure marginal 
energy costs. Examples of this are illustrated in Figure 2 above, at consumption levels a 
and b. 
Step 4. Determination of the Financial Component of the Tariff 
EdF has to maintain a balanced budget. In step 3, the derivation and application of 
marginal costs to determine the tariff structure and price level, was explained. It was also 
explained in chapter 2, that marginal cost pricing will lead to over-recovery of revenue in 
time of capacity shortages and under-recovery of revenue in times of surplus capacity. 
Hence given the constraint that EdF has to maintain a balanced budget, it is necessary to 












the revenue requirement as stipulated in the historical cost accounting based operating 
account. 
Tolls are used to introduce price differences which guarantee budget equilibrium and yet 
preserve the principle of marginal costs. These tolls are based on the Ramsey principle: i.e. 
prices must be closer to the marginal costs, the greater the customer's ability to react to 
them (this was explained in detail in the second chapter). 
To determine the total amount of tolls to be applied to unadjusted marginal costs, EdF has 
developed a mathematical model, the Medium Term Forecast Study, which enables the 
financial position to be reconciled. 
Step 5 Determining the social and political component of the Tariff 
As expressed earlier, EdF's stated tariff principles appear highly rational and scientific, 
leaving little room for consideration of matters social or political. In the literature reviewed 
for this study very little mention was made of socio-political considerations in EdF tariff 
design. 
However it should be noted that 12 million of EdF's customers are on a lifeline tariff with a 
break-even of 2500 kWh per annum (Forster and Fauconnier, 1988:11-6). Furthermore, 
through regulation of the price through the Contract Plan with the State, the tariffs are 
inevitably influenced by broad political will. 
Step 6 The final tariffs 
After proceeding through each of the previous steps, the tariff is ready for implementation. 
If a new tariff results in drastic changes from existing tariffs, then it is necessary to 
determine transitional tariffs. It should be noted that EdF pride themselves in building 
stable tariff structures and that its prices reflect "durable trends of changes in costs" 












5.6 From theory to practice 
One of the key points to be drawn from the analysis of EdF electricity pricing thus far, is 
the emphasis on economic efficiency and equality of treatment. EdF are far from unique in 
their emphasis on these two attributes. The restructuring of the UK ESI~ studied earlier, 
was based on the same objectives. However, in contrast with the UK ideology of 
competition as the modus operandi to achieve economic efficiency, the French ideology is 
that through centralised bureaucratic control (in a tradition dating to Napoleonic days) 
correct tariffs can be determined to achieve the stated goal of economic efficiency. Such 
tariffs "contain incentives which, when cumulated nation-wide, generate benefits that 
enable us to meet the demand at the lowest possible cost" (Bergounoux, 1993:2). 
Although this may sound some-what sinister - as if EdF have a grand plan of what 
constitutes economic efficiency and through their tariffs they seek to realise this goal - in 
practice this is not the case. To the contrary, EdF define their objective of economic 
efficiency as follows: 
"To satisfy the demand of the users at the lowest possible cost to the community, in a 
decentralised system where all users can choose, for a given service to be rendered, the 
solution that is most economical for themselves" (Bergougnoux, 1993:3). 
This definition of economic efficiency is based on EdF's stated goal of providing tariffs 
which accurately reflect the customer's cost of supply. EdF frame this goal in terms of 
treatment equity and tariff neutrality. Treatment equity means that differences which 
customers may have with respect to the quantity of energy consumed, time when the 
connection was first installed, level and regularity of demand, location of point of supply 
and diversity, must be reflected in the costs which these customers pay for their supply. 
Tariff neutrality, on the other hand, means that EdF preclude themselves from 
differentiating between captive customers and competitive customers i.e. there should be 
no differentiation in the pricing policy offered to these two customers on account of the 
fact that they differ in respect of their price elasticity of demand. Tariff neutrality as a 
principle also implies that in principle there is no cross-subsidisation between different 
categories of customers. While this may well be the case in the construction of the tariffs, 
the earlier discussion on Ramsey prices in calculating tolls to reconcile economic marginal 












demand are differentiated and hence indirectly there is a degree of cross-subsidisation 
between customers who are able to shift load in peak period and those that are "captive 
peak-period" customers. (EdF's use of Ramsey prices was discussed earlier in this section, 
while the theoretical principles in Ramsey pricing were discussed in Chapter 2). 
EdF Pricing: Enhancing customer choice 
The requirement that prices paid are cost reflective is balanced against the pragmatic 
requirement that the costs of developing, implementing and metering a highly sophisticated 
tariff does not exceed the cost saved by the utility and the customers using such tariffs. The 
very large number of different tariff options evidence EdF's attempt to find this balance for 
its varied customer profile. Indeed, EdF advance the development of tariff options as a 
solution to reconciling the need for equity, efficiency and practicality. 
The tariff options are designed so that each customer selects the option which best reflects 
the cost of their supply, on the basis that tariff options are designed so that the costs saved 
by the customer are equal to the costs saved by EdF. As such there is no distinction per se 
between "good" or "bad" use of electricity. Rather the objective is simply to create a tariff 
which accurately reflects the cost of supply and leaves the customer to make his own 
choice. In this respect the common conception of EdF tariffs as "carrot and stick" 
(Popplewell, 1982) tariffs would clearly appear to be misguided. 
EdF pricing and Demand Side Management 
From EdF's perspective, utility efficiency means controlling the total system "to reach an 
overall optimum for the community as a whole, and to define the most appropriate tariffs 
and load management schemes by comparing costs (including implementation costs) and 
benefits for both the supplier (reflecting marginal generation and distribution costs), and 
the customer" (Lescouer, Galland and Husson, 1988:191-205). On the demand-side, the 
word "signal" is frequently used by EdF to describe how their tariffs, through reflecting 
marginal costs, provide an indication to any customer of the effect of their consumption on 
EdF's total system costs. In all the tariffs there is a clear incentive for customers to be able 
to forecast and alter their load in a manner which will result in effective savings. This is 












energy, load factor-based capacity and energy charges, and the high degree of time of use 
differentiation in the structure of the tariffs. 
EdF pricing and self-generation 
EdF policy on self-generation seems somewhat confused. On the one hand, the Director 
General of EdF has supported the construction of self-generating plant by EdF customers, 
if the customer finds that using such plant is more profitable when compared to EdF 
tariffs.16 On the other hand EdF have a specific commercial policy: the "phantom 
incentives" consisting of a subsidy payable to a customer who contemplates installing his 
own peak generating equipment on condition that he or she agrees to postpone that 
installation. This incentive clearly conflicts with "tariff neutrality" and "equality of 
treatment". 
Excess capacity and "conunercial aids" 
Since 1984, EdF has had excess generating capacity. Creating new demand through 
"commercial aids" has played a large part in EdF tariffing. EdF define a commercial 
margin as the difference between the variable costs of the excess capacity and the total 
costs of normal capacity. Part of this commercial margin is paid out in the form of an 
investment subsidy to customers who install new electrical processes. When the excess 
capacity runs out, the commercial margin will have been absorbed and the system of 
commercial aids will no longer exist. 
The objective of the commercial aid program is to encourage those customers with a high 
elasticity of demand to consume more, by providing incentives to make electricity more 
competitive. While EdF has excess capacity, this is a logical program. However, it should 
be noted that the commercial aid program is in direct conflict with EdF's stated tariffing 
principle of equality of treatment of all customers, which implies no differentiation of 
customers on the basis of price elasticity of demand. 
16 Director general of EDF quoted at a meeting of regional management personnel on 24 April 












In summary, this section has sought to analyse the principles underlying the tariffs 
implemented by EdF. EdF advance marginal cost pricing - the mechanism to achieve 
economic efficiency - as the basis to their cost reflective tariffs. This is supported by the 
stated goals of equality of treatment and tariff neutrality. (In practice however, EdF has to 
compete against other energy forms in some markets. The economic reality is that the price 
elasticity of demand does vary amongst EdF's customers.) Quite justifiably, but in conflict 
with their stated principle of "equality of treatment", EdF does exploit these differences by 
charging some customers the full economic cost of their supply, while providing other 
customers with "commercial aids" to encourage greater consumption or to postpone the 
construction of self-generation facilities. This discussion does not seek to discredit the 
policy of commercial aids in any way, but rather merely to illustrate that in respect of this 













5.7 A review of EdF Tariffs 
EdF have three principal tariffs defined as the blue, yellow and green tariffs. The bar chart 
below distinguishes the percentage of electricity sales on each of the different tariffs 






% Sales by Tariff 
Tariff Green (B+C) Tariff Green (A) + 
Yellow Tariff 
Figure 3. Percentage sales by tariff type 
Tariff Blue 
The blue tariff has more than 27 .5 million customers, compared to the Yell ow Tariff with 
approximately 180 000, Green Tariff A5 and A8 together with 40 000, Green Tariff B with 
400 customers and Green Tariff C with only 70 customers (EdF, 1992). In each of the tariff 
classifications there are a number of different tariff options. The tariffs pertaining at 
December 1993 are explained hereafter.17 
17 Sources: 
EdF, 1992(b). Prix de Vente de L'Electricite, EdF, Paris. 
EdF, 1993. Bien Connaitre le Tariffvert AS, EdF, Paris. 












5.7.1 The Blue tariffs 
The Blue Tariff is applicable to domestic, agricultural, commercial, civil service and so-
called general customers, from very small customers to 36 kV A customers. Different tariffs 
are offered to domestic and agricultural customers than are offered to "Professional'' 
(commercial and public service customers). This is an aberration in the cost-of-supply basis 
to pricing and stems from a 1935 Decree. EdF claim that they are gradually minimising the 
current 10% difference between the average price to customers in these two classes and 
that by the year 2000, the difference will have been phased out (Bergougnoux, 1993:23). 
At present the Blue Tariff is offered in one of three options: Base, Off-Peak and EJP (Peak 
Day Withdrawal). A notable feature of the Blue Tariff is the number of different tariff 
variants specifically designed for particular applications. This is illustrated in the tariff 
structure explained on the next page: 
Pinta J .C, 1989. Blue, Yellow, Green Electricity Tariffs 1989 - new 
features, EdF Paris 
Pinta J.C, 1992. Bleu, Jaune, Vert /es Tarifs de L'E/ectricite 1992 - Les 












Domestic and Agricultural Tariffs: 
Base Option Fixed Energy charge (clkWh) 
Monthly 
Char_ge (F) 
Less than 6 kV A Demand 12.02 67.14 
6 30.53 
9 61 
12 90.97 57.66 
15 120.94 
18 150.91 
Off-Peak Option Fixed Peak period Off-Peak period 










EJP Option Fixed Standard ·period Mobile Peak 

















Professional and public service tariffs 
Base Option Fixed Energy charge (c/kWh) 
Monthly 
Charge (F) 
Less than 6 KV A Demand 12.02 66.56 









Off-Peak Option Fixed Peak period Off-Peak period 










EJP Option Fixed Standard period Mobile Peak 
Monthly charge charge 
Charge (F) 
12 94.66 
18 94.66 36.7] 299.83 
36 322.54 
General use tariffs 
The general use tariffs are the same in structure to the Professional and public service 













Public lighting tariffs 
Option Monthly maximum Energy price (clkWh) 
demand char.ge 
Base option 11.65 57.66 
Fixed charge (F) Maximum. demand Off-Peak Peak.Rate 
char!?e (F/kV A) Rate 
Off-Peak option 9.42 14.5 32.19 57.66 
5.7.2 The Yellow Tariffs 
The Yellow Tariff is available to customers subscribing to power between 36 and 250 kV A 
and to customers subscribing to power of less than 36 kV A, who are not satisfied with the 
simplicity of the Blue Tariff. The tariff comprises two versions: 
An average usage version for usage of less than 2400 hours 
A long usage version for usage of more than 2400 hours for customers who are 
able to shift load from the peak to the off-peak periods, 
In addition, each of these tariff versions are offered either on the Base Option or EJP 
Option. 
The tariff differentiates two seasonal periods and two time-of-day periods as follows: 
Winter (5 months) : November to March inclusive 
Summer (7 months) : April to October inclusive 
Peak hours : 16 hrs per day, 7 days per week 
Off-Peak hours : 8 possibly non-adjacent hours per day, 7 days per week. 
Demand is invoiced in terms of apparent power (kVA). In the average usage tariff, a single 
demand level is possible. In the long utilisation version however, customers subscribe for 
demand in the peak period but subscriptions for additional power in the off-peak period is 












50% for additional demand outside the peak periods 
66% for additional demand within winter low-load periods 
80% for additional demand in summer 
For the EJP Option, there is a discount on the maximum demand charge of 
65% for additional demand during winter hours 
80% for additional demand during summer hours 
The 1993 rates applicable to the Yellow Tariff are as follows: 
Version Max. Demand Winter 
char2e 
Peak hours Off-Peak hours Peak 
hours 
Long usage 338.16 66.92 40.12 20.52 
Average 116.04 93.57 54.1 21.99 
usa2e 
EJP Option 338.16 247.81 38.78 20.52 






The Green Tariff is offered to Medium Voltage customers between 5 and 30 kV. The tariff 
offered to any particular customer varies according to that customer's subscribed maximum 
demand. Tariff A5 is for all customers subscribing to between 250 kW and 10 MW. Tariff 
A8 is for all customers between IMW and 10 MW, Tariff Bis for customers between 10 
MW and 40 MW and Tariff C is for customers taking more than 40 MW s. The Green 













Versions Fixed charge Energy Price (Centimes/kWh) 
(F/k.W/year) 
Wmter Summer 
Peak Standard Off-Peak Standard Off-Peak 
Very High Usage 781.56 52.79 39.43 28.36 17.4 11.7 
High usage 483.96 77.61 51.02 32.14 18.39 11.97 
Average usage 301.92 113.82 60.54 35.78 19.72 12.26 
Short usage 119.28 158.06 79.25 44.09 20.93 12.55 
Reactive energy 13.23 
charge (C/k.V Arh) 
Base Option: Coefficient for calculating the maximum demand charge 
Versions Tariff periods 
Winter Summer 
Peak Standard Off-Peak Standard Off-Peak 
Very Hi2h Usru?e 1 0.73 0.22 0.07 0.01 
Hiwusage 1 0.68 0.26 0.07 0.01 
Average usru?e 1 0.65 0.28 0.07 0.01 
Short usru?e 1 0.62 0.35 0.16 0.01 
Subscribed maximum demand 
With the Green tariff, customers subscribe to a maximum demand level in each of the five 
tariff periods thoughout the year. The applicable annual maximum demand charge is then 
calculated on the basis of the subscribed demand during each period, scaled by the 
applicable coefficients and multiplied by the annual fixed charge. An example illustrates 
the method of calculating the applicable annual maximum demand: 
A customer taking electricity on the very high usage tariff has recorded maximum demands 
in the applicable tariff periods as illustrated below: 
Wmter Summer 
Peak Standard Off-Peak Standard Off-Peak 
200kW 220kW 250kW 300kW 350kW 












(200 kW*l) + (220kW*0.73) + (250kW*0.22) + (300 kW*0.07) + (350kW*0.01) 
= 440.lkW 
The maximum demand charge would thus be: 440.lkW* 781.56F/k.W/Annum 
= FF343 965 
· Penalties for exceeding subscribed maximum demand 
The customer has to subscribe for a level of maximum demand in each of the tariff periods. 
If this level is exceeded then EdF apply a penalty in respect of the excessive demand. This 
is calculated as follows: 
D = k.T.L\P max 
Where 
D =the penalty amount 
k = 10% of the fixed annual charge for the base case of the tariff for very high usage 
T is a coefficient applying to particular tariff periods, as illustrated below: 
Wmter Summer 
Peak Standard Off-Peak Standard Off-Peak 
1 0.7 0.23 0.06 0.06 
L\P max is the difference between the subscribed demand and the actual demand for each 
tariff period. 
As an example, a customer subscribes for a maximum demand as illustrated below, 
Wmter Summer 
Peak Standard Off-Peak Standard Off-Peak 
lOOkW 300kW 500kW 500kW 500kW 













Peak Standard Off-Peak Standard Off-Peak 
llOkW 320kW 550kW 500kW 600kW 
In this case, the penalty, D, would be calculated as: 
(110-100)*78.16*1 + (320-300)*78.16*0.7 + (550-500)*78.16*0.23 + (600-
500)*78.16*0.06 = F 3244 
The above penalty calculation is used for those customers who have a maximum demand 
indicator. In the case of more sophisticated electronic metering, the penalty charge is 
calculated according to the following formula: 
Tariff AS: EJP Option 
In addition to the Base option, customers have the choice selecting the EJP option. The EJP 
option is only offered to average or very high usage customers who are able to reduce their 
consumption drastically from 7h00 to 1 lhOO during 22 peak days in winter. These days are 
not on fixed dates. Rather, every one of these days is determined separately in "real time" 
by EdF. Customers on the EJP tariff are given short notice, usually not more than one day. 
The applicable charges in the EJP tariff are as illustrated below: 
Versions Fixed charge Energy Price (C/kWh) 
(F/kW/year) 
Wmter Summer 
Mobile Standard Standard Off-Peak 
Peak 
Very Hicll Usru?e 781.56 85.16 30.17 17.4 11.7 
A vera!:!e usage 301.92 209.86 35.7 19.72 12.26 
Reactive energy 13.23 












EJP Option: Coefficient for calculating the maximum demand charge 
Versions Tariff periods 
Winter Summer 
Mobile Peak Standard Standard Off-Peak 
Verv High Usru!e 1 0.27 0.07 0.01 
Average usaQ:e 1 0.35 0.07 0.01 
The applicable demand charge and the penalties for exceeding subscribed demand are 
calculated as in the base case explained earlier. 
Green Tariff AS, B, C 
Unlike A5 which has two seasons, and three tariff periods, Tariffs A8, B and C have four 
seasonal periods and three time-of-day periods. The seasons and time-of-day periods make 
up eight tariff periods, with a steadily decreasing cost price as indicated below. The hours 
per year of each tariff are illustrated below: 
Position Tariff Periods Duration 
1. Peak 249h 
2. Winter hi1rh-load hours 872h 
3. Mid-season high-load hours 745h 
4. Winter low-load hours 1039 
5. Mid-season low-load hours 719h 
6. Summer high-load hours 1870 
7. Summer low-load hours 1778h 
8. July-August 1488h 
It should be noted that for Tariff C, subscribed demand > 40 MW, EdF only publishes a 
guide tariff schedule. The special sales conditions for this tariff depend on: 
the location of the customer in relation to the interconnected system 












The modulatable option: Tariffs AS, B and C 
EdF cost-based tariff philosophy has lead to the development of the modulatable option as 
a further enhancement on the EJP Option to customers on Tariffs A8, B and C. In the 
modulatable option, four tariff periods are based on a virtually real time basis. The tariff 
period for which the periods are determined is one week, starting on Tuesday at 7h00. The 
warning provided is at least 12 hours, i.e. EdF announces the tariff categories for the days 
of the next week on Monday before 15h00: 
The moveable peak period, [MP] 18 hours per day for 22 days, the days being 
chosen between 1 November and 31 March. 
The moveable winter period, [MM] for 9 weeks, all hours which are not moveable 
peak hours. 
The moveable mid-season period, [MS] for 19 weeks, all hours during the seven 
days of the week which are not moveable peak hours. 
The variable low-load season, [LL] for the rest of the year, approximately 24 
weeks. 
With the modulatable option, the annual maximum demand charge is calculated as the 
sum, over all tariff periods, of the basic maximum demand charge multiplied by the 
subscribed demand for each tariff period multiplied by the applicable coefficient of the 
subscribed demand reduction. The table below contains the 1992 figures for the 
modulatable option demand charge and applicable reduction co-efficients for the A8 and B 
Tariff options: 
Version Basic maximum demand Coefficients of demand reductions 
charge (F/kW) "A8" 
MP MM MS LL 
Very high usage 774.24 1 0.25 0.08 0.05 
A vera2e usa£e 303 1 0.31 0.09 0.05 
In addition to the demand charge rates, the modulatable option also has specific energy 












5.8 Taxation in the electricity industry 
A notable feature of taxation on the income generated from sales is that all taxes which are 
raised on electricity sales and which are used to fund activities outside of the electricity 
industry, are transparent In particular there are three external taxes: 
1. VAT, applied to all electricity sales. 
2. A municipal tax, set at between 0 and 8% of the total bill (mainly for domestic 
customers). 
3. A provincial tax, set at between 0 and 4% of the total bill (mainly for domestic 
customers). 
Blue tariff customers are liable for tax on 80% of their bill. Yellow Tariff customers are 
liable for taxation on 30% of their bill, and Green Tariff customers pay a negotiated 
amount of tax. A notable aspect of this taxation system is its transparency. A customer's 
account reflects their total bill, exclusive of tax. Taxes thereon in respect of local, regional 
and central government are separately calculated and expressed on the face of the account. 
5.9 A discussion on Ed.F pricing 
The review of the EdF tariffs so far, sets a background against which a qualitative 
assessment of the tariffs can be made. The discussion begins by focusing on the 
relationship between customer siz  and tariff complexity. The discussion then focuses on 
how supply costs in terms of voltage, power factor, time of use and maximum demand 
costs versus energy costs, are expressed in the different EdF Tariffs. 
Complexity versus customer size 
The simplest EdF tariff available is the "long utilisation" Blue Tariff Option which is 
designed for installations such as fountains, which have a steady and continuous demand. 
This tariff is simply a single fixed charge in Francs per year or alternatively Francs per 
hundred kilowatt-hours. The next simplest tariff is the one offered to "petites foumiturs" 
(small installations). This is the EdF equivalent of the lifeline tariff. It should be noted 












Fauconnier, 1988). With this tariff the fixed charge is less than. the management and 
metering costs. However, the energy rate is greater than that in the Base Option. The tariff 
is thus only applicable to those customers who consume less than 2500 kWh per year. 
For the rest of the Blue Tariff, the maximum demand is not metered at all. The only 
sophistication in the Blue Tariff is the EJP and Off-Peak option where the energy rate 
differs between mobile peak hours (in the EJP tariff), peak hours in the Off-Peak tariff and 
standard hours. 
The Yellow Tariff is pitched at customers with a capacity between 36 and 250 kV A. In the 
Yellow Tariff there is a maximum demand charge in Francs per kVA, seasonal 
differentiation and a choice of Base and EJP Options. There is also differentiation between 
high usage and average usage customers. The complexity and the resultant increased 
management and metering costs is justified on account of the size of the Yell ow Tariff 
customer~. 
The Green Tariff 
The Green Tariff, in its most sophisticated version is highly complex, with a differe~tiation 
between four seasons, two tariff periods in each of those seasons, four levels of load factor 
differentiation, a separate reactive energy charge and three tariff versions: Base, 
modulatable or EJP. The Green C Tariff for customers greater than 40 MW has no 
prescribed prices per se, but rather a list of recommended prices. These prices are then 
negotiated with individual customers based on the proximity of those customers to the 
transmission grid and also the ability of such customers to modulate their demand during 
the peak periods. 
Cost-based pricing 
Voltage 
The Blue and Yellow tariffs are delivered at low voltage. Customers in each of these tariffs 
are differentiated with respect to their subscribed demand. For the Green Tariff, since 
changes in 1981, customers are classified according to their demand and not their supply 












charges (Francs) in the case of the Blue tariff, Franc/kV A charges in the Yell ow Tariff and 
Franc/kW charges in the Green Tariffs. 
In the Green Tariff in particular, the following voltage categories are distinguished: 
Voltage Category Actual Voltage Level 
MV 1 kV to 40 kV exclusive 
HV 40 kV to 130 kV exclusive 
225kV 130 kV to 350 kV 
exclusive 
400kV 350 kV to 500 kV 
exclusive 
There is no rigid relationship between a tariff and the connection charge. Rather the 
maximum demand charge is altered based on the actual voltage of supply, thereby enabling 
all customers to pay the cost price of their electricity. The increases or decreases on the 
basic demand charge are explained in the table below: 
Voltage Category Tariff category 
A B c 
MV A B increased NIA 
HV A decreased B C increased 
225kV NIA B decreased c 
400kV NIA NIA C decreased 
The increases are applied to the maximum subscribed demand while the decreases are 
applied to the chargeable demand. 
Power factor 
In the Blue tariff there is no charge for reactive energy. Any losses as a result of reactive 
energy consumption have already been factored into the energy and standing charges. The 
Yellow Tariff does make provision for some recovery of reactive energy losses, by 












the customer to ensure that the power factor of their operation does not result in excessive 
payments for subscribed kV A. 
In the Green Tariff, an even more sophisticated method of charging for reactive energy is 
used. Maximum demand is measured in kW s and reactive energy is free of charge, together 
with active power, under the following conditions: 
Up to 40% of the active energy consumed during the peak hours in December, 
January, February, and during the high-load hours from November to March. 
without restriction during the low-load hours from November to March and 
without restriction from April to October. 
When applicable, reactive energy is invoiced on a monthly basis at the rates stipulated in 
the price schedules. 
Time of use 
Cost variations in respect of time of use· receive a lot of attention in the EdF Tariffs. The 
only tariffs which are not time differentiated are those in the Base Option of the Blue Tariff 
for customers subscribing to not more than 18 kV A. The Off-Peak option of the Blue Tariff 
distinguishes between peak and off-peak periods. 
The EJP (Peak Day Withdrawal) Option in the Blue, Yellow and Green tariffs is a 
considerable step towards real time pricing where there is one day's notice for the 22 EJP 
days during which the unit price is very considerably higher than for the other days. The 
EJP option is advanced by EdF as an improvement to traditional time of use tariffs which 
do not account for the additional conditions which affect supply costs i.e. demand and 
equipment availability. The EJP Option is able to counter for these other uncertainties by 
determining the EJP days virtually in real time. 
As a further enhancement on the EJP Option, with the Green A8, B and C Tariffs, the 
customer has the choice of going on the Modulatable Tariff. This tariff extends the 
principle underlying the EJP Tariff by using four determinate tariff periods (with applicable 












notice. The tariff is still a long way from a true real time tariff but is nevertheless a step 
towards the goal. 
Maximum Demand related costs versus energy-related costs 
One of the greatest strengths of the EdF tariffs is that a distinction is made with respect to 
the level of usage in terms of the relative size of the capacity-related charges and the 
energy-related charges. The supply-side costing philosophy underlying this was explained 
earlier in the section on the development of a tariff structure based on marginal costs. The 
argument for usage-dependent capacity and energy costs may also be made as follows: A 
customer who has a high load factor uses predominantly base power stations. These 
stations have a high capital outlay but a low variable operating cost. Conversely a customer 
with a low load factor, because of the intermittent nature of his demand, causes the utility 
to invest in peaking plant. This plant has, by nature, a high operating cost but low capital 
cost. The differing costs which these two customers incur should thus be reflected in the 
prices they pay. Both the theoretical supply costing argument presented earlier, as well as 
this more practical perspective, present convincing evidence in favour of load factor 
differentiation of the tariffs. 
Conclusions 
It should be borne in mind that the basis of the present tariffs originated almost 40 years 
ago and electricity pricing in EdF has had a stable and supportive environment in which to 
mature. From this analysis it is clear that in practice the EdF tariffs are broadly in line with 
their stated tariffing philosophy. While there is a clear emphasis on equality of treatment 
and efficiency, this is moderated by the practical requirement that the size of the customer 
must directly proportional to the tariff's complexity, its accuracy in cost reflection and the 
number of options available to that customer. Furthermore, with the exception of the very 
smallest customers for whom a specific tariff is set, the rest of EdF's customers enjoy a 
wide choice of different tariff options. This choice means that in order for a particular tariff 
to find acceptance by the customers it has to offer the customers the ability to reduce the 
size of their electricity bill. While this means reduced revenue to EdF, the tariff has been 
designed so that any reduction in revenue is at least matched by the reduction in costs. This 












Part 2: Lessons from EdF tariffing of relevance to the SA electricity industry. 
5.10 Industry structure and the price regulatory framework 
In respect of generation and transmi~ssion, there are a number of parallels that can be drawn 
between the French and South African electricity industries. In both countries, a single 
parastatal organisation has had a defacto monopoly of the industry for more than 45 years. 
In terms of governance of this side of the industry, both have enjoyed a largely arms-length 
relationship with the regulatory authorities. At the same time, in both countries, the 
stability of nationalisation and isolation from external interference has facilitated the 
development of technologically sophisticated industries. 
However, on the distribution side of the industry there is a considerable difference between 
the industry in South Africa and that in France. In this respect, the structure of the 
distribution industry in SA is best likened to that of France at the time of the 
nationalisation. In France then, and in South Africa now, the distribution industry is highly 
fragmented with a large number of independent distributing authorities, each with their 
own resources having the responsibility for the distribution of electricity within their own 
areas of supply. As discussed in more detail later, the fragmentation has given rise to an 
enormous multiplicity of tariffs with essentially little to no effective regulation of the prices 
which the majority of customers in South Africa pay. By comparison, electricity 
distribution in France is undertaken by EdF only. 
The structure of EdF is often referred to as a feasible possibility for the South African 
electricity industry. Indeed there are strong lobbies in favour of a national distributor a la 
EdF. Arguably the most attractive aspect of the French industry is the simplicity of the 
industry structure. Since the industry has only one supplier the triangular relationship 
between the supplier, the customer and the State is considerably simplified. The simplicity 
of the industry structure is further enhanced by the simple but effective regulatory 
mechanism through which the State and EdF interrelate. In this regatd, reference is made to 
the Contract Plan. With the Contract Plan, EdF is effectively able to "buy" freedom from 
State interference. This has meant that although EdF is a parastatal corporation it is 













Compared to the confusing and inefficient fragmentation of the South African EDI, it is 
clear why the structure of the French industry is advanced by some as a possible alternative 
for South Africa. Therefore, having already focused in detail on how electricity is priced in 
the vertically integrated French industry, the next section will ignore the issue of industry 
structure in a discussion on the applicability of the principles and practices of EdF tariffing 
to South Africa. 
5.11 Lessons of principle 
As discussed earlier, EdF claim that their tariffs are built on two fundamental cornerstones: 
* 
Tariff neutrality 
Equality of treatment 
Flowing from the realisation of these two principles, marginal costs came to be used as the 
basis of EdF Tariffs. It was and still is argued that tariffs based on marginal costs will 
result in economic efficiency and hence the optimal utilisation of resources. Inherent in this 
approach, although not plainly stated, is that tariff neutrality and equality of treatment 
preclude EdF from allowing any cross-subsidies to exist. 
It is at this point that possible difficulties in the application of EdF tariffing to SA begin to 
creep in. The electricity market in France and that in SA are vastly different. EdF's 
"lifeline" tariff has more than 12 million customers and EdF in total has more than 28 
million customers in a country with a population of about 55 million. South Africa by 
comparison has approximately 2.8 million domestic customers in a country with a 
population of approximately 40 million. In addition, in South Africa, wealth disparities 
between different communities severely affect their ability to pay for services such as 
electricity. Ultimately this means that if the principle of tariff neutrality and equality of 
treatment were to be applied in South Africa, only those customers who are able to afford 
the full cost of the service, will be eligible to receive it. The issue immediately becomes 
political since those who are able to afford electricity are generally those who have, in the 
past, been favoured by an unjust political dispensation. In the light of such historical 
analyses, the somewhat theoretical postulations of equality of treatment and tariff neutrality 












Dismissing the use of marginal costs in SA because of inherent structural defects in the 
wealth distribution in South Africa may seem reasonable. However this is only one side of 
the debate. The principle of marginal cost pricing applied to the electricity industry was 
pioneered by Bioteaux in the 1950s and has been developed to a fine art in EdF. As a 
result, EdF have saved an enormous amount of money through optimising the utilisation of 
their generating and transmitting capacity. EdF have successfully proved the value of 
marginal cost pricing. 
One possible solution to explore is the Ramsey pricing theory which allowed for price 
differentiation based on a customer's price elasticity of demand. Indeed, even EdF claim to 
use a Ramsey-Boiteaux formulation of marginal costing in their solution to the problem of 
differences between economic and accounting costs. However, a Ramsey adjustment to the 
prices paid by different customers is ultimately dependent on the knowledge of those 
different customer's price elasticity of demand. This becomes a highly difficult problem to 
solve since it requires an assessment of the wealth of each and every customer in order to 
determine that customer's price elasticity of demand. Alternatively some generalisation 
could be made such as: all domestic customers with ripple-control geysers have a lower 
price elasticity of demand than customers who do not have ripple-control geysers. While 
this may well be true for most cases, it is not true in all cases and furthermore within the 
category of those with/without ripple-control geysers there may be an endless number of 
other subjective possible ways of classifying customers into price elasticity of demand 
classes. 
Perhaps a better solution would b  to calculate tariffs based on marginal costs and then, 
external to the industry, calculate those subsidies or other means of funding which would 
make it possible to supply those who don't have the means to be able to afford the actual 
cost of electricity. Funds to allow such cross-subsidisation could be raised through a charge 
on every kWh sold. The beneficiaries of this funding would receive an account reflecting 
their actual cost of supply based on marginal costs and in accordance with the principles of 
tariff neutrality and tariff equality, but there would be an additional entry reflecting the 
subsidy received. In this way the efficiency-improving qualities of marginal cost based 
tariffs will be maintained while at the same time transparently allowing cross-subsidisation 












5.12 Lessons of practice 
Choice 
In EdF tariffs, the degree of tariff choice which a customer has, is directly proportional to 
the size of the customer. In the case of the largest customers, the principle of choice is 
taken to its logical conclusion in that these customers are able to negotiate customised tariff 
deals with EdF. However, even in the case of the smaller customers there are a 
considerable number of possible options. 
In South Africa, as discussed in more detail later, most customers have almost no choice at 
all. Perhaps this is indicative of the historically entrenched supply-side orientation of the 
industry. In view of the fact that the customer base in South Africa varies so considerably a 
very strong case can be made for the development of tariff options, a-la-EdF, in South 
Africa. In the South African domestic sector for example, there are a number of customers 
with high consumption and sophisticated uses for electricity. There are also a large and 
increasing number of customers with very low consumption who would best be classified 
as "life-line" customers. Both of these customers are in the same tariff category but the 
nature of their consumption varies considerably. Therefore, by offering such customers a 
choice of different tariffs, the customer will be able to choose the tariff which best suits 
their operation and, if they choose to change the pattern of their consumption, will allow 
them to make the largest savings. If they are properly designed, the tariff options therefore 
allow a win-win saving shared between the supplier and the customer. 
Subscribed demand 
All EdF customers, excluding those on the life-line tariff are required to subscribe to a 
specific maximum demand. For the larger customers this is taken even further in that the 
customers are required to subscribe to a level of demand during each different tariff period. 
Demand charges are then calculated on the basis of the subscribed demand and penalties 
are calculated should demand exceed the subscribed level. This method of charging for 












1. On the demand-side, customers are forced to consider their usage of electricity in 
calculating what the correct subscribed demand.level should be. This has particular 
implications for large customers who have to subscribe for a specific level of 
maximum demand during each tariff period. 
2. On the supply-side, since demand is subscribed for a year in advance, EdF have 
an estimate of the maximum demand during different times of the year - this has an 
obvious benefit in the planning process. 
Furthermore, the method of getting customers to subscribe to a specific demand level does 
not require any special administrative effort or special metering technology on the part of 
EdF. Hence in view of the considerable benefits of subscribed demand, a strong argument 
can be made that this method of charging for capacity could be profitably applied in the 
South African industry. 
Tariff differentiation based on duration of usage 
All Yellow and Green tariffs·differentiate the proportion of the total electricity costs which 
are recovered through the energy charge and the capacity charge. It. was explained earlier 
that tariffs which differentiate between the relative size of the demand and energy charges 
based on the variations in the load factor, reflect the costs of different types of generating 
capacity. The argument in favour of applying load factor differentiated tariffs to South 
Africa can be made as follows: In South Africa, in the large customer category a significant 
amount of electricity is sold to the gold mining and ferrochrome industries. The nature of 
the operation of these two different types of customers results in Gold Mines having high 
load factors while ferrochrome industries have relatively low load factors. These different 
customers, because of their different load factors, cause Eskom to construct different types 
of power station with different relative sizes of capacity and operating costs. At present 
however, the only differentiation between these customers is in terms of the time of 














In EdF tariffing, transparency is a valued principle. This is reflected in the VAT charges 
and the levies (calculated on the total electricity price) in support of local and regional 
government. This contrasts with the situation in South Africa where the actual amount of 
the electricity price charged by local authority electricity undertakings which constitutes a 
contribution to the coffers of local government, is not known with any certainty. 
The concept of transparency also extends beyond taxation and levies to the calculation of 
the actual cost of supplying any particular type of customer. Once this has been achieved, 
any intra-industry cross-subsidies between different consumer classes or even within 
consumer classes will be publicly known. In so doing, departures from the economically 
efficient marginal cost prices, in the name of social subsidies, or any other reason for that 
matter, can be quantified. 
Time of use pricing 
In the history of EdF tariffing, time differentiated tariffs were first introduced in the 1950s 
as a result of the implementation of the Boiteux application of marginal cost tariffs to the 
electricity industry. Since then, time of use has played a progressively larger role, so that 
today customers on the Green Tariff have a choice of three different time of use options: 
The Base Option which is a standard time of use tariff, the Peak Day Withdrawal Option 
whereby the energy price escalates dramatically for 22 days of the year, or the Modulatable 
Option whereby four time periods with applicable charges are determined on virtually a 
real-time basis. The time of use tariffs have been very successful as indicated by a steady 
increase in the system load factor between the 1950s and the present. By comparison with 
France, South Africa's first time of use tariff is yet to be promulgated. It is clear that time 
wasted on rediscovering the wheel can be prevented if EdF's 40 years of experience in time 












SC PRICING IN ZIMBABWE 
5.1 Introduction 
At the end of 1992, it was forecasted that in the following year, Zimbabwe would lose 
57000 jobs and Z$2.5 billion in GDP through electricity rationing as a result of 
expected electricity shortages of up to 30% (Robinson and Dale, 1992). In 1993, the 
newspaper headlines such as "Zimbabwe - the Heart of Darkness" and "Zimbabwe's 
power crisis causes anger" appeared frequently in the local and Zimbabwean presses. 
The Zimbabwean electricity industry is an industry in crisis, in more ways than one. 








Inability (of the industry) to supply existing customers with sufficient energy 
Inability to redress the backlog of suppressed demand or respond to requests 
for connections associated with major projects; 
Unhelpful political intervention 
A continued lack of foreign exchange 
A steady loss of trained and experienced staff 
Conflicts between the ZESA Board and the Minister of Energy 
Zimbabwe's electricity pricing policy - in as far as it fulfils the roles explained in the 
beginning of the first chapter - has contributed to the current parlous state of the 
industry. To place a discussion of electricity pricing in Zimbabwe in context, this 
chapter begins with a discussion of political and economic realities in Zimbabwe. The 
chapter then discusses the development of the Zimbabwe electricity industry. This is 
followed by an analysis of the increasing supply/demand imbalance in the industry. The 
chapter then attempts to explain the role that electricity -pricing has played in the 
industry. 
5.2 Political and economic realities in Zimbabwe 
Independence in 1980 brought an end to white minority rule in Zimbabwe. It also 
brought an end to 15 years of Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) during 












of strict economic sanctions from Britain and the United Nations. When -Robert 
Mugabe became the first Prime Minister he promised to create a non-racial society, to 
rebuild rural areas damaged by war and to construct a socialist economy on the 
principles of Marxist-Leninism (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992:1). 
At the time of Independence, Zimbabwe had one of the most diversified economies on 
the continent. On the one hand the economy had a developed and efficient agricultural 
and mining industry and a manufacturing sector producing a more complex range of 
products than any other countries in the sub-Saharan region apart from South Africa 
(The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992:15). On the other hand there was a highly 
uneven pattern of income and access to economic assets such as land and housing, and 
to the key social services of education and health. Its colonial history having initially 
been dominated by private foreign capital, the Zimbabwean economy was basically 
capitalist. 
The coming to power of a government whose legitimacy and power were based not 
only on a nationalist and anti-racist platform but also on an explicit commitment to 
socialism appeared to set an agenda which would seek to correct social, economic and 
racial inequalities. 
In terms of social upliftment and development, Zimbabwe made some impressive 
progress: Education expansion has been impressive. The expansion achieved a growth 
in school enrolments greater than anywhere in Africa in the post-colonial period: total 
enrolments rose from 892 000 in 1979 to 2.96 million in 1989, with the transition rate 
from the top of primary to the first year of secondary school rising from 28% in 1980 to 
66% in 1989. In 1980 Zimbabwe had fewer than 200 secondary schools; by 1989 it 
could boast more than 1500; enrolments at teacher training and technical colleges 
trebled and university enrolments increased fivefold. (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
1992 p18) However, while there are now about 200 000 school leavers per annum there 
are only about 60 000 to 70 000 formal sector job openings (Zimbabwe Structural 
Adjustment Program (World Bank), 1991:3). In the area of health care, in the 9 years 
from 1980 to 1989 , the percentage of children fully immunised has more than tripled 
from 25% to 86%; infant mortality has declined from 86 to 61 per 1000 births and life 
expectancy has increased from 55 to 59 years (Zimbabwe Structural Adjustment 












However, while it is clear that in the first 10 years of independence, considerable gains 
were made in the social services, there was a considerable decrease in investment in the 
productive sectors of the economy. Private sector investment as a share of GDP fell to 
8% in 1987 and government took far greater direct control of the business sector 
(Zimbabwe Structural Adjustment Program, World Bank, 1991:3). In addition to the 
constraints of a financial nature, businesses experienced price controls, credit controls, 
wage controls and labour legislation that limited employers' rights to discharge or 
retrench labour without permission of the ministry of labour. With these came rent 
controls, interest-rate ceilings for foreign-controlled companies depositing surplus 
funds, borrowing limits based upon a company's degree of local ownership, dividend 
remittance restrictions, investment and disinvestment controls, immigration controls 
and severe restrictions upon the employment of expatriates (Baynham, 1992:108). 
Generally confrontational attitudes made themselves felt between the business sector 
and government. These attitudes seem to be of some importance today, with vice-
president Joshua Nkomo accusing whites of being disrespectful f Mugabe and of 
attaching greater importance to the Commercial Farmers' Union and the Confederation 
of Zimbabwe Industry than they do to the Zimbabwe Government (Saturday Star 
Newspaper, Johannesburg, August 211993). 
Another distinct aspect of the first 10 years of independence was the growth of external 
debt in government and the parastatals (parastatals include Zimbabwe Iron and Steel 
(ZISCO), Zimababwe Water and Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA). In 
1981, government debt stood at Z$ 73 billion, by 1988 this had risen to Z$ 584,5 
billion. Parastatal debt rose from Z$ 2.7 billion in 1981 to Z$ 264.4 billion by 1987 
(Baynham, 1992). In the case of ZESA, overall foreign debt repayments amount to 
more than Z$ 760 million per annum. By comparison, private sector debt was Z$ 27 
million in 1981 and Z$ 27.9 million in 1988. The huge increase in government and 
parastatal debt has meant that large amounts of foreign exchange have been channelled 
into servicing these debts and hence preventing any hope of systematic capital goods 
replacement in the business sector. Even regular maintenance programmes have had to 
be abandoned by most companies. In many instances the foreign exchange allocated has 
had to be used for raw materials almost to the total exclusion of replacement goods. 
Often because production staff could not be laid off production simply had to continue 
(Baynham, 1992:71). 
It is against the background of the social development successes but the failure to 












comprehensive program of structural adjustment The program entitled "A Framework 
for Economic Reform" was discussed and widely supported by the IMF and World 
Bank. The program is a departure from pervasive direct controls, to market forces. Its 
central components are: (Zimbabwe Structural Adjustment Program, World Bank, 
1991:3) 
II 1. Fiscal deficit reduction coupled with prudent monetary policy. 
2. Trade liberalisation. 
3. Domestic deregulation. 
4. Measures to alleviate the impact of reforms on vulnerable groups. 11 
The key objectives of the program are to increase investment and improve efficiency. 
The cost of the package was estimated at Z$4 bn by the government and Z$7 bn by the 
Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992:13). 
There are a number of aspects of the structural adjustment program which will directly 
impact the electricity supply industry. In particular the Structural Adjustment Program 
(SAP) aims to reduce central government deficits .by reducing parastatal subsidies 
(3. 7% of GDP in 1990/1991). These subsidies are expected to fall as a result of 
comprehensive programs to improve parastatal efficiency, improvements in pricing 
policy and actions to reduce the size of the parastatal sector. In respect of pricing policy, 
the World Bank recommends the replacement of administered prices by market 
determined prices for parastatals operating in a competitive environment and allowing a 
degree of automaticity and parastatal autonomy for public utilities. Other, sector-wide 
actions will be taken to improve the economic performance of parastatals. The legal 
framework within which parastatals operate, will be overhauled to ensure that boards of 
directors are given sufficient autonomy and responsibility to operate in line with their 
mandates. The respective roles of ministries, boards of directors and management will 
be clearly defined. 
The key aspects of the SAP relating to parastatals have specific relevance to ZESA 
which has been noted for the degree of direct government interference and political 
nepotism which characterised its governance. 
5.3 A history of the development of the electricity industry 
Electricity was first introduced into Rhodesia in 1897 with the formation of the 












electricity company. After the formation of these electricity companies, construction of 
municipal power stations - which were all coal-fired - followed progressively. Later as 
demand for electricity increased steadily, particularly among mining and farming 
customers, authorities soon realised the need to formulate a proper energy policy which 
would respond quickly to the country's energy development needs. This lead to the 
promulgation of the Electricity Supply Act which took effect from 1 July 1936 and 
brought the Electricity Supply Commission (ESC) into being. The Act assigned to the 
ESC the duties of investigating "new or additional facilities for the supply of electricity 
within an area, and co-ordinating and co-operating with existing undertakings where 
required" (ZESA 1991 a). 
By 1940, in addition to power stations at Gweru, Kadoma and Mutare, the commission 
had established new stations at Gwanda Munyati and Zvishavane. It was at this stage 
that the idea of harnessing the Zambezi River at the Kariba Gorge, was conceived. The 
damming of the river began in 1955 and, after completion in 1958, the Kariba Power 
Station was officially opened by Queen Elizabeth in 1960. The Kariba station had been 
built by the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to serve both Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, the Federal Power Board, later reconstituted as the Central African Power 
Corporation (CAPCO) was created to run the power station (ZESA, 1991a). 
During the period that the Kariba dam was built, the 330 kV transmission network 
linking the interconnected system in Zambia and Zimbabwe and joining the towns of 
Kitwe and Bulawayo was constructed. By the time of its dissolution in 1964, the 
Federal Power Board had over 1488 km of 330 kV line constructed (ZESA, 1991a). 
In the meantime, the ESC had been given jurisdiction for the distribution of power to 
the whole country excluding the four largest municipalities. In addition, ESC operated 
Munyati Power Station to schedules set by CAPCO. In the urban areas of Harare, 
Mutare, Bulawayo and Gweru, the councils had the mandate to distribute power. This 
was the situation until 1983 when the government approved in principle the 













The instrument giving effect to amalgamation of the electricity supply authorities in 
Zimbabwe, the Electricity Act, 1985, was debated in Parliament during the first quarter 
of 1985 and assented to by the then President Cde Canaan Banana on 5 April 1985. On 
24 April 1986, the Act came into legal operation and paved the way for the 
amalgamation and unification of the five Zimbabwean electricity authorities and the 
Zimbabwean portion of CAPCO's operations into one organisation - the Zimbabwe 
Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA). The Act stipulated the functions of ZESA as 
being: (ZESA, 1991a) 
II 1. To acquire, generate, transmit, distribute and supply electricity; 
2. To investigate new or additional facilities for the generation, 
transmission distribution or supply of electricity and, to advise the 
1\1inister of Energy of the result of such investigations and; 
3. To acquire, control and operate other electricity undertakings within 
Zimbabwe. 11 
The formation of ZESA heralded a new era in the Zimbabwean electricity industry. 
From this period onwards the control of the industry was firmly rooted in political 
hands. In addition to the above-mentioned functions, in terms of the Act a number of 
key manageria1/business decisions have to be referred to the minister for ratification, 
including: appointment of a General Manager; tariff increases; investment proposals 
(also to be approved by the ministry of Finance); and the negotiations of agreements 
with supply authorities in neighbouring states. The move to create ZESA may be seen 
as being consistent with the government's socialist ideology (Robinson, 1992). As an 
aside, it is interesting to note the parallels between this regulatory structure of the 
industry - which ensured a high degree of political control - and the recommendations 
of the South African Government's Board of Trade and Industry Report (1977) which 
had recommended something similar for South Africa's electricity supply industry 
almost a decade earlier. 
5.4 Increasing supply/demand imbalances in the electricity industry 
Demand side 
In 1980, per capita power consumption in Zimbabwe was one of the highest in the East 
Africa region (928 kWh per capita in 1980), largely because of the manufacturing and 












Electricity provided 31.5% of the total energy consumed in Zimbabwe in 1980-(Mian, 
1982:5). 
Between 1980 and 1990 electricity sales increased by 83.6%. However, this growth was 
not even throughout the period, with load growing by 56.9% between 1985 and 1986 
and only by 12.2% between 1986 and 1990 (ZESA 1990 Annual Report). In 1980, 
sales to the mining sector accounted for roughly 2.6 times the sales to the domestic and 
municipal sector. In the same year, sales to industry were 5 times as much as the total 
sales to the domestic and municipal sector (ZESA 1991 Annual Report). However, 
mining consumption as a percentage of total consumption decreased by 10.2% between 
1960 and 1980, while industrial consumption increased by 3.3% in this period (ZESA 
1990 Annual Report). 






Domestic & Other 25.8 
In 1980 the electricity sector had only about 190 000 domestic customers, which 
accounted for 16% of all households in Zimbabwe (Mian, 1982:31). In 1990, there was 
an aggregate. total of 267 871 domestic connections. However in the same year there 
were 176 000 outstanding applications for domestic electricity supply. Furthermore, 
progress in making new connections appears to be totally inadequate, with the number 
of connections actually decreasing by 1753 between the 1988 and 1989 financial years 
(ZESA 1989 and 1990 Annual Reports). 
Supply side 
In 1981, to determine the least cost generation and transmission solution to meet 
Zimbabwe's expected demands for power in the country, the government commissioned 
a Power Development Plan study. This plan recommended the construction of various 
power stations to meet the forecasted load growth. (Growth rates were based on 7.2% 
per year for 1980 - 1990 and 6.1%for1990 -2000. (Actual growth for the period 1980-
1990 was less than expected). The least cost development program to meet the expected 












Plant Size [MW] Commissioning 
vear 
Hwan2e Sta2e 1 480 1982/83 
Hwan_ge Sta_ge II Phase 1 400 1985 
Kariba South Extension 300 1987 
Kariba North Extension 300 1988 
Hwan2e Sta2e Il Phase 2 400 1989 
Batoka Dam and South 800 1991 
Bank Power Station 
North Bank Power Station 800 1994 
Mupata Gorge Dam and 600 1996 
South Bank Power Station 
North Bank Power Station 600 1998 
Sen_gwa 600 2000 
Most of the projects have not been implemented to date for what ZESA describes as 
"various reasons, mainly related to the availability of finance, both local and foreign 
currency" (ZESA, 1992: 22). 
The one project, Hwange Power Station, which did eventually come to fruition is, 
ironically, one which the Smith government initiated in the late 1970s to achieve 
greater independence from Zambian imports. Smith was unable to complete the power 
station during the period of UDI since sanctions against Rhodesia made it impossible to 
acquire the necessary equipment. However, following Independence these sanctions 
were relaxed and the Zimbabwean government decided to embark on what has been the 
largest capital development project since independence. 
The second phase of Hwange was eventually commissioned in 1987. The station has 
thus far not had a particularly successful history. Plant has already had to be upgraded 
in order to achieve design capabilities. Furthermore, difficulties in obtaining foreign 
exchange have lead to incidents where a unit had been taken out of operation for 106 
days because of difficulties in arranging foreign exchange to purchase a pump for Z$ 
6000 (Robinson, 1992:3). Today Hwange is not capable of producing greater than 844 












Hence, the generating capacity of ZESA at August 1993, consisted of 
Plant Maximum Capacity [MWl 
Kariba South 666 
Hwange 734 
Small Thermals 158 
In addition to this generation capacity, there is currently a limited 40MW from Eskom 
as at January 1993; though this will increase considerably after the completion of the 
Matimba-Bulawayo 400 kV line. 
As a result of insufficient capacity and the resultant excessive usage of the Kariba 
South power station since 1981, the Kariba Dam became considerably overdrawn. By 
1992, the supply crisis reached a head when the Kariba Dam reached its minimum 
operating level in August resulting in a complete system failure (ESMAP, 1993). The 
crisis lead to the establishment of a quota system to attempt to ration electricity supply. 
5.5 The contribution of electricity pricing to the current crisis in the electricity 
industry 
The current state of the Zimbabwe electricity supply industry is the result of a number 
of different factors, some of which have already been described in this chapter. 
Electricity pricing in terms of both structure and price level has contributed to the 
inefficient utilisation of the electricity infrastructure. It has also contributed to 
undermining the financial viability of the supply industry. 
The first issue to be broached in the tariff debate is that of the regulatory structure. 
Throughout the history of the industry, the regulatory structure of the industry has 
provided no incentive for economically efficient pricing. This is evident both before 
and after the creation of ZESA. Before ZESA, the primary supply was undertaken by 
the Electricity Supply Commission and through the four municipal distributors. In the 
case of the former, the strong governmental relationship meant that the Commission 
was used as a tool to attract industry to Zimbabwe through low prices (ESMAP, 
1993:5). In the case of the latter, the issue of price level and structure was referred to 
the local municipal councils who as in South Africa at present, set prices as far as 
possible to the liking of the bulk of their electorate: the domestic customers. From a 
pricing point of view the regulatory structure only worsened with the creation of ZESA. 












be referred to the government for ratification; The concept of arms-length control which 
is currently seen as a vital aspect of control of the electricity industry had effectively 
been ignored, and the industry became a tool of the government in the implementation 
of its social development programs. Evidence of this is clear from the ZESA 
Chairman's 1990 Annual Report addressed to the Minister of Energy and Water 
Resources and Development where he expressed the hope that "the Government will 
seriously address the question of energy pricing in this country, and come up with clear 
guidelines on pricing, in order to avoid subsidies and promote stable prices and efficient 
electricity use" (ZESA 1990 Annual Report:l). Evidently these hopes were not fulfilled 
since, in the 1991 Annual Report, the ZESA Chairman reported with a sense of 
frustration, the fact that the government's failure to approve tariff increases had resulted 
in a record deficit (ZESA 1991 Annual Report:4). 
Further evidence of the heavy hand of government is to be seen in the average price of 
electricity as illustrated in Table 1 below: (Source: ESMAP 1993) where the average 
prices of electricity for the different customers, evidence the high degree of cross-
subsidisation of the domestic and agricultural customers. This is clear in view of the 
fact that the average domestic and agricultural customers are much more costly to 
supply than the average industrial or mining customer, and. yet almost all customers 












Consumer Category Number of Total Tariffs (Z $) 
Customers consumption Dec 1991 
[GWh] 
Metered Domestic 145 769 1116.65 
Monthly Charge 12 
Energy 
First 300 kWh 0,1085 
Balance 0,1266 
Average Price $/kWh 0.1369 









Average Price $/kWh 0.0951 
Commercial, industrial and mining < 300 32 167 1073.98 
kVA 
Monthly charge 30 
Energy charge 0.1163 
Average Price 0.1271 
Agriculture < 300 kV A 8531 712.38 
Monthly charge 30 
Energy charge 0.1221 
Average Price ($/kWh) 0.1264 
Commercial, Industrial & Mining > 300 kV A 1156 2579.16 
Monthy charge 100 




Average Price ($/kWh) 0.1387 
Al!riculture > 300 kV A 86 110.24 





Average Price ($/kWh) 0.1388 
Special customers 
3 Mining and 4 industrial 7 2923 Confidential 
Table 1. ZESA Tariffs at 1 Dec 1991 
Besides the inefficient cross-subsidies between customer classes, a major reason for the 












electricity decreased considerably in real terms. During this period, the largest -capital 
cost was the Kariba South Hydro station commissioned in 1960. In addition, operating 
costs of the hydro station were very low. Hence based on the historical cost 
methodologies used to calculate the price, there was no reason to increase the price 
during the period. However the failure to increase the price meant that ZESA became 
severely handicapped in its ability to meet the considerable capital costs necessary to 
expand the supply infrastructure to meet the continually growing demand. As a solution 
to the problem of the backward looking historical average cost principles, the United 
Nations/World Bank Energy Strategy Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) 
stipulated that prices should be based on forward-looking Long Run Marginal Costs. 
ZESA have supported this in principle. In addition, ESMAP emphasised the need for 
effective time of use tariffs as part of a demand side management program. 
In 1992 ZESA began implementing some radical price increases. However these price 
increases seem to be based more on basic revenue requirements than on any thorough 
analysis of Long Run Marginal Costs. Evidence of this is that the price increase to 
industrial and commercial customers has been in excess of 120% while the increase to 
domestic customers was around 40 % thereby further aggravating the existing cross-
subsidies (ESMAP 1993, Annexure 3). 
Perhaps the over-riding impression of the Zimbabwean pricing policy is one of irony. 
During the colonial era, the government used the Electricity Supply Commission to 
provide a cheap source of energy to attract and sustain industry and mining. The 
municipalities, while they had a licence to supply, also used their control to ensure that 
municipal customers had cheap electricity. Following the formation of ZESA, the 
Zimbabwe government sought to use the income generated from the industrial and 
commercial customers to subsidise the domestic customers. At the same time the 
average price was not increased sufficiently to ensure the long term financial 
sustainability of the industry. As a consequence, by 1991 ZESA was one of the few 
electricity utilities in the world known to make a loss. In 1992, there were several 
power shortages and on one occasion the whole system failed. In addition, at a time 
when there were more than 176 000 applications for supply outstanding, ZESA was 
disconnecting existing customers and rationing supplies, costing the country millions. 
But this was the exact opposite to the desired result: The desired result was one in 
which a low electricity price supported the social development of the country's people 
and the economic development of the nation's resources. In this irony, the ZESA study 












CHAPTER 6 TOWARDS A PRICING STRATEGY FOR THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION 
INDUSTRY 
The objective of this chapter is to present some ideas on a possible short, medium and long 
term pricing strategy for the South African electricity supply and distribution industry. The 
chapter begins with a review of the key issues discussed in the preceding chapters. It then 
briefly presents a vision for optimal tariffing in South Africa. The final section of the 
chapter then describes a three phase process reflecting different structural phases of the 
industry and the pricing practices applicable at each stage. 
6.1 A review of the previous chapters 
6.1.1 Chapter 2: A theoretical framework for electricity pricing 
* A tariff can be seen as a mechanism which arbitrates between the interests of the 
customer, the supplier and the State. A well formulated rate st;ucture can discourage waste 
and foster the efficient use of the national resources of capital, energy and manpower. 
* There are frequently a number of conflicting criteria which need to be compromised 
in establishing a pricing policy. Economic efficiency, equity, fairness and administrative 
feasibility are widely held as four essential criteria for a pricing policy. However, the 
pursuit of a high degree of economic efficiency may be administratively impossible and 
may contravene the principles of equity and fairness. Similarly, a rigorous pursuit of the 
latter will compromise the former. 
* Electricity costing has developed significantly from the early days of Hopkinson 
and Wright. Tod.ay it is accepted that for a tariff to be truly cost-reflective it must 
incorporate charges for the quantity of energy supplied, the maximum demand of supply, 
load factor, diversity factor, geographical location, voltage of supply, power factor and 
time of use. 
* The provision of electricity may be costed either according to the principles of 
absorption costing or marginal costing. In the case of the former, costs which are directly 












directly attributable to a particular unit of output are shared amongst all output. The 
marginal costing approach seeks to determine costs which will lead to economic efficiency. 
In the domain of welfare economics, the net social benefit is maximised when demand is 
met at a price equal to marginal costs. 
* Unless supply and demand is perfectly balanced, marginal costs and accounting 
costs will differ. Hence if marginal costs are used there will be over or under-recoveries 
with respect to accounting costs. However, normal business practice does not tolerate wide 
variances in costs from one period to the next, as results from the use of short-term 
marginal costs. To a certain extent the tariff instability resulting from short-term marginal 
costs, can be ameliorated with the use of long run marginal costs. However, as Teplitz-
Sembitzky (1990) points out, long run marginal costs can only be calculated with any 
certainty, in a industry which has a perfectly known future. 
* All electric utilities which apply economic marginal costs, whether they be long run 
marginal costs or short run marginal costs are ultimately forced to c mpromise the pursuit 
of pure economic costing so that accounting costs are consistently stated from one year to 
the next. 
* Although marginal costs were first applied to the electricity supply industry in the 
early 1950s, they only gained widespread acceptance after the energy crisis of the 1970s 
lead to a greater quest for economic efficiency. Today the principle of marginal costing in 
the electricity supply and distribution industry is recognised world-wide. 
* Competition as a prime determinant of electricity prices is becoming increasingly 
popular amongst different electricity utilities world-wide. In a truly competitive industry, 
price is determined by the interaction of supply and demand. In this scenario, complex 
arguments over marginal costs or fully distributed costs are rendered meaningless since it is 
ultimately the market which determines the applicable price. However en-route to this truly 
competitive state, it is possible to simulate competition amongst different suppliers though 
incentive competition. A commonly used form of incentive competition is to index 
allowable price incre.ases against a suitable index such as the Consumer Price Index. 
* Non-tariff pricing which is defined as the process of "determining the price 












playing an increasingly important role in electricity pricing internationally. -Non"'."tariff 
pricing is of particular relevance to the South African electricity industry where a handful 
customers account for a very significant proportion of total electricity consumption. By 
developing customised contracts for such customers, many of the simplifications of 
conventional tariffs may be avoided. 
6.1.2 Chapter 3: The development of the electricity supply industry in South 
Africa 
* In the first period of the industry from 1882 to 1948, the trend in the development 
of the supply industry was from private ownership to public ownership, from fragmentation 
to consolidation and from private control to public control. The impetus for the 
development of the electricity industry in South Africa has never been of its own making 
but rather it has been as a response to the development of industries and communities for 
whom electrical energy has been a necessary resource. A key turning point in this period 
was the 1922 Electricity Act which provided for the establishment, acquisition, 
maintenance and workings of an electricity supply commission which would oversee the 
efficient supply of electricity. The establishment of such, a commission set in place the 
structures for a centrally controlled supply industry under public control. Furthermore, in 
terms of the provisions of the Act, the privately owned Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power 
Company could be expropriated after a period of 38 years. Prices to be charged by the 
private electricity suppliers were to be regulated through an Electricity Control Board. 
However, while the supply industry was becoming increasingly centrally controlled, the 
distribution industry was becoming increasingly fragmented. This is because the influence 
of the Electricity Supply Commission did not extend to include municipal electricity 
distributors who were exempted from applying for a licence to supply. Instead, municipal 
distributors were regulated separately by their Local Authority Councils and respective 
Provincial Administrators, as had been established by the various Provincial Ordinances at 
the beginning of the century. 
* The second period in the history of the industry began around the time of the 
expropriation of the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company which effectively 
marked the end of any significant amount of private ownership of electricity supply and 
distribution infrastructure. By this stage there was nothing standing in the way of Escom 












grew very rapidly with close to double figure annual electricity sales increases, on average, 
for each year between 1950 and 1974. However, from 1973 onwards, although the industry 
continued to grow strongly there was considerable customer dissatisfaction concerning 
unacceptably high tariff increases. This resulted in the Board of Trade and Industry (BTI) 
Investigation into the Electricity Supply Industry. One of the recommendations of this 
investigation was that there should be a greater degree of government involvement in the 
activities of Escom. The BTI investigation was followed shortly after by the 1984 De 
Villiers Commission of Inquiry into the Supply of Electricity in the RSA. The De Villiers 
Commission recommended far-reaching changes to the control and management of the 
industry. Specifically, the following recommendations were made: 
I. The principle of operating at neither a profit nor a loss 
should be discarded in favour of a sound assets and income 
2. 
3. 
structure complying with certain requirements. 
The industry should be integrated and production costs 
(excluding transmission and distribution costs) should be 
centrally pooled. 
A permanent Board of Control, whose Chairman would be 
appointed by the State President, would be responsible for the 
supervision of an independent Escom management board. 
4. the task of the Escom Management Board would be to run 
Escom properly. 
Most of the recommendations of the De Villiers Commission took effect through the 
Eskom Act of 1987 and the Electricity Act of 1987. Through the Eskom Act, the supply 
industry was largely rationalised and placed at arms length from government control. The 
respective acts also provided for customer representation at the highest level of the 
industry. 
However, the positive developments in the supply industry did not reach into the 
distribution industry. Legislation written in the early 1900s provided for a high degree of 
Local Authority control over their own electricity distribution departments. This resulted in 
a high degree of fragmentation of the industry and through direct political control by their 













local authority councils to re-distribute wealth from the productive sectors of the economy 
in favour of their white voters. Furthermore, through the apartheid inspired creations of the 
Bantu Administration Boards in 1973 and the Black Local Authorities in 1982, the 
provision of electricity to developing and disadvantaged communities was further 
neglected. The specific impact which this tangled and structurally defective distribution 
industry has had on electricity pricing, is reviewed in the next section. 
6.1.3 Chapter 4: Past and present electricity pricing in the South African 
Electricity Supply and Distribution Industry 
* The previous section reviewed the circumstances which gave rise to the Board 
of Trade and Industries and De Villiers Reports on the state of the electricity supply 
industry in South Africa. The implication of these reports on the structure and governance 
of the industry was also explained. Relating to pricing policy, the BTI report produced a 
number of interesting conclusions and recommendations. Specifically, regarding the cost 
allocations which formed the basis of tariffing in the municipal sector, the report concluded 
as follows: 
"The majority of municip.alities are vague (with regard to cost allocations) and it 
appears that sophisticated methods are not applied. A number of these 
municipalities stated that they follow Escom's policy as nearly as possible without 
indicating what it means. In two cases, tariffs were restructured about thirty years 
ago and in one case it was not possible to determine how tariffs were structured. In 
two further cases where th  methods of allocation were described it was stated in 
the first case that own costs are allocated according to a fixed rule and in the other 
case that demand related costs are allocated to consumer groups according to their 
kWh consumption." 
Further recommendations arising out of this report were as follows: 













The industry should be allowed to make a profit. However this profit 
should be regulated by the government. 
There should be a greater extent geographical equalisation of the 
Escom tariffs, through greater cost pooling. 
The BTI report also introduced the idea of marginal costing though without making any 
specific recommendation that it should be used in the industry. It is interesting to note that 
at the time of the BTI report, Escom strongly opposed the use of marginal costs in the 
industry. 
* The De Villiers Commission of Inquiry in 1983, into the supply of electricity in 
South Africa, marked a new era in electricity pricing in the industry. One of the central 
recommendations was that "Escom should assume a leading role in the conservation of 
energy and electricity while preventing prices from rising too rapidly and the generation of 
electricity from making excessively high capital demands on the economy. Its objective 
should be the maximum utilisation of resources and capital in the economy through the 
optimum use of energy and electricity." 
* In accordance with the objective of increased savings and efficiency, the report 
recommended that customised price deals and time of use tariffs should be developed. 
However, strangely enough, the study argued against the use of marginal costs. Instead it 
recommended a "consumer privileged" philosophy which promoted the use of embedded 
accounting costs instead of economic marginal costs. 
* At present, Eskom supplies more than 96% of South Africas electrical energy. All 
Eskom energy is "sold" firstly via a Generation Tariff between the conceptually 
independent Generation and Transmission businesses. The objective of the Generation 
Tariff at present is to attempt to induce some competition between different power stations 
in an attempt to induce the optimal utilisation of the generation infrastructure. However 
this objective is constrained by the centrally controlled production optimisation plan which 
effectively limits the amount of discretion which individual power stations have to 












* The Eskom Transmission Tariff is used to charge for electricity sold between 
Transmission and the five Distributors. The 1994 Transmission Tariff consists of three 
specific charges: 
A network charge designed to recover Transmission's own revenue 
requirement. 
A time of use charge designed to recover the total .fixed and part of the 
variable components of the costs of generation, including a predetermined return on 
generation and transmission assets. 
An hourly marginal energy rate designed to recover part of the variable 
components of the cost of Generation and Transmission. 
The network charge is a fixed monthly payment in respect of each point of supply (Main 
Transmission Substations). The time of use charge is based on the expected minimum load 
for every point of supply. The hourly marginal energy rate is applied to consumption in 
excess of the expected minimum load. 
The Transmission Tariff is probably the most sophisticated tariff currently used in the 
industry but it remains to be seen whether it is administratively workable. 
* A number of bi-lateral agreements exist between Eskom and various international 
customers. The objective in the structuring of these agreements is to move progressively 
towards a "power pool" which will operate following the transmission network 
interconnection of a majority of sub-Saharan countries. It is clear that a considerable 
amount of work remains to be done in this area not only in terms of the working's of such· a 
power pool but also in terms of the transmission infrastructure which will need to be 
constructed in order to effect real power flows between the different participants in the 
pool. 
* The pricing policy governing Eskom Distributor sales to end-user consumers and 
non-Eskom re-distributors is. defined as follows: 
1. " Electricity pricing must ensure that national economic resources are allocated 
efficiently, not only amongst different sectors of the economy, but also within the 












customers the cost of supplying their specific needs, so that supply and demand can be 
matched efficiently." 
2. The objective of fairness and equity in electricity pricing must be satisfied by 
allocating costs among customers according to the burdens they impose on the system. The 
allocation of costs must be such that a reasonable degree of price stability and predictability 
is maintained. "Fairness and equity" also means that Eskom's prices must be such that a 
minimum level of service to customers who may not be able to afford the full cost, can be 
provided. 
3. Electricity prices must raise sufficient revenues to meet financial requirements. The 
structure of prices must be simple enough to facilitate metering and billing of customers. 
Finally, other economic and political requirements must be considered. Such requirements 
may include, for example, subsidised electricity supply to electrically under-developed 
areas in order to catalyse growth. " 
* The profitability amongst Eskom's different regional operations varies quite 
significantly. Those regions with large industrial or mining customers are generally more 
profitable than those areas that serve predominantly domestic or rural customers. The . 
profitability in each area depends largely on the cost of purchases on the Transmission 
Tariff, but it is also dependent on the distribution capital costs and operational costs 
allocated to customers served in that area. 
* The highly simplified nature of the large power user two-part tariff, Tariff A, 
renders this tariff a dismal failure when judged against Eskom's stated pricing criteria. 
Tariff E, the two-part tariff for off-peak users, which is at best a tentative step towards time 
differentiated pricing faces, similar criticism. 
* The recently developed time of use tariffs seek to address some of the criticisms 
that are levelled against Tariffs A and E. The time of use tariffs encountered considerable 
opposition from municipal electricity distributors since these tariffs recover a much smaller 
amount of total revenue from the demand charge than it does from the energy charge and 
hence the extra revenue municipal distributors could derive through the benefit of diversity 
was considerably reduced. Some opposition was also encountered from mining customers 












more than they would on Tariff A. However this argument was refuted by Eskom on the 
basis of the fact that the calculation of the demand charge in Tariff A meant that low load 
factor customers were effectively cross-subsidising high load factor customers. 
* Eskom currently offer a range of five small power user tariffs, specifically tailored 
to suit different types of small power users. However, in practice, customers are relatively 
limited in their choice of different tariff options. It is suggested that perhaps a better 
solution would be to develop two or three generic structures and allow customers to choose 
the particular tariff which allows the user to minimise their cost of purchases. Extra 
charges such as connection fees, a transmission surcharge etc. could then be charged on top 
of the basic tariff. 
* Customised pricing plays a significant role in Eskom tariffing with 30 customised 
deals earning more than R360 million and accounting for appr ximately 10% of total 
Eskom sales for 1993. 
* The salient features of the non-Eskom distribution industry are as follows: 
In the non-Eskom distribution industry there are a total of just over 300 
·electricity distributors including separate Black and White Local Authority 
municipal distributors, Regional Services Councils, "Self-governing State's" and 
"National State's" Electricity Departments. White Local Authorities' Electricity 
Departments provide an adequate service to their approximately 2 million 
customers. Within their areas of jurisdiction, these electricity departments have 
achieved close to 100% electrification. However only approximately 1,8 million of 
a total of more than 7 million dwellings in South Africa, have electricity. The 
electrification of these currently unelectrified dwellings is an immediate priority in 
the distribution industry. 
The regulatory structure is best described as a "tangled mess": White Local 
Authority Councils are responsible for the Electricity Departments under their 
jurisdiction. Similarly, Electricity Departments formed under Black Local 
Authorities are answerable to their Black Local Authority Councils. Municipal 















councils and then by their respective Provincial Administrations, although the latter 
are not known to regulate the activities of municipal electricity undertakings 
whatsoever. Regional Services Councils and Joint Services Boards are responsible 
for their own activities as assigned by Provincial Administrators. The electricity 
supply authorities in the "National States" and "Self-governing States" are 
accountable to their respective governments. And finally, an Electricity Control 
Board issues licenses to distributors, "controls" the activities of licensees and can 
control the Local Authority tariffs to customers outside their proclaimed Area of 
Jurisdiction. Eskom's tariffs in terms of structure are ultimately regulated by the 
Electricity Control Board. The level of Eskom tariffs is however within its own 
jurisdiction. 
On account of the relationship between most Local Authority Councils and their 
electricity departments, cross-subsidisation between commercial and industrial 
customers in favour of domestic and farming customers, has been entrenched. This 
is reflected in the average price level to domestic customers, as compared to the 
average price level to industrial and commercial customers . 
The non-Eskom part of the South African distribution industry made a surplus of 
Rl,27 billion in the 1992 Financial Year. Most of this was transferred to the 
municipal Rates Account to subsidise other services. 
This surplus is not evenly distributed throughout the country, but rather is 
concentrated in a few metropolitan areas, notably the PWV. 
6.2 A vision for optimal electricity pricing in South Africa 
The long-term vision for electricity pricing described in this thesis is one which has been at 
the heart of the recent transformations in the Chilean, British, New Zealand, Dutch, 
Norwegian, and Swedish electricity industries and promises to transform the enormous 
American electricity industry in the shortly foreseeable future, i.e. that the relationship 
between price, quantity and quality should be determined by a fair, competitive market. As 












"In the market system that flourishes when politics and economics are kept apart, decisions 
about the allocation of resources are highly decentralised. Instead of an explicit organising 
intelligence, there is spontaneous and unwitting co-ordination - the invisible hand. Instead 
of planned co-operation, there is competition. This competition extends far beyond the 
static rivalry of elementary economic theory - i.e. far beyond competition among existing 
producers and their products. It also encompasses competition among new, would-be 
producers, ideas for products yet to be invented, alternative means of production and 
different modes of industrial organisation." 18 
Theoretical arguments for or against competition in the operation of economies have 
occupied some of the finest minds since the beginning of the industrial age and no attempt 
is being made here to add to this debate. The fact that the jury on this debate still sits is 
perhaps evidence of the fact that a verdict for or against competition as the ultimate means 
of allocating resources, has yet to be been delivered. In view of this, the argument here in 
favour of competition as the basis to electricity pricing amounts to a faith and is thus not 
argued further. 
It should be noted that the argument here is in favour of fair competition. If the South 
African electricity industry were to be restructured to achieve competition in the shortly 
foreseeable future, millions of currently unelectrified homes would remain unelectrified 
because the electrification of most domestic dwellings in South Africa is only financially 
viable in the very long term and would thus not deliver the required rate of return to 
motivate competing organisations to invest in such electrification projects. Before fair 
competition in the distribution industry can be established, it will be necessary that the 
unelectrified market is considerably developed in order to attempt to rectify the current 
imbalance in the allocation of resources. Furthermore, until the many existing customers 
who at present are unable to pay the full cost of supply, are able to pay a price in excess of 
this cost, an effective competitive industry will simply not exist. With the existing wealth 
distribution, it is clear that a competitive industry created now would only be effective in 
serving the needs of the developed market. This is recognised at the National 
Electrification Forum which has rejected competition in the industry at present. It is 
accepted that for the present, a doctrinaire adherence to the principles of competition, will 
not achieve the far-reaching structural transformation which is necessary before fair 












competition can be created. For this reason, a phased progression directed towards an 
increasing degree of competition, is envisioned. This process is explained in more detail 
below. 
6.3 A three-phase development 
In light of the long-term vision for pricing as described above, the challenge is to develop a 
pricing strategy which will allow the relationship between price, quantity and quality to be 
determined in a fair market. In the short-term however, the electricity industry is faced with 
an enormous challenge to overcome the problem posed by the need to electrify 
approximately 4.2 million consumers, most of whom are not in a position. to able to afford 
the full cost of their supply. 
With the long term vision of competitive pricing, and the short term reality of the need for 
pricing to facilitate massive electrification, the envisioned pricing strategy is to develop 
pricing in ·the industry in three distinct phases during which transformations in pricing 
practice would coincide with transformations in industry structure. During the first phase, 
the industry would be centralised. There would be one national distributor. It should be 
noted that it is not material whether this national distributor is unified with generation and 
transmission into a single industry, a la EdF, or whether it stands separate from the 
generation and transmission industry. During the second phase the industry would be 
gradually decentralised through the creation of a number of autonomous regional electricity 
distributors and perhaps a number of different electricity generating companies. In the final 
phase the industry would be open to full competition with a power pool between the 
generation and distribution sides of the industry and any number of competitive 
distributors. These distributors would compete in a fair market to sell electricity to the 
various different end-customers. The three phase process is expanded upon further: 
Phase 1: Centralisation and vertical integration 












The currently fragmented industry should be rationalised under one single organisation. 
Existing distributors would initially be incorporated into the industry on an agency basis 
with a franchise over all customers in their existing area of supply. Municipal distributors, 
Eskom Distributors and other such organisations would therefore continue their 
distribution operations as agents acting for a centrally located Principal (the National 
Council). 
A National Regulator would be appointed by the Government and its powers, duties and 
functions will be legislated. The National Regulator will be an autonomous, independent,. 
expert body and as such would present recommendations to a National Council 
representative of the key stakeholders in the industry. The National Council will represent 
the interests of the customer, the industry and the State. 
After the industry has stabilised in this first stage, the initial principal/agent relationship 
between the National Council and the existing distributors could perhaps reform to one in 
which the industry becomes more fully integrated by establishing a direct relationship 
between the erstwhile agents and the National Council. It is argued that the centralisation 
of the industry would allow the current electricity pricing related problems to be addressed. 
More importantly however, the immense electrification task, which has to be the industry's 
most important task at present, would most effectively be addressed in a centralised and 
homogeneous industry. It is only until the industry has been extensively electrified that 
control of the industry should be decentralised. 
Phase 1: Pricing policy in the transmission and generation industry 
1. In the first phase, the current structure of centrally controlled generation in 
Eskom should not be altered. Furthermore, the operation of the centrally controlled 
high-voltage transmission network would remain unchanged. The progressively 
developing Generation Tariff and Transmission Tariff should continue to operate. 
Current non-Eskom power stations should be integrated into the national network, 
though it is expected that most will be decommissioned on account of their 
relatively uneconomic operation. 












Transmission Group, should remain inside the Transmission function of the new 
industry. The National Regulator will deliver an expert opinion to the National 
Council on the effectiveness of these agreements. The National Council will then 
have the right to accept or reject such agreements. 
Phase 1: Pricing Policy in the Distribution Industry: 
Through the establishment of the agency/principal relationship between the National 
Council and the existing distributors, it will be possible to change the control structure of 
the industry over-night without disrupting the physical operation of the industry. From the 
perspective of control over tariffmg in the industry, the agency/principal relationship 
instantaneously remedies the current regulatory tangle by placing all existing distributors 
under one common principal. At the same time however, existing distributors would still 
maintain a degree of autonomy through the agent/principal relationship. At the beginning, 
the agents should be instructed to maintain their existing tariffs until such time as the 
National Regulator is able to detail a plan to transform tariffing in the industry. 
Tariffmg during the first period will be focuse4i on remedying many of the current 
deficiencies in pricing in the industry. As such the following is proposed: 
1. A single national pricing policy will apply to the whole distribution industry. 
2. The existing plethora of different tariffs should be rationalised into a set of 
generic tariff structures for different types of customers, to be applied nationally. 
3. The magnitude of the different elements of cost in supplying different 
customers must be accurately established so that a rational basis is used for tariff 
differentiation amongst different customers. 
4. The principles of accounting used to determine the revenue requirement and 
hence tariff level, must be common throughout the industry. 
5. Economic marginal costs must be used in the determination of tariff structure. 












This has wide implications: Firstly, the profitability of distribution must be clearly 
established and widely publicised. Secondly the allocation of distributable profits, if 
any, must be widely publicised. Thirdly, the determination of strictly cost-based 
tariffs by the National Regulator must be a transparent process. These tariffs must 
then be submitted to the National Council for ratification. The National Council, 
representing the interests of the State, customers and industry, will understandably 
resolve in favour of social subsidies to sub-economic customers, and possibly 
surcharges to others. With the imbalanced wealth distribution in South Africa, such 
deviations from the cost of supply are understandable. However, most importantly, 
such deviations should be transparently calculated and widely publicised . 
• 
7. The size of a customer should be directly proportional to the degree of tariff 
choice which that customer is offered. It should be the joint responsibility of the 
National Regulator and the industry to develop a set of tariffs which allow 
customers to choose the tariff which best suits them . 
• 
8. Non-tariff agreements should continue to play a major role in the industry, 
particularly for very large and nationally significant customers. Such agreements 
should be open to public inspection . 
• 
9. Distribution tariffs should carry a national, regional and local tax. The local 
tax would be levied to possibly re-imburse the local authority councils for the 
revenue they would have lost after losing control over their lucrative electricity 
distribution undertakings. The dynamics of this tax to the industry should however 
be debated between all the interest groups. The national and regional taxes could be 
used to contribute to a national electrification fund . 
• 
Phase 2: Regionalisation 
Phase 2: Industry Structure 
After having centralised the industry under a single organisation and in so doing having 
facilitated the electrification of the industry, it is possible to begin decentralising and 












the industry is primarily an interim step between the centralised industry and the 
competitive industry. On the generation and transmission side of the industry, it is 
envisioned that these operations remain in one single organisation. However, the creation 
of some sort of generation power pool in which conceptually autonomous generating 
' companies compete to sell to a power pool should be developed, as a precursor to the 
actual working of a similar structure in the final phase. 
On the distribution side of the industry, a number of regional electricity distributors, 
corresponding perhaps to the geographic regions, should be created. These regional 
distributors will have a franchise over all customers in their particular area. Day-to-day 
management will take place through a management board, but political responsibility will 
rest with a number of Regional Councils, representative of customers, regional government 
and the regional industry, in the same way as such responsibility rested with a National 
Council during the first phase. The Regional Distributors will bid to purchase electricity 
from a power pool managed by a national transmitter. As in the case of the UK power pool, 
the regional distributors should be able to enter into direct contracts with generating 
companies. The National Regufator established in the first phase, will continue to play a 
role as an independent expert body. It will advise a National Council now made up of 
representatives from the Regional Distributors, national government and the Generation 
and Transmission industry. The National Council will be the level of ultimate political 
responsibility for the industry and will have the right to accept or reject resolutions passed 
at the Regio_D:al Council level, as well as govern the generation and transmission industry. 
Phase 2: Pricing in Generation and Transmission 
The principle focus of pricing in this sector of the industry, during this phase, will be on 
establishing a power pool to effect competition in the generation industry. The section in 
Chapter 5 on the restructuring of the UK ESI, briefly dwelt on the subject of the possible 
organisation of the existing distribution industry into competitive generating companies. 
Obviously this subject will have to be extensively debated between Generation, 
Transmission, the National Regulator and other interest groups before a workable solution 
will be found. During this phase however, all competing generation companies will remain 
part of a single organisation and they should not be totally separated until the final stage. A 
key criterion in the structuring of the competing generation companies, is that no single 












recall the experience of the restructuring of the UK industry, it is vital that competing 
companies are not in a position to collude in anti-competitive behaviour. 
Phase 2: Pricing in Distribution 
As explained, during this phase the regional distributors will have a franchise over all 
customers inside their area of supply. There will be three challenges to pricing in this 
sector of the industry: The first is the pool pricing mechanism between the distribution and 
generation-transmission side of the industry, the second is pricing between the distributors 
and their end-customers, and the third is price regulation by the National Regulator to 
ensure that the REDs do not exploit their monopoly status. 
With regard to the first challenge, it is envisioned that the regional distributors will bid to 
purchase electricity from the pool or via the pool, directly from the generation companies. 
The power pool currently used in the UK would seem to provide a workable example of 
how this should be done. 
In terms of pricing between the distributors and their end-customers, the costing systems 
developed during the first phase of the industry would form the basis of the tariffs applied 
by the distributors. However, the national tariffs applied during the first phase will be 
replaced by tariffs developed by the distributors. The development of these tariffs will be in 
the context of the franchise which the distributors have, over the customers in their own 
area of jurisdiction. The urge to abuse their monopoly will be tempered by the threat that in 
the third and final phase of development, the distributors will no longer have a franchise 
and hence in order to maintain or further their market base, they will be forced to develop 
tariffs suitable to their customers. The tariff principles described in the first phase i.e. 
economic costing, transparency, choice will play an important role in this phase. However, 
distributors will have discretion over the extent to which their pricing policies reflect these 
objectives. Ultimately, towards the end of this phase, pricing policies will be driven more 
by the threat of competition in the final phase than by "an explicit organising intelligence". 
The third challenge in pricing in distribution during this period relates to the price 
regulation, by the National Regulator, of the prices charged by the regional distributors to 
their customers. As long as the regional distributors have a franchise over their customers, 












be to provide an incentive for distributors to minimise their costs so as to make a profit. 
This can be achieved by regulating the maximum prices to be charged by distributors. 
These maximum prices may be linked to the annual change in indices, such as the retail 
price index, to determine the allowable price increases from one year to the next. This 
methodology of indexed-linked price regulation is widely practised internationally. 
The challenge in distributor price regulation will be to reconcile the disparities in wealth 
distribution, with the need to create an equitably competitive system. It is envisioned that 
the electrification efforts particularly in the first phase, will contribute considerably 
towards lessening the highly uneven wealth distribution that currently characterises the 
distribution industry. However it will take a considerable period of time, if ever, for the 
geographic distribution of wealth in South Africa to reach the degree of homogeneity 
evident in the UK for example. This is obviously an impediment, though not an 
insurmountable one, which the price regulatory system used by the National Regulator will 
have to address. 
Ultimately however, some might argue that the differences in wealth distribution mitigate 
against the creation of a competitive industry since competitive distributors will not supply 
loss-making customers and hence much of the lower socio-economic sector - who are not 
able to pay the full cost of electricity - will not receive a service. This argument is one of 
the principle reasons for the phased progressi n towards a competitive system. During the 
first and second phases, through the electrification and development initiatives, the aim 
will be to reduce the size of this sub-economic sector. It is accepted, however, that by the 
time the industry makes the final transition to a truly competitive structure, a reasonably 
sizeable sub-economic sector may still exist. But, this need not be an insurmountable 
constraint. One possible solution to the problem is for the State to reimburse competitive 
distributors for the difference between the cost of supply (plus a reasonable return on 
assets) and the revenue recovered, in respect of electricity sales to sub-economic 
customers. The income for this State subsidy could be generated through a c/kWh levy on 
all electricity sales, for example. 
Phase 3: Competition 












A state of fair competition in generation and distribution characterises the third and final 
phase. By this stage the experimental power pool and competitive structures developed as 
part of the second phase, will take final shape. The role of government, where previously it 
played a guiding hand in the allocation of resources, relinquishes this to the market. The 
only role of government thus becomes to ensure that the market remains equitably 
competitive and to ensure that, if applicable, the competitive industry is provided with 
incentives to undertake electrification projects which may otherwise not be financially 
viable. The National Regulator then plays the role of ensuring that the rules of the 
competitive industry are adhered to by the various competitors. Contraventions of the rules 
will allow the regulator, with government approval, to revoke the licence of the offending 
competitor. 
Phase 3: Pricing in Generation and Transmission 
In a truly competitive industry, there is no need for a regulated pricing policy. Competitive 
suppliers will frame their pricing policy in terms of their specific competitive strategies 
relating to price, quantity and quality. In theory such competition should always be free and 
fair with the most competitive supplier winning the best advantage both for itself and its 
customers. In practice, competing suppliers may collude in an attempt to manipulate the 
market through anti-competitive strategies in order to achieve an unfair competitive 
advantage. A current example of this is the allegation of duopolistic collusion between 
National Power and PowerGen in the UK. 
In the triangular relationship between customers, suppliers and the State, the role of the 
State is thus to ensure that the market remains fair. The responsibility for this should rest 
with the National Regulator. In order to achieve this, the Regulator will have a thorough 
grip on the costs of supply in order to ascertain if there are any unreasonable deviations 
between the costs of supply and the prices charged. Whereas the Regulator's role 
particularly during the first phase and to a lesser extent during the second phase was 
primarily proactive, in the competitive phase it becomes reactive to the pricing 












Hence, while pricing-related decisions in the supply industry during the competitive phase 
will be decentralised and largely left to the market, there will still be a strong regulatory 
framework to ensure that competition in the supply market remains fair. 
Phase 3: Pricing in distribution 
Although the essence of the third phase is that competition should be the principle 
determinant of the price of electricity, there is a fundamental difference in the operation of 
this competition between the supply industry and the distribution industry. In the supply 
industry there are a number of existing and possible future power stations which may be 
grouped in a number of different ways to form a number of different supply companies. 
New power stations will be built on condition that the present value of future earnings 
exceeds the present value of the investment. In the distribution industry there is an existing 
network of wires, switch gear, transformers and cables which are used to distribute 
electricity from a central network to the end-user. It would be a gross mis-allocation of 
resources if every prospective distributor were to build their own distribution network in 
order to supply the same customers. Instead, prospective distributors compete to provide a 
distribution service to customers, using the existing distribution network. 
This service entails firstly, the purchase of electricity from a central pool and secondly the 
sale of this electricity, via established distribution networks, to a number of customers. The 
extent to which a particular distributor is able to meet different customers' specific service 
requirements will determine the success of that distributor. As such, distributors do not 
have a franchise over the distribution of electricity in any specific area but rather compete 
with other distributors for the business of existing or new customers. 
In this situation, ownership of the distribution networks is not material: the only condition 
is that distributors who use the distribution networks, pay the owner/s of these networks an 
amount to cover the costs incurred by usage of the network plus, say, a reasonable return 
on assets. In the competitive UK structure, in forming the Regional Electricity Companies 
(RECs), the former Regional Area Boards took ownership of the distribution networks 
inside their area of jurisdiction. To ensure that the RECs do not overcharge competing 
distributors for the use of their networks, the regulator determines the costs which the 












the distribution network could, however, just as easily rest with a public corporation which 
would then charge competing distributors for the use of the network. 
With carefully controlled costing and pricing of the use of the distribution infrastructure, 
the competition created in the distribution industry will maximise the operational 
efficiency of competing distributors and in so doing will result in a distribution service to 












CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
This thesis has attempted to analyse pricing theory, discuss the development of pricing in 
the South African electricity industry, describe and interpret pricing in the United 
Kingdom, France and Zimbabwe, and finally present some ideas on a pricing strategy for a 
future South African electricity industry. This conclusion attempts to fit the disparate parts 
into a unified whole. Following on from this, some ideas are presented on the possible 
direction of further pricing-related investigation. 
The first chapter of the body of the thesis attempted to build a theoretical framework for 
electricity pricing. In researching the subject of electricity pricing and costing it was found 
that most of the literature dealt with the subject either from a highly theoretical perspective 
or from a highly practical, or intuitive, perspective with a clear divide between the two. 
The theoretical framework presented in the second chapter attempts to bridge this gap so 
that the link between the intuitive perspectives of pricing and the theoretical basis of 
pricing may be established. As such, the different pricing theories have only been reviewed 
as far as they fulfil this objective. Hence it should be noted that the theoretical treatment of 
electricity cost and pricing in this chapter does not purport to be a rigorous or exhaustive 
treatment of the subject. 
The chapter began by creating a paradigm which described a tariff as a mechanism which 
arbitrates between the interests of the customer, the supplier and the state. In practice 
however, the rate structure arises more as a consequence of the relationship between the 
different players, than as a medium through which the relationship between these players is 
determined. As such, electricity pricing is, by nature, reactive. It is reactive to socio-
political priorities and economic policies and hence to industry governance and, to a lesser 
extent, industry ownership. It is in this context that the theoretical discussions on a 
framework for electricity pricing should be viewed. The discussions attempted to get to the 
fundamental theoretical basis of various costing and pricing theories and from there to 
consider the application of these principles to real tariffs. However, whether a utility 
· implements tariffs based on marginal costs, embedded costs, Ramsey's rules or according 
to the principles of competitive pricing or priority service pricing is, as discussed, largely 
independent of the theoretical merits of the specific approach but rather is dependent on a 












The third chapter on the development of the electricity supply industry in South Africa, 
. described the history of the industry in two periods: from 1882 to 1948 and from 1948 to 
1987. The section provides a background to the industry as it exists today. Tracing the 
history of the industry, one sees the transformation from private ownership to public 
ownership, the gradual centralisation of the generation and transmission industry and the 
progressive decentralisation of the distribution industry. Furthermore, the provincial 
ordinances dating back to the start of the century, the various Electricity Acts and the 
establishment of the Bantu Administration Boards and Black Local Authorities were 
discussed with a view to explaining the regulatory tangle which characterises the 
governance of electricity pricing in South Africa at present. 
Using the back-ground developed in the previous chapter, the chapter on past and present 
electricity pricing in the South African electricity supply and distribution industry, seeks to 
describe pricing at the various levels of the supply and fragmented distribution industry. 
The nature of past pricing practices is examined, and as far as possible, reasons for changes 
in the method of costing and pricing in the industry, have been discussed. From here the 
chapter discussed electricity pricing practices in Eskom at present. As explained, internal 
pricing between Eskom's three line functions, Generation, Transmission and Distribution, 
has developed considerably over the past few years. In particular, the Generation and 
Transmission Tariffs to price for electricity sold between the Generation business and 
Transmission business and between Transmission and Distribution respectively, are now 
certainly the most complex and possibly the most cost-reflective tariffs in the industry. 
These internal transfer pricing mechanisms will continue to be relevant in view of the 
impending restructuring of the SA electricity distribution industry since, regardless of the 
industry structure chosen, to determine cost-reflective tariffs at the end-user level it will be 
necessary to develop cost-reflective transfer pricing mechanisms from Generation through 
Transmission and Distribution and finally to the end-user. 
In terms of the tariffs which Eskom charges for sales to its end-user customers, there has 
been a particularly interesting progressive development. Changes in the pricing practices at 
this level of the organisation have largely been driven by changes in the industry's 
accounting policy, the extent of geographical tariff equalisation, the extent of direct 
government control, and the industry's attitude to its customers. At present, Eskom's 












tariffs. An example of this is the recent development of time of use tariffs and the 
considerable growth of customised tariff agreements. 
The emphasis on economic pricing in Eskom is, however, not generally evident in the non-
Eskom distribution industry. In particular, the non-Eskom industry (excluding the 
electricity distributors in the "self-governing" and "National States") is controlled at local 
government level. This has meant that the municipal electricity distributors have generally 
come to be used as a source of revenue for their controlling local authority councils. 
Furthermore, most municipal electricity distributors extensively cross-subsidise from their 
industrial and commercial customers in favour of their domestic customers. 
The fragmentation of the distribution industry has lead to a situation where, in most cases, 
there is no logical reason for differences in end-user tariffs offered by different distributors 
to their customers. Furthermore, the fragmentation and localised control of the distribution 
industry has severely hampered the development of tariffs. Evidence of this is clear in the 
myopic attitude to electricity pricing, adopted by most local authority distributors. A recent 
example of this attitude, as explained earlier, is the initial opposition of the Association of 
Municipal Electricity Distributors to the implementation of Eskom's progressive time of 
use tariff options. 
Having analysed electricity pricing in South Africa, the following chapter on international 
studies in electricity pricing set an international background for pricing in South Africa. 
The first section concentrated on the recent restructure of the UK industry from a 
monopolist state industry to one in which there was extensive private ownership, 
competition in generation and limited but increasing competition in distribution. In 
analysing the restructuring of this industry, it is important to note that it was primarily the 
consequence of a political dispensation headed by arch free-marketeer, Prime Minister 
Thatcher. The competitive structures that developed were at the time, without comparison 
world-wide. However, they have since been applied in New Zealand and Sweden and are 
gaining increasing credibility in the electricity industry in the United States. 
A popular misconception about the restructuring of the UK ESI is that it was primarily an 
initiative by the government to privatise the electricity industry. Rather, the prime objective 
of the restructuring of the industry was to create competition. Privatisation was seen as a 












means of aiding the creation of a competitive industry. It should also be noted that the 
British Government still owns 40% of the equity in the two major generating companies, as 
well as 100% of the equity in the nuclear generation company. Various ideas on the 
possible application of aspects of a UK-type restructure to the South African industry were 
also investigated. Perhaps the central conclusion to this is that while there are aspects of the 
restructured UK industry that are of immediate relevance to the S.A electricity industry, it 
is impossible to consider a competitive industry in South Africa while approximately 70% 
of the population of South Africa does not have access to electricity, and in a competitive 
regime, will remain neglected unless there is considerable state financial assistance. 
However, ~is does not discount the relevance of the restructure of the UK industry to this 
thesis since, as discussed in the penultimate chapter, in the envisioned final phase of the 
development of the industry, it is proposed that the SA electricity supply and distribution 
industry should largely emulate the structure of the current industry. 
Perhaps of more immediate relevance to pricing in South Africa, is the current electricity 
pricing industry in the French electricity industry. There are amazing parallels between 
pricing in France prior to the nationalisation of the industry in 1946, and pricing in SA at 
present. In France at that time, as in SA at present, there was a multiplicity of independent 
distributors operating in a fragmented and decentralised industry. The nationalisation of the 
industry centralised electricity pricing and allowed the progressive development of pricing 
in a stable and vertically integrated industry. Pricing in France is the antithesis of pricing in 
the restructured UK ESI in the sense that the entire pricing function is centrally planned 
with the relationship between price, quantity and quality determined analytically. The many 
advantages that the centralisation of the electricity industry in France had brought to that 
industry, is one of the principle reasons that the objective of the envisioned first phase of 
the restructuring of the electricity industry in South Africa, is to centralise control. 
After the analysis of the successful French industry, the thesis explored pricing in 
Zimbabwe, where the industry has failed to meet the demands imposed on it. It was 
explained that one of the main reasons why the industry failed was because the pricing 
policy adopted as far back as the 1960's, failed to provide for the industry's future growth. 
Furthermore, despite the hardship suffered by the industry during the UDI period, in the 
post-independence period, the industry was brought under progressively more direct 
government control so that by the time the industry was nationalised in 1985, there was 












during this phase since the government was loathe to increase the price of electricity in 
view of the effect this might have on the industry's customers and on its social 
development program. However, by the late 1980s the industry began to collapse under the 
stress of its enormous interest burden. This paralysed the industry and the resulting major 
power outages forced a rethink of the pricing policy in the industry. Recently there have 
been some significant price increases in an attempt to restore the industry to a financially 
sound state. Perhaps the most relevant lesson from ZESA's experience is that while the 
industry was forced to support the social and economic development of Zimbabwe through 
artificially low prices, the policy back-fired and the subsequent failure of the industry has 
placed severe stress on the Zimbabwean economy. 
The four chapters concluded t.4us far, formed the bulk of the research underlying the 
development of some ideas for a pricing strategy for the industry. In moving from the 
analysis of the past and present of pricing to a possible future, the thesis was introduced 
that in the long term electricity pricing will be optimal when the forces of fair competition 
determine the relationship between price, quantity and quality. The view is taken that belief 
in this thesis amounts to a faith and hence no attempt has been made to prove this thesis. 
With the underlying faith in mind, and in view. of the immense practical challenges that 
face the electricity industry in South Africa, the idea of a three phase industry and tariff 
development process was developed. The first phase of the development is to centralise the 
industry and determine tariffs at a national level. It is argued that this will achieve the 
objective of developing logical, transparent and accountable tariffs as well as facilitating 
the elimination of the structural imbalance in the distribution industry, through a centrally 
co-ordinated electrification program. After having achieved the objectives of the first 
phase, the second phase will begin. In the second phase, the distribution industry is 
regionalised. The generation industry is also restructured in order to create competition 
between autonomous generating companies. The purpose of the second phase is really to 
prepare the industry for the third and final phase when pricing is totally decentralised in a 
competitive market. In the final phase, the industry achieves the goal of decentralised 
pricing in a competitive industry, through the operation of various competitive structures. 
However, to reiterate a point introduced in the beginning of this chapter, electricity pricing 
is by nature, reactive. Obtaining the correct rate structure is dependent on a correctly 












electricity industry structures, the problem has been approached from the opposite end, i.e. 
determine the correct pricing mechanisms and follow this back to determine the correct 
industry structure. This means that while the industry structures developed in terms of the 
envisioned pricing development are intended to be optimal from a pricing perspective, all 
the social, political and economic forces that normally determine the structure of the 
industry have largely been ignored. In practice the political, economic and social forces 
which have determined the past and present structure of the South African electricity 
industry have clearly done so in a manner which, from a pricing perspective, has been sub-
optimal. As much as the author would like to believe to the contrary, there is no reason to 
believe that electricity pricing policy in South Africa has now been elevated to the status of 
a crucial determinant of electricity industry structure and there is no reason that this should 
be the case in future. 
With this in mind, perhaps a better way to approach the problem of electricity pricing in 
South Africa, would be to surmise on various possible industry structures and then to 
develop ideas on optimal pricing in each possible structure. However this too would be 
unsatisfactory since industry structure is not the sole determinant of pricing policy: Within 
each possible industry structure, issues such as customer relations, technological capacity; 
the availability of suitably qualified personnel; amongst others, will also have a 
considerable impact on the nature of pricing. Furthermore, this dissertation has been 
written at a time when the South African electricity industry teeters on the verge of a 
possible major restructure. It is however, highly uncertain exactly what industry structure 
will transpire and furthermore exactly what affect, if any, national political changes will 
have on the governance of the industry. With such a high degree of uncertainty in the basic 
determinants of a future pricing policy, attempting to develop ideas on a future policy 
which will make the most of one of many possible outcomes, can become a highly 
frustrating endeavour. 
· Finally, the envisioned three-phase development process only deals with pricing at a very 
high level. It is clear that an extensive amount of work needs to be done to quantify the 
pricing mechanisms during each phase. Another area deserving considerable further 
research is the role of the National Regulator in setting, adjudicating and enforcing 
particular pricing policies. The South African electricity industry has never had an effective 












independent regulator will have an immensely important role to play in the determination 
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